


Sine plus cura



Do you enjoy maths? I hope you do. After all, I am asking you to solve this mathematical problem before reading any further. Quite literally, you *need* what is described by the solution.

Sine + Cura = _____?

Do not despair, you will find the answer easily when browsing through this publication. The right side of the equation is not only the essence of these pages, but it is also hidden in public transport, where a sticker saying ‘Sicherheit ist zum Greifen nah’¹ entertains the passenger; in literature, where George Eliot’s *Middlemarch* employs the lexical field of security tirelessly and in music, where musician Faber sings ‘Sicherheit / schießt dir in den Kopf mit deiner Kleinlichkeit’.² History and Philosophy offer an equally rich treasury of security as public transport or George Eliot. In your encounter with the need for security, you will become acquainted with a human being who wants to become security in ‘Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas’.

[1] Cf. ‘Berlin: Aktion „Sicherheit zum Greifen nah“’, *Nachverkehrspraxis*, 2014, <http://www.nachverkehrspraxis.de/news/nachverkehrspraxis-news/article/berlin-aktion-sicherheit-zum-greifen-nah/>. ‘Security is within your reach (my translation).’

[2] Faber, *Generation YouPorn* (IRRSINN Tonträger, 2019), <https://genius.com/Faber-generation-youporn-lyrics>. ‘Sicherheit’ is the German for security.



Were the text’s protagonist to read the next article, ‘Securitas, securitatis et omnia securitatis’, she would be shocked: it describes the Baroque, a state of utter insecurity. The pendulum of security in ‘Of a philosophical pendulum’ then swings back and examines two Enlightenment writers to seek refuge from insecure times. That insecurity can nevertheless be desirable is demonstrated in ‘Dada is(s)t Sicherheit’. To complete the ensemble, ‘From good girl to secure girl’ recounts the tale of how being good simultaneously means being secure. Your journey will not end there: in addition to a conversation on contemporary security, fifteen people will show you their own security.

Alas, I have now revealed the solution to our mathematical problem. Despite what you may think, a simple equation can offer an intriguing and multifaceted result.

Sina Buchholz

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Sine plus Cura

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fit
quomodo

homo
sapiens
securitas

A day in the life of a human being who wants to become *securitas*. In doing so, she loses her humanity. An essay.

Fiducia, *fiducia*, *f* is the Latin word for trust, which is, in itself, bestowed with the gift—or curse—of having connotations and associations ranging from positive to negative, both in their respective extremes. Some associate the term with blindness and dependency, others associate it with letting go, connection and finally, security. Nevertheless, we all change our perception of the term according to our life circumstances. Language, after all, is shaped by experience and perception. *Fiducia* is not as widely discussed as the topic of this magazine, as omnipresent and surely is not as controversial. Still, it shares the gene of ambiguity in meaning with the term security, and this is not just due to the fact that they are descendants from the same ancient language.

Securitas, too, possesses the gift or curse of encompassing a wide spectrum of meanings, most of which are coloured by our mutual perception and circumstances. We could even go as far as saying the two terms are intertwined in their meanings: they have similar semantic fields as well as ambiguous connotations. Replace *fiducia* with *securitas* in the very first three lines; you will most likely detect that this attempt is successful without forfeiting logic or meaning. What makes their differences, then? Besides having its own article in a dusty Latin dictionary, its derivatives in modern languages and its fixed place in

relationship guides, what else is *fiducia*? In our story, she plays another role. *Fiducia* is a human being. She is ageless, although her *quotidien* will most likely, maybe unfortunately so, remind you of your own everyday life. That is, if you are an adult. *Fiducia* does not live in a specific place, but her way of living will ring a bell. This is assuming you live in the Western hemisphere and are not living below the poverty line. Her physical shell and her mind with all its possibilities is a canvas so that both can assume an entirely novel meaning: she aims to be the personification of *securitas*.¹ She *trusts* in *securitas* and has made it her purpose to adapt and display its features, whatever that may involve. She has not (yet) assumed the name of *Securitas*, not because it costs almost a fortune to change one's birth name, but rather because *securitas* is more an ideal than an actual state of being.

Mornings. *Per definitionem* they represent the beginning of our waking hours. As well as *fiducia* and *securitas*, they too are associated with characteristics best filed under the category of ambivalence.

[1] Cf. Frédéric Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, trans. Ulrich Kunzmann (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015), 8; 13; 53f. *Securitas* means the ancient meaning of security, which was understood as a state of inner tranquility. This meaning was most prevalent in the time period of approximately 300 BC to 200–400 AD.

Morning people define themselves by their love for the early hours, and night people declare decidedly their distaste for the very same time period. To each their own—like the rest of us, *Fiducia* also has a preference. A storm is raging through the lands. It is an early morning, yet *Fiducia* wakes in a tranquil state, as usual. She also has her bad days but they are dispersed generously throughout the year. If she were to have a bad day, it would follow a pattern of this kind: while still remaining tranquil, this very tranquility is no longer an admirable one. Her usually self-disciplined nature² is warped: it is now lazy and refuses to acknowledge the necessity of the day's work as it claims that whatever tasks she has completed the day before are entirely satisfactory.³

Her usually self-disciplined nature would remark on the inaccuracy and ignorance of that notion and furthermore, of the state it has

[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, 13–16. *Securitas* is often mentioned in the works of the Stoic philosopher Seneca. 'Her self-disciplined nature' refers to the fact that Stoicism concerned itself with self-discipline and control.

[3] Cf. Quint. Inst. 2,2,7; Cf. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and trans. D.A. Russell, vol. 124, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 270f., <http://bit.ly/2BJT4Ak>. Referenced in Andrea Schrimm-Heins, 'Gewissheit und Sicherheit: Geschichte und Bedeutungswandel der Begriffe certitudo und securitas' (Universität Bayreuth, 1990), 17. As an example for the negative connotation of *securitas*, Quintilian denotes that *securitas* in students manifests itself as 'complacent self-satisfaction'.

been—apparently—randomly transformed into. On the said bad days though, her nature has been contaminated and repopulated by these convictions. And it is blind.

Nevertheless, we cannot neglect the fact that today is a good day. Fiducia is fully conscious from the moment her eyelids open and shortly afterwards, she decides to place herself on her bedroom floor to conduct her morning routine, it leveling unfailingly the path to *securitas*, yet which she only does on her good days, where she is not plagued by 'complacency'.⁴ *Securitas*, little does she know, is simply an ideal—but it gifts her with direction and a focus. The routine is based on advice from her aunt *Ata*, who in our short account personifies the concept of *ataraxia*, which translates as imperturbability.⁵ Family and heritage are both meaningful in *Fiducia's* life—how else could one stand as tall and firm as a tree if one did not have roots?⁶

Despite nearly retreating to her inviting bed, her being utterly tired, *Fiducia* commences by making an assessment.

[4] Quint. Inst. 2,2,7; Quintilianus, *The Orator's Education*, 124:271.

[5] Richard H. Popkin, 'Skepticism', *Britannica Academic*, 22 August 2014, <http://bit.ly/2MswX6v>.

[6] Cf. Schrimm-Heins, 'Gewissheit und Sicherheit', 13. *Ataraxia* is thought to be a predecessor of *securitas*, with marginal differences. See also Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 14f. Gros, by contrast, sets the concepts equal, at least in their inherent meaning.

What could block the path leading to *securitas* on this very morning? Is it imagination, desire, the taking of action or even the fear of death?⁷ She decides that today, all four are tarnishing the clarity she is so ardently seeking. Soon she begins her first ritual, which targets imagination. Imagination manifests itself in jealousy, more specifically, *Fiducia* is jealous of her friend's relationship. In order to have some chance of tranquilising the stinging envy, which she is sure she will encounter once her friend gives her an all-too detailed account of their last romantic date, she staunchly decides to reduce the situation to the mere facts in their smallest entity.⁸ Actually, to her at least, this act of reducing is more an act of enlargement. *Fiducia* is giving more weight to facts and making fiction run on a treadmill. That way, it has less meaning to her. She is paving the way for something marginally close to *securitas* concerning the domain of imagination by omitting everything deemed non-factual. The idealisation of her friend's partner with their seemingly celestial characteristics belongs to this category as well

[7] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 16. In Seneca's Stoicism, the four terms denote areas in which practices must be conducted in order to achieve the state of *securitas*.

[8] Cf. *Ibid.*, 21–25. The method of reducing situations to their mere facts and mentally dissecting objects into their minutest components is said by Stoics to lead to *securitas* within the domain of imagination.

as the fact that *Fiducia* generally has the tendency to steer away from Stoic facts. She is indeed very human, just like the rest of us. What used to be her 'spouse goals' is now merely a sack of flesh and an assemblage of eagerly-dividing cells in all shapes and sizes that could excite nobody but the most enthusiastic of biologists. Check, she thinks. She is no longer stung by jealousy and envy. Instead, a mellow, warm blanket has wrapped itself around her. Very comfortable indeed.

A relativised wish a day keeps the doctor away.

That very sack of flesh is also the object of desire of her second ritual. Meant

to tackle all kinds of longings, it makes use of another type of reduction. Again, *Fiducia* is thoroughly convinced that she is securing her path to *securitas* by performing this ritual. She demands herself, in frequent intervals, whether this would actually be her last wish,⁹ this being married to the person concerned. Do I really want to obtain the love and care of this creature? Let alone have this sack of flesh accompany me for the rest of my life, if I could only have one more wish? Viewed from a purely objective point of view, most definitely not. Too insecure seems the dependency that is necessary if one is to love another, the dependency which she is trying so hard to get rid of on the road to *securitas*.

[9] Cf. *Ibid.*, 27. By pretending the experienced wish is the last wish available, any vanity contained in the wish can be uncovered. Consequently, the person is not disturbed by the wish anymore and can thus retain a state of *securitas*.

Too probable an eruptive event that would shatter her path in its entirety, and do so irrevocably. The horror that is provoked just by thinking about this possesses such vigour that she swears to herself yet again that this cannot be a wish she would want to become reality. Check number two—and it is only eight in the morning. A relativised wish a day keeps the doctor away.

Fiducia knows that she must divert her attention from these ponderings immediately. What she has feared is now manifesting itself readily, in her body and mind, which she had always thought of as insurmountable. She guesses she may be wrong. Her limbs begin to tense, her gaze is now a piercing look. Tears would finalise this act of cruelty, as she has christened it.

To become mistress of her own sea again,¹⁰ *Fiducia* reaches for a folder in her bookshelf. It contains the path she has mapped herself and the tools to arrive at her desired destination. She grabs a short text, which is threatening to succumb to gravity's pull. One line in particular attracts her unperturbed attention: 'Utrumque vero alta securitas est.'¹¹

[10] Cf. Sen. Cons. Polyb. 9; Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, 'Ad Polybium de Consolatione', in *Schriften zur Ethik: Die kleinen Dialoge*, ed. Gerhard Fink, Sammlung Tusculum (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 632–35, <http://bit.ly/2LWlj4L>. Seneca uses the sea as a metaphor for life, whilst arguing it is impossible to become master of it.

[11] Sen. Epist. 54,5; Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, trans. Rainer Nickel, Sammlung Tusculum (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 288f, <http://bit.ly/2nqTLEM>.

She searches in her memory for her school Latin: 'On both sides, however, there is deep security (my translation).' On both sides of what? Life,¹² she can gather from the script. It seems somewhat plausible to her. How could she now put her newly obtained knowledge into practice? She could resume her prenatal state. Or fast-forward some larger chunk of time and realise her post-mortem state. Neither seems particularly appealing.

Meanwhile, the storm has passed and *Fiducia* did not even notice it, in spite of her once adamant love of nature and the outdoors, which she has not surrounded herself with in a long time. This allows for sadness and regret to manifest themselves in her heart and thought so that she decides to take it easy for once and manoeuvre herself onto her sofa, when she promptly decides to listen to the radio, a relic of former times to which she is still somehow attached.

Just as she is making herself comfortable, the speaker announces the news: rivers are flooding thousands of villages and cities in multiple areas of the world (who would have thought).

Some politician has been accused of corruption (what is news about this) and protests are going on in countries X, Y and Z. Just the usual, until one short contribution grabs her attention.

[12] Cf. *Ibid.* In order to lessen the fear of death, Seneca argues that one finds *securitas* in a prenatal and more importantly, post-mortem state.

She listens more closely: ‘Long ruling leader of Sudan ousted after month-long mass protests.’¹³ Admittedly, *Fiducia* was not even conscious of the existence of that country, let alone its political history or current state of affairs. Nonetheless, something about this piece of news reminded her of *securitas*. She wholeheartedly wishes the citizens of the Sudan will now enjoy a period of political calm driven by the force of *securitas*, something similar to the Pax Romana.¹⁴

There is a grumbling noise. At first, *Fiducia* is confused, if not concerned as to where the origins of this utterly disturbing sound may lie. After attempting to make out the cause, she suddenly realises that it is nothing else but her stomach. She is just hungry, eager to indulge in some soul food. Never mind the fact it is actually lunch time. Then, *Fiducia* reminds herself that today is one of those days where her quest leads her to take control over even the most elementary part of her life: her physical vessel.¹⁵

[13] Cf. Declan Walsh, ‘The Fall of Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, the “Spider” at the Heart of Sudan’s Web’, *The New York Times*, 11 April 2019, sec. A, <https://nyti.ms/2AOMsjI>.

[14] Cf. Schrimm-Heins, ‘Gewissheit und Sicherheit’, 20.

[15] Cf. Sen. Epist. 18,6; Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, trans. Gerhard Fink and Rainer Nickel, Sammlung Tusculum (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 97–99, <http://bit.ly/2nqTLem>. Seneca advises to conduct ‘experiments of poverty’ in times of *securitas* so that one can attain a state of *securitas* in spite of calamity.

To be exact, she had been slightly sceptical about her own idea. Nevertheless, she thinks, it is all in the name of *securitas*. In this case, ‘it’ is eating just peas for days at a time¹⁶ and then interrupting these austere periods by indulging in what in contrast seems excessive, namely a normal diet. In order to endure the physical symptoms she suffers from due to her methods, she has to recall her reasons for doing so incessantly. ‘In ipsa securitate animus ad difficilia se prae-
paret et contra iniurias fortunae inter beneficia firmetur’¹⁷ is her go-to wake-up call. Nevermind the dizziness.¹⁸

After her nutritious lunch, a certain restlessness takes hold of *Fiducia*. She is pacing around her apartment, not able to determine the cause of her inner agitation.

Then, after minutes of engaging in this rather pointless activity, she can pinpoint the roots: she is doubting her course of action. What if her rituals actually do not have much of an effect?

[16] The pea diet is a reference to Woyzeck’s pea diet, an experiment conducted by a doctor, in Georg Büchner’s eponymous play *Woyzeck*.

[17] Sen. Epist. 18,6; Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, 2014, 97–99. In the quoted words, Seneca summarises the aim of his experiments, which are commented on in note 14.

[18] Cf. Georg Büchner, *Woyzeck*, ed. Burghard Dedner (1879; repr., Leipzig: Reclam, 2005), 24. Woyzeck suffers from physical and psychological symptoms such as dizziness as a result of the doctor’s experiment with his diet.

After all, she is feeling disconnected from nature, profusely tired and hungry, which is definitely not making her feel tranquil. Still frantic, she now searches for her laptop. It is untraceable, although she just recently ‘Marie-Kondoed’ her entire apartment.

After rummaging through cupboard after cupboard, she finally catches sight of it: it had been on her bedside table all along. Silly me, she thinks to herself. Quickly, she demands answers from Google. Most of the links on the results page are purple already, but a couple of new ones have also appeared. An unknown article from an unknown author pops up—her brain, which is hungry for *securitas*, is sceptical. Desperate times call for desperate measures; therefore, she decides to let the text present its solution to her.

Initially, *Fiducia* does not like what she reads. The piece of writing, which has now unfolded itself on her screen, mainly consists of anecdotes and shorter quotes. In that way, it reminds her of Diogenes, the Cynic, and even more so of Pyrrho, the Sceptic.¹⁹ It forces her thoughts and convictions to endure an uncomfortable test; one that may not condemn her previous road but even more definitely so will urge her to question its cohesive tar. Although the fragmentary text does not directly attack her methods, it

[19] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 44. Pyrrhon’s philosophy is preserved in anecdotes.

warns her not to let them become her dogmatic beacon in such perceived times of insecurity.²⁰ Furthermore, she should not neglect other paths to achieving *securitas*. Albeit paradoxical, the latter could also be found in insecurity. This, however, requires another understanding of the path to *securitas*, which differs slightly from *Fiducia*’s. The path referred to requires the finding of an absolute truth as a sufficient condition, by virtue of which *securitas* can be achieved.²¹ Contested, *Fiducia*’s approach does not deviate significantly from the latter, yet there exists an important distinction nevertheless. According

Security could also be found in insecurity.

to the piece she is reading, this finding of truth is only successful insofar that it

uncovers that no absolute truth could be found. This, however, should not lead to some dogmatic nihilism but rather motivate to practise that dogmatic and repudiating claims can and should not be made,²² ‘for each thing is no more this than that’.²³

Consequently, what was previously considered to be insecurity could now be reinterpreted as *securitas*.

[20] Cf. Popkin, ‘Skepticism’.

[21] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 45f.

[22] Cf. *Ibid.*, 49.

[23] DL 9,61; Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, ed. James Miller, trans. Pamela Mensch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 466.

After all, ‘such non-assertion [referring to the ascertaining of truth] then entails tranquillity’.²⁴ For example, one could find security amidst a ravaging storm on a ship, similar to the one that had shaken up *Fiducia*’s neighbourhood just this morning.²⁵ Now, that *did* indeed arise her suspicion.

She ponders on these statements for a while. She concludes that at the very least, she should put this approach to the test. What made her feel insecure, what perturbed her tranquillity? The list of activities and events that popped up in her mind seemed ceaseless. Decidedly, she opts for the following. She will leave her house, *alone*. She will take a walk, *alone*. She will then sit on a bench, in her favourite park, still *alone*. And finally, she will remain there to write; write about her deepest, darkest wishes, her desires. To her, the thought of exposing this vulnerable act of writing to the general public is anxiety-inducing, and tranquillity-reducing, on its own.

[24] Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson, ‘The Pyrrhonian Idea of a Good Life’, in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 200.

[25] Cf. DL 9,68; Cf. Diogenes Laertios, *Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen*, trans. Otto Apelt, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 2008), 182. Cited in Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 44. The storm alludes to the sea storm experienced by the ship and its passengers, which included Pyrrhon and a pig. The latter was said to have remained calm in spite of the ravaging sea. For this reason, Pyrrhon declared it to be the only true philosopher on the ship.

Nonetheless, she readily grabs a piece of paper, a pen and an umbrella. After all, she should expose herself to such situations in order for her to put her knowledge into practice. The city is still being battered with rain, winds and the occasional crack of thunder. Despite all this, *Fiducia* embarks on her little adventure and heads out to the park. She quickly finds a seat underneath an oak’s protective leaves. Wrapped in a raincoat, she begins to write. She reconsiders, reflects and questions, she forms new theses and discards them again. Although the imminent natural phenomenon and her *ancien régime*²⁶ are defiantly attempting to convince her to return to the security of her four walls, they fail to do so.

Taking risks is uncharacteristic of *Fiducia*, and the risks she then takes are hardly definable.²⁷ Similar to her laziness, risky activities are not on her daily wish list. However, when she defies the odds of Stoic recommendations, only one being can put her back on track. This lone being is her aunt *Ata*.

[26] In this context, ‘ancien régime’ alludes to the practices of Stoicism, which *Fiducia* had subjected herself to as a subject in the actual *ancien régime* would have had to subject itself to the convictions and practices of the absolute monarch.

[27] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 44. *Fiducia*’s risks, being elements of Sceptic philosophy, are not easily explicable, as is explained in the quote: ‘Doch es ist nicht ganz so einfach, ihren [der Skeptiker] Beitrag [zur Sicherheitsdiskussion] zu erläutern’. This translates to: ‘however, it is not so easy to elucidate their [the Sceptics] contribution [to philosophical thought on *securitas*] (my translation)?’.



She is always closely tracking *Fiducia's* whereabouts, and *Fiducia* tolerates it, as she is somewhat reliant on her advice.²⁸ They are, after all, family. *Ata* is now briskly heading toward *Fiducia*. Her countenance expresses her determination and conviction. She stops by *Fiducia's* oak and delivers a calm, yet poignant speech. Although she herself remains undisturbed, she uses an unconventional method to force *Fiducia* back on the family path. *Ata* targets her vulnerable spot: the fear of death. She shoots, by saying words along the lines of 'you could have been struck by lightning or frozen to death'. And she strikes by repeating these very sentences. *Fiducia* is now, yet again, searching for *securitas*, for she is fearful she could have died. Or will die, out in the now ravaging winds. It is time for another ritual.

She reminds herself of what she had read in her folder just before lunch, namely 'utrimque vero alta securitas est'. On one side of life lies death, she recalls. Moreover, she knows that 'cotidie morimur'.²⁹ Therefore, death itself—even if brought about by a streak of lightning—cannot be something entirely new. It may even be

[28] Cf. Schrimm-Heins, 'Gewissheit und Sicherheit', 15. In order to confer the Greek term *ataraxia* together with *euthymie* and *apatheia* to the Latin, one most probably used the term *securitas*. Thus, *securitas* is based on the concept of *ataraxia*.

[29] Sen. Epist. 24,20; Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, trans. Gerhard Fink and Rainer Nickel, Sammlung Tusculum (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 142f., <http://bit.ly/2nqTLem>. 'We are dying daily (my translation).'

desirable, too. Fully in the sceptic tradition, she poses herself a question. What if in life, *securitas* is unattainable in full? What if it is a treasure unascertainable on a map, instead of a partial, non-absolute state? Concluding, she thinks that only death can harbour her safely. The voyage of life is simply too tumultuous.³⁰ Even though she knows that she could lower her anchor—and harbour herself—, she does not want to do so yet. Eternal *securitas* seems desirable, but she is aware of the fact that her story has not yet found an end. With that, she has performed her third ritual, which leaves her somewhat calm and assured.

How to navigate her own sea then, of which she cannot really become mistress? How can she prepare for mishaps, calamities and indignities? Even though she has already begun to free herself of envy and desires, the fetters of action are still firmly in control of her. *Fiducia* calls forth a fourth ritual, one she should really have done in the morning.³¹

[30] Cf. Sen. Cons. Polyb. 9; Cf. Seneca, 'Ad Polybium de Consolatione', 632–35. Death (harbour) is proclaimed as the only way to escape the tumultuous voyage of life (sea). Harbours are traditionally associated with calmness, safety and security.

[31] Cf. M. Aur. Med. 2,1; Cf. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, *Selbstbetrachtungen*, trans. Albert Wittstock, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Phillip Reclam jun., 1985), 14. Referenced in Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 27. The routine *Fiducia* is about to conduct is one Marcus Aurelius advised to conduct in the morning.

She compares it to a compass, hitherto an object of which she has not been in possession. Since she is still out and about, and has to return home by public transport, she can readily perform the ritual now to harness its effects immediately. *Fiducia* begins to envision the worst-case scenario for her return home: a cancelled bus, the replacement bus overcrowded. Running into her co-worker, a pretentious maverick; having her wallet stolen and so on and so forth. She will not be surprised if all those events take place. If they fail to do so, this failure will be the foundation for a celebratory act.³² Nothing will shock her anymore, regardless of its unpredictability; everything is embedded in *securitas*. How pleasant!

Upon a safe and undisturbed return from the park, Fiducia settles in at home before she meets up with her group of friends. A mug of tea is accompanied by a brief reading of the newspaper. There is nothing as thought-provoking as what she heard on the radio earlier in the day. She decides to get up to do something; any random activity will suffice so that she decides to water her plants. How profoundly boring. Maybe she should meditate instead, she thinks, perhaps she should remind herself of her goal. But then again, this she has already done throughout her day by completing her rituals one by one.

[32] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 28f.

A repetition of principles and mantras³³ would be too similar to what she has already done during the day,³⁴ so she omits this step. Instead, she passes her time gazing out of the window, onto the buzzing streets. It is possible to spend quite some time engaged in such an activity.

Eventually, she realises she will not make it to her friend's symposium if she does not speed up her analysis of life on the streets. Actually, seeing her friends is part of the routine, but she does not like to consider it that way. Anyway, a new garment tossed on and just a few sprays of perfume later, and she is ready to re-enter the world again. In contrast to her journey home, commuting proves much more stressful and frankly, unenjoyable this time. Only she has not prepared her mind for not being at ease, this time. That is indeed very unfortunate.

After having been stuck in traffic for 30 minutes and surrounded by relentless car-honking, she arrives at her friend's doorstep.

[33] Cf. Ibid., 37–39. According to Epicurean doctrine, the repetition of principles aids to achieve *ataraxia* through a content life, as it is one of the 'four pillars of *ataraxia*'. *Ataraxia* is related to *securitas*.

[34] Cf. Schrimm-Heins, 'Gewissheit und Sicherheit', 15; Cf. Stefanie Arend, *Glückseligkeit: Geschichte einer Faszination der Aufklärung. Von Aristoteles bis Lessing*, vol. 23, Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert. Supplementa (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2019), 52. Seneca was in part influenced by Epicurean thought, especially when it comes to his attitude toward death and the unpredictability of the future.

Let us call her *Ecura*. Just like *Fiducia*, *Ecura* is on the road to *securitas*. They share their ambitious goals as they shared a locker back in grammar school and before that, the same sandpit. Friends, especially from childhood continue help to ground her. Unlike her cousin they come and go but their effect is constant. Tonight, a soirée, not as French as it may sound, is on the programme at *Ecura's* symposium,³⁵ which is routinely hosted at her house. Their whole group of friends has turned up, now either eagerly jogging or indifferently shuffling into her house.

The latter really needs their weekly dose of *Ecura's* convincing speeches; that will surely put them back on track, *Fiducia* thinks. After all, friendship is not only there to have fun or to dry each other's tears. It also serves a much more relevant purpose: to strengthen, to consolidate and to keep from going astray. All in a community, one for all and all for one. *Fiducia* recalls having picked that up at school, when they were discussing Epicurean philosophy.³⁶ With *Ecura* by her side, of course.

[35] Cf. Fiona Hobden, *The Symposion in Ancient Greek Society and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7. A symposium was an ancient Greek 'communal gathering', where '[...] companionship and pleasure [we]re implicitly on the agenda [...]'.

[36] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 34; 39f. Friendship is the second 'pillar' of *ataraxia*, which is a second variation of inner security.

A perfectly adequate amount of food later,³⁷ discussions begin. They talk religion, although whom they believe in so firmly is distant and non-interfering, which mainly serves the purpose of omitting all fear of punishments for sins or other wrong-doings that the Church, in isolation from what the supernatural calls for, rejoices in imposing.³⁸

They practise gratitude to their Gods and Goddesses, not because they have watched one of many million YouTube videos on mindfulness and the importance of gratitude, but because they know that thanks to their Gods and Goddesses, 'Lebenslust' is no longer dependent on an 'unsichere[r] Zufall [...]'.³⁹ Moreover, their conceptions of the supernatural has another conducive effect on their path to *securitas*, or *ataraxia*. Gods and Goddesses being no more than atoms, which are in perpetual motion in the boundless universe,⁴⁰ they are representative of *ataraxia*.

[37] Cf. Arend, *Glückseligkeit*, 23:52. Veracious pleasure consists of moderate and restrained enjoyment.

[38] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 41. In Epicurean thought, Gods and Goddesses are considered to be non-interfering, which is claimed to create security from all Church-called penalties. This represents another of the four pillars of *ataraxia*.

[39] *Ibid.*, 42. 'Pleasure' is no longer dependent on an 'insecure coincidence (my translation)'.

[40] Cf. Tim Whitmarsh, *Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 173.

After all, they perfectly illustrate the tranquil state which all deceased persons will experience post-mortem, too.⁴¹

To conclude the eve in community, *Fiducia*, *Ecura* and the joggers help those who came in shuffling rather than eagerly jogging. They seem worn out, probably due to their tiresome *quotidians*. If all animated conversation, satisfying food and company has not helped them, what can then be done? *Fiducia* knows something they all have in common, besides their quest. At least, it has to do a lot with it. She clears her throat for everyone, including the shufflers, to hear. Although still not as enthusiastically as she would wish for, they have all directed their gaze toward her. *Fiducia* casually implements another technique from what she had learned about Epicurean philosophy at school in her day: she calls forth, from the dustiest of places, a fond memory,⁴² which she shares with all members of her friend group. Their trip to France—*très chic*—a couple of years ago. Dazzling sunlight, the elegant flows of the French language and an ever so beautiful and captivating landscape, which matched in variety of hues the Mediterranean. The remembrance of two weeks spent in communal seclusion near St. Tropez—*très cliché*—is enough for corners of mouths to rise and finally, for all shufflers to break out into laughter. Although she does not want to admit it to herself,

[41] Cf. Whitmarsh, 174.

[42] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 43.

she is recounting the tale for her own sake, too. Memories, even if faded and yellowed, are comforting and easily accessible in moments of what seems to be despair.⁴³

Fast forward, a couple of hours later. It is midnight. *Fiducia* has safely returned to her sanctuary. She resumes her staring-out-of-the-window-activity from the early evening but this time, she is accompanied by some ambient background music. A little blues cannot hurt, that she knows.

Nights are for important discoveries, impossibilities in daylight. *Fiducia* puts a twist on this. Instead of drunkenly stumbling about as she did in her—admittedly—wild teenage years, she discovers something other than what it feels like to empty her stomach's content into the nearest loo. Actually, that something is reflection. Instead of a frantic, panicky and unguided reflection, it is calm, grounded and most importantly, directed. She thinks about how she has spent this day off. She worked tirelessly for her goal. She can be proud of that, she knows. A brief smile follows.

Nevertheless, her doubts, which had first been instigated by her tiredness in the morning, make an appearance. Is not it all a bit pointless? An airplane could crash into her apartment building, an earthquake could dislodge all fundamentals of infrastructure in her city.

[43] Cf. *Ibid.* Recalling memories can lead to the state of *ataraxia* even if one is in despair.

Even worse, some natural catastrophe could wipe out all she knows and all everybody else knows, too. Well, maybe that is a tad unrealistic, she has to admit to that. Perhaps then, *securitas* is achievable, regardless of outside circumstances.

It is found in the mind. It is *ataraxia* and *apatheia*, *tranquillitas* and *quies*; it is *magnitudo* and *eleutheria*, all fermented together in a Roman wine barrel.⁴⁴ In former times, the wine was manufactured to serve seemingly different ends and only the ‘deeply felt contentment permeating the conscious life of the agent’⁴⁵ seems to be shared by *securitas*, *ataraxia* and *eudaimonia*, which, considering Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethic* and the works of Epicurus and the Stoics, was viewed as the final objective of human life and achieved ‘for its own sake’.⁴⁶ Today another wine-making method is preferred, yet it still rests on Epicurean, Stoic⁴⁷ and Sceptic principles.

Finally, *Fiducia* decides she will drink that wine, even if the glasses and the exact flavourings have changed since those times. So, she does it again the next day.

[44] Cf. Schrimm-Heins, ‘Gewissheit und Sicherheit’, 13; Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 14. *Apatheia* can be translated by apathy, *tranquillitas* by calmness, *quies* by inward peace, *magnitudo* by magnanimity and *eleutheria* can be translated by freedom (my translations from the German).

[45] Panos Dimas, ‘Epicurus on Pleasure, Desire, and Friendship’, in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 171.

[46] Cf. Dimas, 172.

[47] Cf. Katerina Ierodiakonou, ‘How Feasible Is the Stoic Conception of Eudaimonia?’, in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 183f. Stoic principles included living in accordance to nature and rationality.

Now it is your turn ...

Why do you think does *Fiducia* want *securitas* so much?

Does *Fiducia* have tunnel vision? Or is she just admirably determined?

Should *Fiducia* have listened to *Ata*?

Do you think that *securitas* is only attainable on either side of life?

Sine plus Cura

Are *Fiducia*'s rituals effective?

What do you think about *Ecura*'s and *Fiducia*'s friendship?

Do you have any suggestions as to how *Fiducia* could achieve *securitas*?

What is a piece of advice you would like to give *Fiducia*?

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Artwork on page 12 by Meret Mareike Behschnitt, 2019.

Secur


securitatum

itas,

et omnia

secur

itas?



Why do we want security? Why do we need it? Because a world submerged in evanescence and battered by insecurity is not one you would like to live in. An essay on such a place.

Today, I want you to conduct an experiment. Go up to a friend, a family member, a stranger or even your dog and ask them what insecurity consists of in this day and age. Perhaps one will refer to the worrying political climate, which includes the USA, Russia, North Korea, and Turkey.¹ Another might remark that they do not even know what insecurity effectually means, which is of course also an answer. Your distant cousin in Brazil might refer to cities like São Paulo, where gangs and robbers rule;² a friend of yours may include the conflict in northern Syria³ in her or his answer. Of course, insecurity with its variable definitions is not a novel phenomenon, for which you and your interviewees will easily find examples going back hundreds, if not thousands of years. The historically conscious of you may stumble across the Baroque Age, during which the Thirty Years' War occurred.

[1] Cf. Tibor Tresch Szvircsev et al., 'Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend', Sicherheit (Zürich, Birmensdorf: Militärakademie (MILAK) at ETH Zürich and Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2019), 21, <http://bit.ly/2MLJlA2>.

[2] Cf. Luiza Campos and Gustavo Ribeiro, *Alphaville - Do Lado de Dentro do Muro*, 2009.

[3] Michael Safi, 'What Is the Situation in North-Eastern Syria?', *The Guardian*, 14 October 2019, sec. World news, <http://bit.ly/366QtyC>.

Naturally, one would assume it spawned insecurity, which nonetheless preferred a disguise different from that today.

'Du siehst, wohin du siehst, nur Eitelkeit auf Erden. Was dieser heute baut, reißt jener morgen ein.'⁴ With these words, Andreas Gryphius began his well-known poem 'Es ist alles eitel'⁵ in 1637, in the time of the Thirty Years' War, which especially affected fragmented German states.⁶ Already in this often cited and famous poem that most German-speaking students are either plagued or blessed with at some point during their schooling, a just as frequently mentioned characteristic of Baroque literature, particularly ascribed to German poetry of the era,⁷ emerges: the concept of *vanitas*. This cannot come as much surprise given the circumstances of Baroque times, where peace was a rarity.⁸

[4] Andreas Gryphius, *Gedichte*, accessed 24 October 2019, <http://bit.ly/31HOPQy>. 'You see, where ever you look, only vanity on earth. What one builds today, the next breaks down tomorrow (my translation).'

[5] Gryphius. 'It is all void (my translation).'

[6] Cf. 'History of Europe', Britannica Academic, accessed 24 October 2019, <http://bit.ly/2qCSVfK>.

[7] Cf. Gerhart Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1987), 175. Whilst Spanish, Italian, and more generally speaking, Roman poets acknowledged the concept of *vanitas*, German poets discussed the subject matter more frequently.

[8] Cf. *Ibid.*, 114.

Unambiguously, the near-ubiquitous realities of war had their fair share of influence on the writers of the time.⁹ As part of collective trauma,¹⁰ life was closely tied to literature. This, however, does not provide sufficient explanation as to why *vanitas* as a prevalent concept and literary motive in the Baroque Age was a chief constituent of Baroque insecurity.¹¹

*Vanitas enveloped the 'transience' of life and '[re-lates] to the evanescence or emptiness of earthly possessions'.*¹² Therefore, both life and material belongings prove to be vain and transitory. Since life, material belongings and abstract entities constitute what is known to woman, man and everyone in-between, it is not at all preposterous to conclude that, given that all that is, however unbeloved, is void, insecurity in the sense of instability in outer circumstances.

[9] Cf. *Ibid.*, 173.

[10] Cf. Claudia Benthien, 'Vanitas, Vanitatum et Omnia Vanitas: The Baroque Transience Topos and Its Structural Relation to Trauma', in *Enduring Loss in Early Modern Germany: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives*, by Lynne Tatlock et al., ed. Lynne Tatlock, vol. 50, *Studies in Central European Histories* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 61.

[11] As observed above, literature reflected the realities of life circumstances during this era in particular. Thus, it is assumable that *vanitas*, even if named alternatively or not named at all, was a notion and concept existent in the population [of Germany] itself.

[12] Liana Cheney, ed., *The Symbolism of Vanitas in the Arts, Literature, and Music: Comparative and Historical Studies* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 1.

These doubtlessly affect the inner state of mind and are created by the quick and ceaseless pace of change.

If one takes the decision to build a home for their family, that very building may easily be obstructed from becoming home to the family unit by fire, an earthquake or war.¹³ If one simply exists even, a condition we all seem to have in common, there is not just a mere possibility but a predictability of this existence being terminated by (outer) circumstances such as illness, starvation or war. Now, this still applies to our modern world to this day. What differs from the modern Western world and distinguishes Baroque insecurity was that death was a particularly loyal and constant companion.¹⁴ Consequently, it was impossible to find any permanent security at all, assuming that security is conveyed by the absence of danger, rather than the retainment of an inner state of security in spite of it.¹⁵

[13] This example is in reference to Gryphius' poem 'Es ist alles eitel'.

[14] As an example, view Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann, *Geschichte Der Belagerung, Eroberung Und Zerstörung Magedburg's von Otto von Guericke, Churfürstlich-Brandenburgischem Rath Und Bürgermeister Besagter Stadt* (Magdeburg: Baensch, 1860), 82–87. Printed in Rainer A. Müller, ed., *Gegenreformation Und Dreißigjähriger Krieg 1555-1648. Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen Und Darstellung*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 296–301, <http://bit.ly/2KMXStz>.

[15] Cf. Frédéric Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, trans. Ulrich Kunzmann (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015), 7–12; 13–52.

Unless one advocated for the view that security may only be found in what is viewed as insecurity, which is mainly deducible from Sceptic philosophy,¹⁶ the emergence and persistence of a notion of insecurity seems near inevitable. This particular state of insecurity, namely the presence of danger,¹⁷ was characteristic for the Baroque and was conveyed by the many conflicts and wars being waged during the Baroque Age. Just after setting a foot out of the door, one was confronted with war realities, which saw properties damaged and lives extinct¹⁸ so that *vanitas* could become effortlessly detectable in everyday life.

Thus, the confrontation with insecurity extended itself beyond the theoretical and abstract realm. ‘Die Kehrseite der Lebensgier [...] ist die *Erfahrung* [emphasis added] der Hinfälligkeit alles Seins.’¹⁹ Decrepitude, voidance and *vanitas* are indeed experienced, not contemplated solely theoretically. If not only all material existence but additionally, all (human) life, is considered to be temporary and void, it quickly loses its significance and meaning in a greater scheme, which was often proclaimed to be a staged theatre.²⁰

[16] Cf. Ibid., 44–47.

[17] Cf. Ibid., 53–97.

[18] ‘History of Europe’.

[19] Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 174. ‘The downside of the lust for life [...] is the *experience* [emphasis added] of the decrepitude of all that is (my translation).’

[20] Cf. Ibid., 176. Viewing the people as actors on stage was a frequent perception in different realms within Baroque art and thought.

Although theatre is brought to life by its actors, even *Romeo and Juliet* would be less tragic without actors illuminating its script, the human being as such loses its importance. The discrepancy between the importance the notion or metaphor of theatre ascribes to the people and the fact that their roles could be erased from the script without difficulty, having as a necessary condition the theatre is even being performed, creates insecurity in the sense that one is torn between acknowledging their own importance or neglecting it entirely on the basis of the argument they cannot establish a secure existence *anyway* and are therefore not sufficiently valuable to be deemed crucial.

Insecurity therefore constitutes itself of unclarity and the impossibility of coming to a stable conclusion concerning one’s existential role, which is further highlighted by a state of confusion, which is resultant from it. One is simultaneously of high and negligible importance, which does not allow for a definitive conclusion regarding one’s importance to be drawn. One has been unknowingly and unasked trying one’s hardest to fulfil one’s role in a theatre play, yet *Fortuna* still seems to be the director. One has lost one’s influence, which must mean, one has lost one’s significance with respect to the director. One is powerless, one is unable to alter the course of action and even more so, the course of life.

Thus, the ‘Nichtigkeit des Leibes’²¹ is proximately tied to another type of confusion, namely that the body especially is considered void yet still experiences both physiological and psychological needs.²² How can something deemed void be so keen on existing, for which evidence is provided by its needs, especially in light of the dismal circumstances of its existence?

This is precisely what two characters, a woman and a man, whose life stories are fictitious yet realistic, considering the periods and its horrors, have experienced. Their *exempla* perfectly illustrate *Fortuna*’s power as the director of the theatre of life. The man is in the role of a farmer, just like his own father. His farm is not quite as impressive as he would like it to be, but he is usually able to provide for his family, which consists of his wife and his four children, who are all underage and unmarried. Although his family eagerly give him a hand whenever he is working in the fields or the miniature stable, they are not quite as skilled as he is so that the labour which is both most demanding physically and sophisticated in its procedure is left for him to complete. So far, so good.

[21] Ibid., 175. ‘Voidance of the body (my translation)’.

[22] Cf. A. H. Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370, <http://bit.ly/2qHFMSO>. Maslow asserts that not only physiological needs influence human motivation.

We can already comprehend that this role is neither as convenient nor as comfortable as ours may be. Nevertheless, it is a relatively decent role in the theatre play. One day, however, the farmer is involved in an accident. The injuries he receives as a result are serious and will leave him unable to work or at least to perform the work he used to do. Although *Fortuna* has shown a certain degree of mercy in sparing him from death altogether, his character and his family must now learn how to cope in order to secure their existence.

The woman’s character has quite a different

That is what theatre entails: to feel powerless.

story, yet naturally, *Fortuna* is still scripting the play.

The woman’s husband is

away in the nearby town to run errands, their two servants are accompanying him. It is the time of the Thirty Years’ War and looting has become commonplace. Whilst she is certainly afraid of such occurrence, she does not want to believe that the raiding soldiers could approach her estate. Unfortunately, her husband has taken his rifle with him, which she knows how to use, so could do so if necessary. Just as she is pondering about these for her still conceptual matters, she hears horses and footsteps approaching the main building. Admittedly, she does indeed become nervous now.

Despite her intuition aiming to convince her otherwise, she clings onto the thought that it *could* be her husband. *Juste en cas*, she grabs the kitchen knife.



A pointless decision, as it turns out. The soldiers, all youngsters and lusting for looting, break down the kitchen door. She wants to defend herself but she soon realises it is an ill-fated enterprise. They drag her down the corridor, their breathing is heavy and they mumble things she wishes she could not understand. Nevertheless, she is conscious. She wishes she was not, for then she could at least pretend she was not being raped. *Fortuna* rests emotionless: that is what theatre entails. To feel powerless.

The feeling of powerlessness presents a further impediment to security. Even if one actively attempted to reach a state of security, irrespective of whether this is more similar to *securitas*, as *Fiducia* is pursuing, or to a security constituent of the absence of danger, it would not be possible as one does not possess the power to do so, nor to overcome the obstacle of powerlessness itself.

The latter is what the both of them share, yet the similarities do not halt there: they both are in a conflict-ridden relationship with time. The woman appeals to the Heavens for her time or at the minimum, her current experience, to end; consequently, she wishes to actuate time. Her counter-part, however, feels as though his time has come too soon and thus wishes it to slow down retrospectively. In their standing toward time they exemplify further Baroque insecurity, which is not only based on evanescence and phony but also on the passing of time.

Alewyn sprach von zwei Botschaften des *Welthasses*: “1. Kein Ding hat Bestand [...] [sic!] *Fortuna* [emphasis added] regiert die Welt”; “2. Alles ist nur Schein. Aller Glanz ist falsch, aller Reiz ist Trug.” Hinter beiden steckt die Erfahrung von der rasenden Flucht der Zeit [...] sowie der Todesgedanke, der sich im Leitmotiv der *Vanitas* [emphasis added] [...] manifestiert.²³

Time is universally thought of as a (abstract) dimension, as it is usually perceived to be moving or passing²⁴ yet seems to be non-detectable by the five senses.²⁵ As it has been previously established, what *was* evident in the immediate surroundings, already evoked insecurity.

[23] Richard Alewyn and Karl Sälzle, *Das grosse Welttheater. Die Epoche der höfischen Feste in Dokument und Deutung* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1959), 49. Cited in Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 174f. ‘Alewyn spoke of the two messages given off by the hatred of the world: “1. Nothing has survival [...] *Fortuna* [emphasis added] is ruling the world.”; “2. Everything is only phony. All sheen is contrived, all allure is deception.” Behind both lies the experience of the frantic escape of time as well as the thought of death, which manifests itself in the leitmotiv of *vanitas* [emphasis added] [...] (my translation).’

[24] Cf. Sam Baron and Kristie Miller, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 54–85.

[25] Cf. *Ibid.*, 8.

After all, the constituents of reality were subjected to ceaseless change, directly endangered one's existence and did not allow for clarity. This was especially the case in Germany during the Baroque.²⁶ By acknowledging that factual realities were imbued with *vanitas*, one could have still resorted to abstract realities, such as time. Nevertheless, time also made itself scarce:²⁷ therefore, even the abstract was not tangible anymore.

The indirect consequence of this is that all is phony.²⁸ Not only are all things beautiful and splendid of limited endurance but in addition, their certainly determinable reality in the moment they are being experienced is rendered insecure as it is later revealed to be contrived. The debunking of the illusions of splendour, which is frequently encountered at gatherings, balls and in the arts,²⁹ instils doubt, suspicion, and thus, insecurity concerning one's very own senses, considering that one was most definitely led astray by the illusion in the first place and is now confronted with the fact that what was held onto as fact is nothing more

What was held onto as fact is nothing more than fiction.

than fiction. This realisation becomes even more daunting if one takes into consideration that this very man-made illusion had the original purpose of concealing 'die Angst vor der Nichtigkeit des Seins'.³⁰ Consequently, we can state that the very coping skill aimed at easing anxiety, which rests on insecurity, triggers a positive feedback loop: it only aggravates symptoms by exacerbating existential anxiety and subsequently, results in more harm than good. Simply fleeing to the world of the Arts and literature especially was not a possibility as the circumstances of life had the habit of penetrating the border to the former.³¹ It is certainly a fair assumption that the frequent discourse on existential themes may have proven helpful, as a way to confront the previously described anxiety. Nonetheless, the incessant exposure to incapable insecurity left little room for distractions and escape.

What is the purpose of art? And what is the purpose of literature in particular? There are numerous answers to this, today as ever, for example, to 'present life as it really is'.³²

[26] Cf. 'Thirty Years' War', Britannica Academic, accessed 24 October 2019, <http://bit.ly/2Pj6hIq>. Although the Thirty Years' War extended beyond the local level, Germany was the main site of battlefield.

[27] Cf. Benthien, 'Vanitas, Vanitatum et Omnia Vanitas: The Baroque Transience Topos and Its Structural Relation to Trauma', 55f.

[28] See note 13.

[29] Cf. Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 173.

[30] Ibid., 173f. 'The anxiety of the voidance of being (my translation)'.

[31] Cf. Ibid., 175. In German Baroque poetry especially, themes such as *vanitas* were frequently utilised and discussed.

[32] Natalie Babbitt, 'The Purpose of Literature – and Who Cares?' (Speech, 1989), <http://bit.ly/364j7jC>.

Or, alternatively, to stir up some kind of emotion,³³ to summarise just two opinions on the subject matter,³⁴ the Baroque Age did have a specific purpose for its art and literature, and it had an idiosyncratic reason to do so.

Commonly, the Baroque, viewed in an artistic light, is a period, where ‘the effect is primary, the means (technique) are secondary and last of all is the real object which serves as the clay for his modelling’³⁵ although this topic has been subjected to discussion.³⁶ Moreover, the Baroque deliberately nurtured and intentioned the evoking of emotions.³⁷

As for the reason for the described state of affairs, a form of inner insecurity can be accounted for, namely ‘when man finds himself to be

no longer an expression of his epoch, or when he finds no integral philosophy to which he may cling, he seeks by some means to procure an effect’.³⁸ The inconsistencies and turbulences of the times including, but not limited to the Thirty Years’ War, scientific discoveries such as the heliocentric model³⁹ and the surge of Absolutism,⁴⁰ resulted in a feeling of insecurity.⁴¹ After all, there is a reason why ideologically extremist thought prospers on grounds of chaos.⁴² Even though the desire to produce an effect was a reaction, it itself also fostered a reaction, which did not alleviate insecurity. This reaction is again concerned with the inner sphere; it is thus worthwhile to take into consideration a form of security which also concerns itself with that same sphere. *Fiducia* has already demonstrated various exercises of how inner security, namely *securitas* and *ataraxia*, which is often denoted as ‘tranquillity’, can be achieved. Both concepts stand in sharp contrast to emotional reactions to occurrences, on the contrary, one reacts to all occurrences stoically in order to attain or retain a certain degree of tranquillity.⁴³

[33] Cf. Tanner Christensen, ‘What Art Should Do’, Creative Something, 2013, <http://bit.ly/363pOm3>.

[34] An interesting speech on the purpose and responsibility of the artist and art was held by Albert Camus, ‘Create Dangerously’ (1957).

[35] Blake Lee Spahr, ‘Baroque and Mannerism: Epoch and Style’, *Colloquia Germanica* 1 (1967): 83, <http://bit.ly/2oedY7x>.

[36] Cf. Ibid., 78–100; Cf. René Wellek, ‘The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship’, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 5, no. 2 (1946): 77–109, <http://bit.ly/2pQZDOM>.

[37] Cf. Monika Kaup, ‘Emotion and the Seduction of the Senses, Baroque to Neo-Baroque’, in *Emotion and the Seduction of the Senses, Baroque to Neo-Baroque*, by Helen Langdon et al., ed. Lisa Beaven and Angela Ndaliansis, vol. 59, Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2018), 21–23.

[38] Cf. Spahr, ‘Baroque and Mannerism’, 87.

[39] Cf. Wolf Wucherpennig, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. (Stuttgart: Klett, 2015), 38.

[40] Cf. Ibid.

[41] Cf. Ibid.

[42] For example, the rise of Nazism was facilitated by the crises, both economic and political, of the Weimar Republic.

[43] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 14f.

An impetuous, affect-steered reaction, which is definitely not considered to be of stoic nature, becomes almost inevitable if an effect on the person concerned has previously been produced. Adverting from this route toward inner insecurity only remains a feasible alternative if one has undergone reflection⁴⁴ or has anteriorly practiced exercises and routines,⁴⁵ yet this is beyond realistic possibility in an age where ancient philosophy was inaccessible to the wide majority of the population. Consequently, the inner security, namely tranquility or imperturbability, which would be necessary to combat the effect literary pieces produced, irrespective of their intention, was unachievable due to practical reasons.

Practicality was of central importance with respect to religion, too, insofar that the lack thereof constituted an underlying cause of Baroque insecurity, since practical actions, such as the paying off of indulgences, or the performance of good deeds in order to be absolved from sin, were not at hand any longer.

Thus, Baroque insecurity concerns itself with the question of indulgences, which had been the pivotal question of the Reformation as proves Martin Luther's *Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum*, more commonly known

[44] Seneca's theory of affects.

[45] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 15.

as the *95 Thesen*, and the fact that the Catholic Church felt compelled to discuss the subject at the Council of Trent.⁴⁶ Thus, the circumstances to be described only apply to Protestant confessional states, where literary production was amplified during the Baroque Age.⁴⁷

What was the general (and admittedly, oversimplified) doctrine of the reformed Church? Solely scripture was thought to be of importance, only faith could offer any justification by grace alone: 'sola scriptura', 'sola fide' and 'sola gratia'.⁴⁸ Faith is a somewhat abstract notion, at least, it did not have the same material manifestations as money or works to absolve oneself from indulgences.⁴⁹ This was decidedly different in Catholic Confessional states although Pope Pius V had effectually abolished their numerical and monetary aspect.⁵⁰ The underlying concept remained in place by way of which auditory confessions allowed for a transferral of responsibility for one's actions from oneself to the Priest.

[46] Cf. Rolf Decot, *Geschichte der Reformation in Deutschland* (Freiburg: Herder, 2015), 195f.

[47] Leonard Forster, 'Deutsche Und Europäische Barockliteratur', *Daphnis* 6, no. 4 (1977): 49; Referenced in Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 117.

[48] Cf. 'Reformation', Britannica Academic, accessed 24 October 2019, <http://bit.ly/2JlhFQl>.

[49] Cf. Lawrence G Duggan, 'Indulgence', Britannica Academic, accessed 24 October 2019, <http://bit.ly/340jeeq>.

[50] Cf. Ibid.

Faith, albeit seemingly abstract, could still bear security, as it was judged to be an instrument of internal assurance.⁵¹ It was predominantly the principle of 'sola gratia' which conveyed a sense of insecurity. Included was the concept that at the end of the day, it was only by the will of God that grace could be bestowed: the penance for sins would not secure the reception of grace.⁵² In fact, it was faith which must exist prior to the committing of a sin so that there was even the possibility that grace could be bequeathed.⁵³ Nevertheless, neither did a righteous life even the path to salvation⁵⁴ nor was God known 'in his essence'.⁵⁵ Subsequently, one could not assure a secure existence, which would have featured the lack of danger and pain, in afterlife, but rather, was reliant on God. It was

all in God's hands, and out of one's own control.

Moreover, if stylistic features reflect the tendencies of a given time, that is, if the *Zeitgeist* manifests itself in various media with sufficient integral homogeneity that one may recognize its traits in the separate media, then we are certainly justified in speaking of an *era*, not of the more restrictive term 'style'.⁵⁶

The Zeitgeist of the Baroque Age was indeed expressed thoroughly by antitheses and other rhetorical devices which conveyed similar notions. The *Zeitgeist* described consequently must have been characterisable by words such as 'torn', 'disrupted', or even 'contradictory'. All these terms illustrate dynamic, yet reluctantly-received changes. The world around one, and perhaps within one, too, is changing rapidly.⁵⁷ This manifested itself in the just premise that everything is unascertainable, nothing in fact is guaranteed as there are brisk oscillations between 'Diesseits und Jenseits, Lebensgier und Lebensangst, Pessimismus und Selbstbehauptung'.⁵⁸

[51] Cf. Mari Eyice, 'The Tree and Its Fruit: The Problem of Good Deeds in the Swedish Reformation', in *Virtue Ethics and Education from Late Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Andreas Hellerstedt (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 80, <http://bit.ly/33WP6Au>.

[52] Cf. H. Paul Santmire, 'Justification in Calvin's 1540 Romans Commentary', *Church History* 33, no. 3 (1964): 298, <http://bit.ly/2BI7ZLA>.

[53] Cf. Ibid.

[54] Cf. Eyice, 'The Tree and Its Fruit', 80; Cf. Decot, *Geschichte der Reformation in Deutschland*, 129. This is commonly referred to as 'Prädestinationslehre', or the doctrine of predestination.

[55] Santmire, 'Justification in Calvin's 1540 Romans Commentary', 294. An outline of the debate on the essence of God and our concept of God is expounded on in Marian F. Sia and Santiago Sia, 'Ultimate Meaning, Suffering, and God', *American Journal of Theology & Philosophy* 13, no. 1 (1992): 25–36, <http://bit.ly/2Jjdwwd>.

[56] Spahr, 'Baroque and Mannerism', 79.

[57] Cf. Wucherpennig, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte*, 38.

[58] Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 173. 'the mortal world and [the] afterlife, the lust for life and the fear of life, pessimism and self-assertion (my translation)'.

Quickly, they draw up the question whether anything, and it does not have to be something as large as ‘this mortal world and [the] afterlife’, is in fact sufficiently secure, so as to be able to hold onto it, if extreme oscillations are not a rarity, but a common occurrence. A degree of inner tranquillity is thus not attainable, as the oscillations occur within the realm of emotion, and feeling, and therefore exclude the possibility of tranquil, rational, and Stoic *securitas*.

Moreover, the use and idea of large entities like ‘the mortal world and [the] afterlife’ demonstrates that the questioning of entities was not limited to circadian objects or occurrences, but extended to those surrounded by belief systems, and those somewhat essential to personality and world view. With certainty, even the constant probing of more modest and small extremes of antitheses could cause a feeling of insecurity. But fundamentally, whether wilfully or reluctantly, examining current and prior perfectly apt beliefs causes them to lose their anterior truth claim. If something is so questionable as it has been proven that the exact opposite is perfectly possible, how can it be considered truthful (in that moment)? Was it ever truthful to begin with or was its truth claim a falsity? Beliefs, convictions and views of the world being what human beings tend to hold onto during times of insecurity and disorder, we have remarked this in our excursus on the goal of evoking emotions, this effect only amplifies what *vanitas* has already begun to do: remove the secure basis of perception

and categorisation of the world and its occurrences, which us humans rejoice to engage in.⁵⁹

Owing to the quotidian encounter of oscillation and extremes, such as splendour and darkness,⁶⁰ the orderly architecture of gardens at court⁶¹ and looted sheds all in the time of the Thirty Years’ War, literature reflected this reality openly and frequently. The effect of constant confrontation with a presumably unpleasant theme, it creating insecurity, is what we colloquially refer to as ‘rubbing it into somebody’s face’. Little room is left for distraction or escapism in the real world, of which literature is a firm constituent and to which it stands in relation.

This is near idiosyncratic for the Baroque Age: insecurity is not only experienced, and overtly dreaded, but it is also approached, and conveyed deliberately. Nevertheless, there remains yet another cause for Baroque insecurity in the prevalent use of the antithesis.

One must, at least, admit that stylistic devices can be imitated very successfully and that their possible original expressive function can disappear.

[59] Cf. Muhammad Ali Khalidi, *Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

[60] Cf. Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 173.

[61] Cf. Wucherpennig, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte*, 36.



They can become, as they did frequently in the baroque, mere empty husks, decorative tricks, craftman's *clichés*. The whole relationship between soul and word is looser and more oblique than it is frequently assumed.⁶²

Assuming the overuse of antitheses as a mean of expression has really rendered them ineffective as far as their expressive nature goes, a literate may come to the conclusion that what he previously deemed perfectly sufficient to communicate the *Zeitgeist* with has now become meaningless.

The literate then, if he wishes to continue his activity, needs to find other means to perform this task, which will never serve the exact equal purpose nor garner the same effect as his beloved antithesis. The loss of expression could aggravate the insecurity previously evoked, as its mean of expression, which served as an early-modern version of a coping skill,⁶³ has become useless. What was previously communicated can no longer be.

Of course, this does not signify that antitheses in particular were 'empty husks' to begin with, or did not, at least prior to an alleged 'commercialisation', reflect an actual *Zeitgeist*.

[62] Wellek, 'The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship', 96.

[63] Cf. Benthien, 'Vanitas, Vanitatum et Omnia Vanitas: The Baroque Transience Topos and Its Structural Relation to Trauma', 60f.

The necessary consequence of such an overuse does not have to be an unresponsive readership or literary audience. Contrarily, even if overexposure in certain cases may result in inurement, the combination of real, observable antitheses such as reality and illusion and the frequent encounter in literary media would result in an amplified effect of the evoking of insecurity, since the reader is immersed⁶⁴ in poetry which conveys insecurity.

If you performed the physical impossibility of time travel and now asked some persons living in the Baroque Age how they would describe their time with respect to insecurity, what would their replies consist of? They would certainly mention the Thirty Years' War, which ensured that death and decay were loyal companions. After all, already Seneca denoted that the fear of death was a form of insecurity.⁶⁵

With death manifesting itself so openly, this characterises Baroque insecurity. Furthermore, the themes they would mention would be coloured by a loss of control; they would not hesitate to portray themselves in a theatre play with a gratuitous director, namely *Fortuna*, which rendered any peace an impossibility. Their answer would include the discrepancy between the experience of human needs, such as hunger, and the inevitable realisation that one was indeed insignificant.

[64] Cf. Benthien, 57.

[65] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 31f.

This is of course a corollary of this beloved metaphor. Anxiously, they would ask you for the time, for time was fleetingly escaping, and thereby represented yet another decaying entity. Those acquainted with the Arts would lament how the Thirty Years' War's insecurity permeated even the border to the beautiful, the splendid and the pompous, since it was ironically the goal of art to evoke emotions, whence the disturbance of an already dissipated tranquility stemmed from. Another point of criticism would certainly include the illusionary properties of all things positive: the gardens, the court, the Arts. After all, these were only masks aimed at deception, which were instituted as an early modern 'coping skill', yet could not succeed in their ambitious endeavour.

Religion, they would say, would have been an escape route, yet all devout prayer, all ascetic penance did not interest the Protestant God. He, let us not forget, preferred to keep the decision over one's final destination in his own hands. They would ascertain us that had there been a guaranteed mean to go Heaven in afterlife, they would have taken that route in order to be guided into a more secure space and consequently, possess the internal assurance of entering the Heavens. Yet, mournful voices would proclaim, this was ruled out.

The poet would attest manifestations of the insecure in the stylistic antithesis, too, for it so brilliantly illustrated the oscillations from joyous development to sorrowful decay, which

gracefully removed any order of the world to hold onto. As a mean of expression of a particular *Zeitgeist*, the antithesis met the poet and their readers routinely and thus left no room for distraction. If one wished to read of rainbows and unicorns, one instead read of death and flamboyant celebrations.

Baroque insecurity did stem from conflict, violence and war, yet its specific excesses were period specific. After all, only the most enthusiastic of historians and philosophers would still proclaim *Fortuna* to be running this world and attest the presence of *vanitas* in the modern world, which is still ridden by wars. Thus, it managed to do what neither security nor much else succeeded in: permanently securing its place in a complex, and ever-changing world.

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Sine plus Cura

Wucherpfennig, Wolf. *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Stuttgart: Klett, 2015.

Artwork on page 27 by Sina Buchholz, 2019.

Artwork on page 34 by Dzama, Marcel. *Trip and Go or Piero Is Wandering Here and There, Reading Out Lines of Pinocchio, as Oskar Dances Down Stairways*. 2014. Photographed by Sina Buchholz, 2019.

Of a

philosophical

pendulum



Imagine if history was divided into segments of extremes: peace and war, or revolution and stability. Or: insecurity and security. A story of something which has met both.



pendulum is swinging. Up to the right, down in the middle and up yet again, only this time, it is in the direction of the left. This motion is repeated almost endlessly but always in an unperturbed fashion. The pendulum swings forth: to security, and back: to insecurity. Its motion is exceptionally slow, resulting in its ability to not only perceive but also to examine closely the ideas and concepts at its imaginary feet.

The pendulum has just been confronted with a period richly saturated with insecurity, namely the Baroque. Just like you, it has also surveyed the notions of insecurity during the said Age, and is now eagerly expecting times more saturated with security. The Enlightenment, being either subsequent or interwoven with the Baroque regarding *res temporum* and *res cultuum*, the pendulum thus bestows with high expectations. It will embark on its voyage shortly so that it can investigate the general trends and more specifically, the hints to security, in English and Scottish Enlightenment works.

Immediately upon leaving the Baroque sphere, the pendulum is confronted with a label, which cannot be missed. The pendulum, it being rather intelligent, reads 'Age of Reason' on it. Although it does not need security as a human being does, it can nevertheless effortlessly detect how reason

itself has the ability to invoke security, as opposed to insecurity. Reason is thus rendered something attractive for somebody in need and search of security. Although it had encountered traces of reason at other times,¹ the pendulum is now startled by its forceful appearance.

The importance of reason the pendulum can discern not only from the label but from one of the most famous texts on and of the Enlightenment, which situates reason at the centre of its argument² and 'best described its [the Enlightenment's] psychological foundations'.³ Reason was indeed vital for the Enlightenment because its use (in the public sphere) was the pathway to a state of Enlightenment itself.⁴

[1] Cf. David Wootton, *The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution* (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 1f. The year 1572 is named to mark the beginning of 'modern science'.

[2] Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, ed. Claus Rosenkranz (1932; repr., Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 12f.

[3] Ira Owen Wade, *The Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1971), 20.

[4] Cf. Immanuel Kant, 'Beantwortung Der Frage: Was Ist Aufklärung?', in *Schriften Zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik Und Pädagogik*. (1784; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), 53–61, <http://bit.ly/2p4oQ8G>; Cf. Wade, *The Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment*, 23.

Reason itself was generally perceived as some kind of force of the innate sort, which allowed the discovery of truth and more importantly, which allowed it to be determined and secured: ‘Dieser Akt der Sicherung [der Wahrheit] ist der Keim und die unentbehrliche Voraussetzung für alle wahrhafte Sicherheit.’⁵ Since security is not explicitly defined, the pendulum makes an educated guess concerning its nature. The author is referring to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which arguably wanted to find truth⁶ either rationally or empirically,⁷ truth resting behind imagination, emotion and the likes. Thus, it seems plausible to the pendulum that by security the state of *securitas* and *ataraxia* are meant, which constituted security in the view of ancient philosophers.⁸ The pendulum can substantiate this claim by the fact that reason, according to the English philosopher John Locke, had the power to procure clarity and, upon employment,

led to correct conclusions.⁹ Therefore, no erroneous confusions¹⁰ and unclear principles would remain upon having used reason and therefore, security could be attained. Due to the advances in science that had been made during the Age of the Enlightenment, there was a firm belief in the success of this enterprise.¹¹

Therefore, not only was one informed of the path to security but one was also evermore sure the latter was actually grabbable due to the evidence at hand, which our pendulum also finds convincing. In addition, the British Enlightenment specifically provided another notion of security invoked by reason. Reason, according to Locke, was authoritative for ‘belief and conduct’.¹² If reason, albeit God-given,¹³ constitutes authority and leads to the disclosure and securing of truth, then the security invoked by reason becomes ever more potent. Finally, reason provided the concrete for the reasoning behind rights and mutual respect.¹⁴

[5] Cf. Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, 12f. ‘This act of securing [of truth] is the seed, and the indispensable prerequisite for all veracious security.’

[6] Cf. Ibid.; Cf. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke (1689; repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), bks 4, chaps VII, §2, 668f, <http://bit.ly/2MKkTyU>.

[7] William Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), <https://stanford.io/2p-dIAXo>.

[8] Cf. Frédéric Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, trans. Ulrich Kunzmann (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015), 13–52.

[9] Cf. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bks 4, chaps VII, §3, 669.

[10] Cf. Ibid., bks 4, chaps VII, §9–13, 681–83. Nevertheless, reason is not without its faults, if the basis, namely ideas, for the ordering it performs are inherently faulty.

[11] Cf. Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, 8.

[12] Ruth W. Grant, ‘John Locke on Custom’s Power and Reason’s Authority’, *The Review of Politics* 74, no. 4 (2012): 619, <http://bit.ly/2BH1qZz>.

[13] Cf. Ibid., 620.

[14] Cf. Nancy J. Hirschmann, *Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 81.

Both rights and mutual respect were chief elements of the social contract theory. If reason then provided the reasoning behind those conceptions, and thereby was able to provide a solid foundation for the social contract and the political rights that should come with it, then reason could be said to have placed the founding stones of security; more specifically, of security invoked by the state.¹⁵ The latter signifies that security was equated with the state because the state itself had been instituted by the social contract in order to bring about security. The civil state should contrast with the state of nature, in which insecurity was resultant from human behaviour, the latter being rampant and rivalling.¹⁶

Upon considering the principle or force of reason, another philosophical concept attracts the pendulum's attention, primarily because the pendulum considers itself to be not in possession of it: liberty. The major stream of thought it can discern is that of the Philosophes, who propagated a view of freedom based on tolerance, and which would thus foster (intellectual) growth.¹⁷

[15] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 99–152.

[16] Cf. *Ibid.*, 110–12.

[17] Cf. Ingvild Hagen Kjørholt, 'Naturally Free, Politically Unfree: Voltaire's Quakers and the Modern Discourse of Human Rights', in *To Be Unfree*, ed. Christian Dahl and Tue Andersen Nexø, Republicanism and Unfreedom in History, Literature, and Philosophy (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014), 157, <http://bit.ly/2MMYpxl>.

This view indeed follows a similar logic as that of Kant's defining work 'Was ist Aufklärung?': if liberty, entailing tolerance, allows for the independent application of reason in the public sphere, then truth will eventually be unearthed. It will be secured by the force of reason, and thus, utmost security will be established.

Now the pendulum aims to take a closer look at John Locke, him being part of the English Enlightenment. The *opus magnum* it wants to scrutinise first is *Two Treatises of Government*, which had been devised in 1689. It does have a feel of time travel to it, as it was composed nearly five


Security was equated with the state.

score years before Kant's 'Was ist Aufklärung?', the traces of which the pendu-

lum has previously detected. Nevertheless, it exhibits an idea of liberty which similarly conveys the notion of security or at least, assures it as a by-product. The pendulum, it feeling utterly capable of taking up the challenge of a proximate perusal, dips into the work. Soon, the contents and their significance for its enterprise unfold themselves.

According to the author, with the establishment of a state and government, property ought to be preserved.¹⁸

[18] Cf. John Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government', in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (1689; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chaps VII, §87, 341f.



Upon pondering on this statement for some time, the pendulum concludes that this condition is indeed conveying security. More specifically, it transmits or potentially realises a form of the latter, namely the security of property. Property in the sense of (consumer) goods, having apparently proven to be somewhat essential to a human being's welfare, do convey a certain security, as they can aid in the assurance of well-being, avert danger and moreover, may be used as security-objects¹⁹ by projecting the function of creating security, for example in the form of *securitas* and *ataraxia*, onto them.

The *clou* the pendulum has yet to unearth but upon continuing its studies, it discovers that Locke dispenses a less tacit correlation of his understanding of liberty and security, which interweaves the notion of security expounded on above and the meaning of liberty in his view. He affirms that liberty is considered property as well.²⁰ If liberty is considered property insofar as it is the government's undertaking to preserve and secure it, then liberty suddenly becomes a less abstract and more tangible quantity due to the fact that in order for a government to arrange for means to preserve it, it must permeate and even cross the border to the literal and thus be assured.

[19] The symbolism of security attributed to selected objects is evident in the photography series.

[20] Cf. Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government', chaps VII, §87, 341f.

Already from the Baroque Age, where the absolution from sins became less or even unquantifiable in Protestantism, it has seen that being able to quantify an abstract notion does convey security, as one seems to be able to categorise and assess, irrespective of whether this concerns absolution or liberty.

Not only this, but the institutionalisation of a concept such as liberty, although it may not be 'natural' to any further extent,²¹ additionally substantiates the claim or founding-cause of the establishment of government, namely 'to have that *Safety and Security in Civil Society*, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they [members of society] entered into it',²² as it serves as a governmental mean to work further toward the objective of security, irrespective of the literal feasibility thereof.

To put it simply: a state founded with the final objective of creating and conserving security would not set itself a task antagonistic to this very goal, as its progress in the direction of the end goal would thereby be undermined substantially. Therefore, liberty must too serve the ends of the said objective. Yet, what does liberty entail? What is its nature?

[21] 'Natural liberty' is not considered the same as 'civil liberty'.

[22] Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government', chaps VII, §94, 347.

Liberty, the pendulum can discern, ‘consists [...] in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall chuse, or *will*’.²³ Although a citizen is still subjected to civil government with its laws,²⁴ which serve the ends of security, she or he is no longer at the disposition of a gratuitous, absolute monarch. Therefore, she or he is at least more secure when compared to the Baroque Age. Liberty, as Locke denotes it, serves the purpose of security, as it is implemented by and through the state, which has to establish security.

Our pendulum is still in motion. It is on its way to discover yet another prominent conception articulated and discussed during the Enlightenment period. It encounters the broad concept of equality, which is set within the realm of the state: the latter should, according also to philosophies other than Locke’s, protect and foster what was reasonable, in addition to being security-invoking. Thus, the state ought to integrate those principles that were threatened by the presumably ‘anarchical’²⁵ state of nature.

[23] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bks 2, chaps XXI, §27, 248.

[24] Cf. Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’, chaps IV, §22, 302.

[25] Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 114. See for an overview of the underlying philosophy and ideas of the social contract and the state of nature: Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, 245–87.

Civilised equality was one of these very principles.²⁶ As the pendulum has previously seen how reason led to security, which presumably consisted of *securitas*, it applies the same reasoning. In fact, if reason was a route to security and reasonable values and doctrines, of which equality was one, should be applied in the state, then equality must also serve the purpose of security. In the antecedent state of nature, equality did the contrary: ‘[E]very man has the natural right to everything, “even to another’s body”’. The result of this [was] that nobody [had] security.’²⁷ Consequently, a civilised form of equality was necessary, which had to be re-integrated into the state due to its security-affirming sense.

The importance of this integration is stressed by the claim that inequality in society directly threatens security.²⁸ The argument behind this is that security is a firm element of the state, which accounts for civil society. If civil society is threatened by inequality, which could exemplarily arise due to extensive gaps in wealth, then now insecure civil society also jeopardises the state. As the state was thought to be equal to security, it having been established by the social contract due to the insecurity experienced in the natural state,²⁹ civil society and the state are imperilled by insecurity drawn up by inequality.

[26] Cf. *Ibid.*, 112–14.

[27] D. W Hamlyn, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Viking, 1987), 132.

[28] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 116.

[29] Cf. *Ibid.*, 102–5.

Notably, inequality persisted both in theory and practice, as equality before the law for women and non-property holding men was not implemented. Although Enlightenment philosophy, as exemplified by John Locke, was more progressive regarding the aspect of gender equality when compared to preceding times. It did ascribe certain rights, which were neither common nor even in existence for women by law at the time,³⁰ to women but this approach was inconsistent.³¹

The pendulum has thus discovered a loophole yet decides to stick with Locke in order to assess his viewpoint on equality. It browses and examines page after page. After some time, a firm idea consolidates itself at the back of its intellectual faculty. Although Locke held the view that all human beings possessed natural rights such as life, liberty and property,³² he did not consider all human beings to be equal in a political state; rather, all citizens obeying ‘natural law’ in the political state, as long as they saw it as reasonable,³³ were thought of as equal.³⁴ If reasonableness with respect to the realm of law was

[30] The time of the late 17th to early 18th century is referred to.

[31] Cf. Hirschmann, *Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory*, 116.

[32] Cf. Bruce A. Hunt, ‘Locke on Equality’, *Political Research Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2016): 546, <http://bit.ly/2WfakHc>.

[33] Reasonable as ‘reason’ according to Locke, as in ‘reason is authoritative’.

[34] Cf. Hunt, ‘Locke on Equality’, 550.

deemed necessary for equality, then the notion of security, which was conveyed by this very reasonableness, was in the same degree implemented in equality itself. Moreover, equality consisted in the fact that every *man* was equally in possession of liberty as the next.³⁵ Therefore, security byway of liberty is not restricted to a select few members of society but rather, extends itself to all male citizens.

Politically speaking, equality further manifested itself in a certain degree of democratisation, which remains an on-going process

in our world,³⁶ within the realm of which the pendulum aims to focus on political participation. The latter, among other factors, ensures the stability of a regime, the pendulum learns, given it is a republic and not an absolute monarchy.³⁷ Consequently, it can be regarded as an ‘Sicherheitsinstrument[]’.³⁸

[35] Cf. Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’, chaps VI, §54, 322.

[36] Laurel E. Miller et al., ‘Democratization and Democracy Promotion: Trends, Theories, and Practices’, in *Democratization in the Arab World, Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), 9–34, <http://bit.ly/31M8EGr>. This chapter especially concerns itself with how democratization is in process (or is not) in the Arab world.

[37] Cf. Martin Fitzpatrick et al., eds., *The Enlightenment World* (London: Routledge, 2007), 461.

[38] Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 119. ‘Instrument[] of security (my translation)’.

The difference is only that it is played by the people themselves and not chiefly by the government. How can the pendulum justify this claim? For example, political participation, whether in form of voting or as an advisory role, extends itself to the domain of the legislative. Laws are ‘Sicherheitsinstrumente’ because they constitute elemental parts of the state with the purpose of security. Only by allowing political participation it can be guaranteed that laws are both ‘Sicherheitsinstrumente’, are simultaneously in public interest and geared toward the common good.³⁹ The condition for public interest is a certain degree of political participation.

The notion of public interest already hints at the fact that individual ideas, needs and votes are not necessarily the determining factors in political activity. Instead, as advocated for by Locke, it was the majority which undertook that role; provided there had been consent for this system.⁴⁰ The pendulum is puzzled because it does not see how the determining of political fate by a majority, which would undoubtedly always leave a minority discontent, could invoke security. It argues that the reign of the majority over the minority, in spite of the changing composition of these groups, seemed eerily akin to the absolute regimes it had been confronted

[39] Cf. *Ibid.*, 120.

[40] Cf. Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’, chaps VIII, §98, 350f.

with in the Baroque Age.

As it reads the document more closely, it realises finally that within this criticised nature of the majority, at least according to the author, lies security. Provided every individual opinion is put into practice, chaos, which can hardly lead to security, will arise due to the conflicting interests at hand, whereby collective security is rendered unattainable. Therefore, another form of participation and implementation of vote needs to be found. If one forced every individual to conform to one single political view, then the dissenting voices would need to be coerced in order to achieve the said objective. Thereby, political instability would arise so that this approach does not bear fruit either.⁴¹

In contrast to the early emergence of what the pendulum has been analysing so far, the study of economics, which it is now confronted with, it has not encountered all-too obviously before in its inquiry of the period.⁴²

[41] Cf. *Ibid.*

[42] Cf. Alessandro Stanziani, ‘Second Serfdom and Wage Earners in European and Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, in *Bondage*, 1st ed., Labor and Rights in Eurasia from the Sixteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 26, <http://bit.ly/2pcODvj>. The study of economics commenced only in the late 18th century, and was thus, due to its late emergence, not an entirely representative depiction of ‘Enlightenment thought’. See also Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’.

Nevertheless, it is conscious of the topical relevance of wealth even preceding the popular Enlightenment discussions.⁴³ Our pendulum, although it would actually like to view accounts of lesser-known authors, simply cannot get past one very dominant name: Adam Smith. Adam Smith, it learns, was deeply opposed to a system characteristic of the preceding Ages, namely the Mercantile system, which had promulgated an increase in wealth of the state to be constituent of the accumulation of gold and silver,⁴⁴ as Locke had advocated for,⁴⁵ and which additionally favoured a state-controlled industry.⁴⁶ The pendulum un-masks Smith's view to differ from the stream of Mercantilism, namely, Smith thought that wealth could only be amassed by increasing the

number of 'necessities of life'⁴⁷ because they were what wealth was truly composed of.⁴⁸

Now, what kind of impression does this leave on our pendulum? Whilst wealth in the sense of precious metals could lead to security via buying what was necessary for life and thereby created security, the pendulum recognises that indeed, this immediate step could also be omitted by changing the meaning of wealth in order to open an unswerving path toward security. Its reasoning amounts to the following: the amassment of wealth is (almost) universally considered desirable. Supposing that wealth has obtained the meaning of 'necessities for life', which arguably are able to satisfy needs to a certain degree, then it has become the objective of society—not necessarily the state!⁴⁹—to increase the fulfilment of needs via the production and commerce of goods. Despite it being convinced by its argument in theory, the pendulum is not yet satisfied with it in practice. What goods could realistically satisfy the need for security?

What goods could satisfy the need for security?

[43] D. Paul Schafer, 'Origins of the Economic Age', in *Revolution or Renaissance, Making the Transition from an Economic Age to a Cultural Age* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2008), 11, <http://bit.ly/2MPy2H3>. Wealth and its increase in particular were the objectives of numerous economic systems, such as Mercantilism.

[44] Cf. *Ibid.*, 13.

[45] Cf. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell and William B. Todd, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (1776; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), bks 4, chaps I, <http://bit.ly/2Wi89T9>.

[46] Cf. Schafer, 'Origins of the Economic Age', 11. Other notable examples included in Mercantile theory: The promotion of international trade and the fierce promotion of exports. See page 11 for more.

[47] Adam Smith, 'Introduction and Plan of the Work', in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell and William B. Todd, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (1776; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), <http://bit.ly/2Wi89T9>.

[48] Cf. Schafer, 'Origins of the Economic Age', 13.

[49] Cf. *Ibid.* Smith argued against maximum state intervention concerning economics, and thereby, advocated for a free (or freer) market.

What precisely would they address? Would they conjure the absence of danger,⁵⁰ would they evoke *securitas* and *ataraxia*?⁵¹ Was not Smith only redefining property? Admittedly, the pendulum's doubts are highly plausible. There is not yet known a good that procures security in an unmediated and unconditional fashion. Nonetheless, different individuals do allot security to goods and people. Numerous of those objects, as the pendulum would realise were it to study this magazine's photography series, are not designed to serve the ends of security; rather, this meaning is given by the owner her- or himself. 'Personalised' security, whether in the form of literal security or a feeling, is consequently brought about by these goods. Nonetheless, security itself cannot be considered a good if we take the latter to be consumable and sellable objects. This is impossible because security is usually referred to as a state, which 'necessaries and conveniences'⁵² can facilitate to attain.

Still, the pendulum remains doubtful, or rather, the doubt it had nearly satisfied previously celebrates a vivacious come-back. The pendulum already knows that Smith advocated for the

'laissez-faire'-principle and argued society shall be governed by the 'invisible hand' with respect to the economic system, in order for (economic) interests to 'converge rather than conflict'.⁵³ The principles both apply to the government and therefore leave it with the task of intervening minimally in the economic sector. The pendulum comes to the quick realisation that this thesis seems wholly antagonistic to the fact that the state should in fact ensure security. Would not the state, it having the task of ensuring security, have to intervene in order to achieve that goal, rather than be left obstructed from intervention? This premise does not mutually exclude the possibility that security could, assuming it was a need of general society, also be realised within another realm. Security could realistically also be worked towards within the economic dimension, albeit clearly separate from the political dimension, and not harm nor inhibit the progress fostered within the governmental sphere. Provided the economy bases its trade and commerce on supply and demand, both of which having been shaped repeatedly by society itself, then the economy will nevertheless work toward security.

This argument, the pendulum comes to conclude, is solidified by the fact that the final objective of Smith was to make improvements in society itself.⁵⁴

[50] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 53–97. The absence of danger is one definition of the term 'security'.

[51] Cf. *Ibid.*, 13–53. This definition of security denotes the state of tranquillity as being its chief constituent in spite of danger or other disturbances being present.

[52] Schafer, 'Origins of the Economic Age', 13.

[53] Cf. *Ibid.*, 16.

[54] Cf. *Ibid.*, 22.

The objective of improvements does not have to be restricted to literal improvements, such as the accumulation of wealth to heighten the standard of living. In contrast to this, it could also serve more abstract ends, namely the minimisation of insecurity, as long as this lay within the “enlightened self-interest” on the part of individuals and institutions.⁵⁵ The improvement of society, insofar as the state of nature, which was largely considered to be insecure,⁵⁶ was eager to manifest itself more openly any time,⁵⁷ was regarded as necessary.

For the time being, the pendulum has completed its tour of the Enlightenment, which it has reviewed on the basis of security, as it is always swinging from one extreme—insecurity—to the next—security. This is not to say the pendulum has ever in its long life encountered an Age fully saturated with security, but it has certainly come across both phenomena in high degrees. The pendulum decides to block its perception of its surroundings, and henceforth, turns inward. It aims to review its experiences in this section of history. What does it conclude?

It reasserts the label of ‘Age of Reason’, the importance of which allowed for security in one or the other forms to be implemented in theory and praxis. Firstly, reason as a guiding principle

allowed for the discovery of philosophical truths. Given that philosophy was deemed imperative in multiple dimensions of life, this was not solely an intellectual triumph of few philosophy professors, but rather was deeply interwoven with the general literary and cultural production, of which many more individuals and communities could benefit from.

Thus, the unearthing and securing of philosophical truths, which were hunted after by philosophers from Hobbes to Kant, through the employment of reason was not merely a small triumph but a ‘big deal’. Reason also permeated and certainly crossed the border to the political, this is most evident in the prominence of political philosophy during the Age. Reason being constitutively pivotal for the establishment of civil society by the social contract, in theory it directly guides toward security.

Secondly, liberty also reaffirms security. Liberty was considered something which was institutionally secured. Thus, its emergence and prominence, although during the Age of the Enlightenment limited to few occurrences in a single demographic group, provided evidence that something, namely liberty, could be secured and quantified, it being considered property as well. Moreover, the participation in political processes within the general will was considered to be freedom. Supposing the general will tended toward security and its realisation, then freedom, so the participation in the process, also tacitly led to security.

[55] Cf. *Ibid.*, 13.

[56] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 106f.

[57] Cf. *Ibid.*, 106.

Furthermore, equality was regarded as a means of firming and fixing civil society, as, supposing inequality emerged, the security of the state was directly endangered. Since the state was commonly equated with security in various forms, inequality also threatened the establishment of security by imperilling the state.

Regarding democratisation, political participation was just one of many ‘instrument[s] of security’, which served as means of the state to gear security. Political participation being called for by the state, it operates toward security, too—the state would not include something which conjures insecurity in its constitution, as its objective remains security.

Finally, economic liberty steered consequentially toward security. By the augmentation of wealth, which consisted, among others, of goods and objects necessary for life, security is conjured, as necessities *per definitionem* possess the capability of satisfying needs, of which the need for security is one. Admittedly, the practical execution of this idea remains very subjective, but at least theoretically, it supports security, or retains the possibility to do so. The larger objective of the concept of economic liberty was the improvement of society. If we connect the premise that uncivil society was insecure, and incivility originating from the state of nature irrespective of the social contract habitually made an appearance to encumber conclusive security, then the improvement of society has the direction of security, too.

The pendulum is still warily conscious of the fact that a permanent, consummate state of security cannot be achieved. Yet it is sure that due to the amassment, and the frequent and numerous appearances of theories pointing toward security, the Enlightenment was not only the ‘Age of Reason’ but also an ‘Age of Security’ insofar as its philosophy largely invoked security.

Now it is your turn ...

Can the state be equated with security?
Or are there counterexamples?

Would you label the Enlightenment as
an 'Age of Security'?

Could Lockean liberty also lead to in-
security?

Would you have come to the same con-
clusion as the pendulum?

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


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Artwork on page 44 by Meret Mareike Behschnitt, 2019.

Dada



is(s)t

Once upon a time, a group of artists decided to eat security (hence the title). Thus, they were fighting fire with fire or insecurity with insecurity. Was it a good idea?

A friend of mine recently told me a story on Dada. Her German teacher had decided to have her class restage a Dada performance, which prompted them to roll around the classroom floor and perform other weird, exotic movements, all whilst uttering bits of sound poetry. What to an outsider may make up an amusing and silly picture did not necessarily feel as amusing for the students. From my friend's account, I could sense confusion, a strong sense of absurdity and the recognition of a lack of meaning in the performative elements, which manifested itself in awkward laughter. Subsequently, I wondered whether insecurity, as a reaction and an element of Dada, may be found at their roots. Perhaps the opening manifesto, which Hugo Ball, co-founder of Dada, presented to the public in July of 1916 in Zurich's *Cabaret Voltaire*, will present an answer.

Hugo Ball initiates the manifesto with the following promising words: 'Dada ist eine neue Kunststrichtung.'¹ Thereby, he immediately prepares

[1] Guido Magnaguagno, Raimund Meyer, and Hans Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916', in *Dada in Zürich* (1916; repr., Zürich: Kunsthaus Zürich & Arche Verlag, 1985), 256. Printed in Karl Riha, ed., *Dada Zürich: Texte, Manifeste, Dokumente* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2015), 30.

the reader for a declaration differing from the bourgeois form of art. Spontaneously, the statement allots the prospect of (radical) change to the newly-founded art movement, the path and content of which are unknown and somewhat unpredictable. Only one thing is known at this point: it aims to use different norms or none at all and thereby dismantles the traditional forms of art, under the necessary condition that one considers Dada significant enough to undermine them in the first place. Aside from what the reader of the manifesto might experience as a reaction to this statement, the author and his companions of similar objectives are also pursuing an uncertain path. In proclaiming the novelty and unconventionality of their form of art, they are defiantly abjuring the conventions of traditional art. The creation of art oftentimes serves as a coping mechanism to be used in difficult times.²

[2] Cf. Heather L. Stuckey and Jeremy Nobel, 'The Connection Between Art, Healing, and Public Health: A Review of Current Literature', *American Journal of Public Health* 100, no. 2 (February 2010): 254–63, <http://bit.ly/2KLpE9O>; Cf. Daisy Fancourt et al., 'How Do Artistic Creative Activities Regulate Our Emotions? Validation of the Emotion Regulation Strategies for Artistic Creative Activities Scale (ERS-ACA)', *PLoS One* 14, no. 2 (2019): e0211362, <http://bit.ly/2NduD3K>. Expressive writing in particular improves overall well-being, and increases control over moods, whereby a state of tranquillity as *Fiducia* aims for can be achieved.

A coping mechanism the First World War undoubtedly required even in neutral Switzerland, but art seems to lose this feature, if it is presumed that the novelty of Dada is applied holistically. If insecurity is either inner turmoil³ or the presence of danger,⁴ then it is undoubtedly evoked by Dada art already at this stage, as the deconstruction of artistic norms does not only signify that style differs considerably, but also that the effect of art defies norms.

Surely, it is presumptuous to assume that art only serves the purpose of security, for it has also been used to stir up emotions,⁵ yet especially in troublesome times it is certainly plausible that this aspect is noteworthy. The adverting from traditional forms of art and literature in particular, which is addressed in more depth in the manifesto, can be viewed as an adverting from meaning: ‘Dada [...] war die Hoffnung, durch Sinnentleerung einen Sinn zu finden, den die Zeitläufe noch nicht korrumpiert hatten.’⁶ The strict abolishment of meaning was regarded as ‘the necessary first step in

[3] Cf. Frédéric Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, trans. Ulrich Kunzmann (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015), 13–52.

[4] Cf. *Ibid.*, 53–97.

[5] As seen in the essay on the Baroque Age.

[6] Sabine Bitter, ‘Dada als Protestbewegung’ (Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen SRF, 3 February 2016), <http://bit.ly/2BJssiU>. ‘Dada [...] was the hope of finding meaning, which had not yet been corrupted by the course of time, by the emptying of meaning (my translation).’

the purging of a rotten culture’⁷ and can be regarded as the essence of Dada’s novelty because the unearthing of meaning was previously characteristic for literature and poetry.⁸ It attempted not to find meaning in the traditional sense, also explained as the bestowing of meaning with a directory and guiding purpose. Consequently, guidance is purposely omitted, which removes the anchorage created by art. Although the deliberateness of this act illustrates that the Dadas took control of their artistic movement and moulded it to their preference, meaning is still lost and seemingly leaves the movement without an orientating purpose to hold onto.

Dada’s control extends itself beyond the realm of meaning because it consciously aimed to rebuild authenticity⁹ as Europe was being reduced ‘to rubble’¹⁰ by Dada’s contemporaries.

[7] David Gascoigne, ‘Boomboom and Hullabaloo: Rhythm in the Zurich Dada Revolution’, *Paragraph* 33, no. 2 (2010): 199, <http://bit.ly/2PksTZg>.

[8] Cf. Barbara Hahn, ‘Lesenschreiben Oder Schreibenlesen: Überlegungen Zu Genres Auf Der Grenze’, *MLN* 116, no. 3 (2001): 565, <http://bit.ly/340UVNh>.

[9] Cf. Hubert van den Berg, ‘Avantgarde und Anarchismus: Dada in Zürich und Berlin’ (Universität Amsterdam, 1999), 285.

[10] Elza Adamowicz, *Dada Bodies: Between Battlefield and Fairground* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019), 2.

Authenticity and the proximity to life, which are attested to be absent in contemporary art according to the manifesto, are reinstated by Dada.

This leads Hugo Ball to say ‘Wie kann man alles Aalige und Journalige, alles Nette und Adrette, alles Vermoralisierte, Vertierte, Gezierte abtun? Indem man Dada sagt.’¹¹ Consequently, the antidote for the inauthentic, bourgeois way of life lies in Dada, which thereby implies that Dada is not merely a form of art, but that it committedly smashes the border to life in its actuality. Façade, moralisation¹²

and the genteel had to make way for perceived reality, which only Dada could achieve.¹³ This reality did not present itself favourably: apart from the war’s atrociousness, the climate of the times was further intoxicated, according to Hugo Ball.¹⁴ First, there was the surge in secularisation, during which belief was lost *en masse*,¹⁵ the destabilising effects of which were exacerbated by the discovery of the atom. That discovery signified that reality was no longer static, as matter

could change.¹⁶ Finally, technological progress presented its inevitable downside, namely that the human being as such lost its significance and machines were gaining increasing importance.¹⁷ Their destructible power was mainly demonstrated by the First World War. Similar to the circumstances of the Baroque times, the world was in what seemed like uncontrollable motion in a direction and within a realm which was neither predictable nor life-affirming. Un-

The climate of the times was intoxicated.

doubtedly, this could have given rise to insecurity because it attested danger to

be omnipresent, which, with Dada *seeking to* implement reality in art consequentially to render it life itself,¹⁸ was therefore also existent in Dada art and literature alike. Upon assessing Dada’s novelty and prompting our remarks on initial insecurities, Ball returns to the origin of the term ‘Dada’ itself. According to Ball, the term, which self-evidently serves an emblematic purpose, has a multitude of meanings depending on the chosen dictionary’s language.

[11] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, ‘Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916’. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. ‘How can one dismiss all that is eely, all “journaly”, everything nice and neat, everything moralised, brutish, genteel? By saying Dada (my translation).’

[12] Cf. Gascoigne, ‘Boomboom and Hullabaloo’, 201.

[13] Cf. Berg, ‘Avantgarde und Anarchismus’, 340.

[14] Cf. Adamowicz, *Dada Bodies*, 26.

[15] Cf. Ibid.

Dada stammt aus dem Lexikon.
Es ist furchtbar einfach. Im Franzoesischen bedeutets Steckenpferd. Im Deutschen: Addio, steigt mir bitte den Ruecken runter, auf Wiedersehen ein ander Mal!

[16] Cf. Ibid.

[17] Cf. Ibid., 27.

[18] Cf. Berg, ‘Avantgarde und Anarchismus’, 285.

Im Rumaenischen: 'Ja, wahrhaftig, Sie haben Recht, so ist es. Jawohl, wirklich. Machen wir'. [sic!] Und so weiter.¹⁹

In addition to being of ever-present internationality, which was also reflected elsewhere in Dada's texts,²⁰ and of children's language like qualities, the term's meanings, if they can be taken to be true, are conflicting with one another. No matter if one denounces the term as senseless blabber or is confused by its abundance of meanings, one cannot discern a universally true meaning and semantic field. To put it another way: through the conflicting meanings or lack of meaning and sense altogether, the human mind, which continuously has the desire to categorise²¹ and assess, is confused. Is it now a hobby horse? Is it just senseless blabber? With the movement being so closely tied to its chosen name, as is evident from the statement '[in

[19] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. 'Dada hails from the dictionary. It is terribly simple. In French, it means hobbyhorse. In German: Addio, please climb down my back, goodbye another time! In Romanian: "Yes, indeed, you are right, that's how it is. Yessir, really. We'll do it". [sic!] And so forth (my translation).'

[20] Cf. Gascoigne, 'Boomboom and Hullabaloo', 212.

[21] Cf. Muhammad Ali Khalidi, *Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

reference to the term 'Dada'] Nur ein Wort und das Wort als Bewegung. Es ist einfach furchtbar',²² this mystification is effortlessly conveyed to the movement itself, an effect which quite obviously leads to a greater effect than the quotidian, minimally disturbing reflection on the term itself. Therefore, it becomes unclear to the reader of the manifesto what now actually lies behind the ominous 'Dada' term and movement, aside from the fact that it is novel. This solely adds further to the perceived enigma which the movement is declaredly imbued with at this point in the text. Through this, insecurity can be said to have been evoked because the name does not give a universally comprehensible explanation regarding its contents and ambitions. Tranquillity, which *Fiducia* would argue to constitute *securitas*, can hardly be achieved, as it seems to be antagonistic to a lack of meaning, deconstruction and ominousness regarding its contents. Although one could apply the principle of 'ignorance is bliss'²³ and argue that not being able to scrutinise the threat to convention also allows for an assessment, there remains at the core the fact that Dada, cannot be branded nor assessed beyond doubt and thereby evokes insecurity.

[22] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. 'Just one word and the word as a movement. It is simply terrible (my translation).'

[23] Thomas Gray, 'On a Distant Prospect of Eton College', in *Select Poems of Thomas Gray*, ed. William J. Rolfe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1883), <http://bit.ly/2Wdn8xB>.

Ball moves on to expound on language itself, the traditional kind which was to be dismantled, and the novel kind which had not been existent and had to be built.²⁴ Ball himself admits to this in his manifesto by asserting the following:

Ich lese Verse, die nichts weniger vorhaben als: auf die Sprache zu verzichten. Dada Johann Fuchsgang Goethe. Dada Stendhal. Dada Buddha, Dalai Lama, Dada m'dada, Dada mhm'dada. Auf die Verbindung kommt es an, und dass sie vorher ein bisschen unterbrochen wird.²⁵

Conventionally, verses cannot relinquish language, as the necessary condition for the existence of a verse is thought to be the existence of language itself. (Logically perfect) language not being interpretable, according to philosopher Wittgenstein, it has the quality of connecting different individuals and therefore inherently

possesses continuity in its meaning.²⁶ If verse rids itself of language and is composed either of fragments of natural languages²⁷ or of a wholly 'unrecognisable personal language',²⁸ then this aspect of communication and community is lost. With the loss of meaning, therefore the loss of communal understanding, a sense of insecurity is amplified since it is not possible to doubtlessly determine the meaning of any verse. Theoretically, violent threats could be contained in Dada works and the public would not be able to recognise them as such. As a result, danger could not be distinguished from non-danger, the latter being comparable or even constituent of security.²⁹ More specifically, this is instated through the fact that a seemingly impermeable border is drawn between the Dada poet, the non-Dada reader and even the self-declaredly studied Dada reader. The latter should still not be able to fully grasp the content of the work of literature.

[24] Cf. Gascoigne, 'Boomboom and Hullabaloo', 207.

[25] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. 'I read verses which attempt nothing less than relinquishing language. Dada Johann Fuchsgang Goethe. Dada Stendhal. Dada Buddha, Dalai Lama, Dada m'dada, Dada mhm'dada. It comes down to the connection, and that it is interrupted a bit beforehand (my translation).'

[26] Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophus*, trans. C.K. Ogden (London, New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD.; Harcourt, Brace & Company, INC., 1922), 23, <http://bit.ly/2BEo9Wf>; Cf. Bertrand Russell, 'Introduction', in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophus*, by Ludwig Wittgenstein, trans. C.K. Ogden (London, New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD.; Harcourt, Brace & Company, INC., 1922), 7f, <http://bit.ly/2BEo9Wf>.

[27] Cf. Tobias Wilke, 'Da-Da: "Articulatory Gestures" and the Emergence of Sound Poetry', *MLN* 128, no. 3 (2013): 658, <http://bit.ly/340VgQ3>.

[28] Gascoigne, 'Boomboom and Hullabaloo', 207.

[29] Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 53–97.

Simultaneously to creating borders, those same borders are overstepped by Dada, which is highlighted by the connection of art to reality. Literature as a programmatic part of Dada art was aimed at hovering over artificial frontiers. More generally, the experimental sound poetry of Dada helped even general literature in this task.³⁰ Borders and conventions had been utilised by conventional artists and the consumers thereof as something to hold onto. When convention is destroyed and not replaced by another, it is arguably difficult to retain security in the sense of continuity.

This continuity can be said to bring about tranquillity of an equal degree as brought about the literary conventions which had performed their task reasonably well, according to most people. Although Dada was neither the first nor exclusive in its criticism and denunciation³¹—Symbolism in the late 19th century constituted first artistic attempts in modernism³²—it was amply uncompromising to be recognised as radical, which is only underlined by the fact that the bourgeoisie sought to repress Dada, not corre-

sponding to their imposed moral standards and even instituting spies at Dada performances.³³

Even more radical than verses which do not necessitate language is the wish to reinvent one's own words, as Ball proclaims:

[...] und ihr, verehrteste Dichter, die ihr immer mit Worten, nie aber das Wort selber gedichtet habt. [...] Ich will keine Worte, die andere erfunden haben. Alle Worte haben andere erfunden. Ich will meinen eigenen Unfug, und Vokale und Konsonanten dazu, die ihm entsprechen. Wenn eine Schwingung sieben Ellen lang ist, will ich fueglich Worte dazu, die sieben Ellen lang sind. Die Worte des Herrn Schulze haben nur zwei ein halb Zentimeter.³⁴

[30] Cf. Juliana V. Kaminskaja, 'SPRÜNGE ÜBER DEN EIGENEN SCHATTEN: Die Grenzen Der Literatur in Der Experimentellen Poesie', *Poetica* 42, no. 3/4 (2010): 396, <http://bit.ly/36fdG1A>.

[31] Cf. O. B. Hardison, 'Dada, the Poetry of Nothing, and the Modern World', *The Sewanee Review* 92, no. 3 (1984): 375, <http://bit.ly/32QDZJe>.

[32] Cf. 1900-1919, *The Avant-Garde Movements*, vol. 1, *Art of the Twentieth Century* (Milano: Skira, 2006), 13.

[33] Cf. Sascha Bru, *Democracy, Law and the Modernist Avant-Gardes: Writing in the State of Exception* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 139.

[34] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. '[...] and you, most honoured poets, who have always written with words, but never written the word itself. [...] I do not want any words, which others have invented. Others have invented all words. I want my own mischief, and vowels and consonants, which correspond to it. If a vibration is seven cubits long, I conveniently want corresponding words, which are seven cubits long. Mr Schulze's [Schulze is a typical German name] words are just two and a half centimetres long (my translation).'

The quote criticises the fact that one does not invent one's own words and the lack of correspondence with reality that is innate to words which have been concocted by others. It is precisely the correspondence to reality which corroborates that insecurity is to be found at the heart of this objective, too. Furthermore, the above passage accentuates the demand for language to be privatised to an uncanny degree where it is not as alien as utter gibberish, but also not as familiar as a natural language would be. Language is, therefore, in many ways at a threshold³⁵ and its meaning is substantially difficult to categorise or define.

It loses its distinctive property of intentional communication due to the fact that the perception of reality is partially subjective, from which insecurity also stems, since meaning, which can serve as a point of orientation, is bound to be misunderstood by parties other than the communicating one and is thus rendered defunct. After all, cognition can be deceptive. The sound poetry alluded to in the manifesto exhibits this: it is open to interpretation, much more so than a conventionally designed poem. Thus, a type of fluidity in meaning, if there is any at all, is created; 'a perfectly transparent poem can become everything simply because it is not tied to one specific meaning'.³⁶

[35] Cf. Wilke, 'Da-Da', 649.

[36] Hardison, 'Dada, the Poetry of Nothing, and the Modern World', 388.

Not only do the goals outlined in the passage present culturally challenging obstacles, but they also fundamentally criticise the established language whilst bickering about the fact that words have not yet been questioned as they ought to be. The criticism of language implies that it is in some way defunct, namely in the absence of congruence with reality. What by many has been thus far undisputed, is now declared as inherently faulty because, presumably, the Dada poet finds traditional language to be not sufficiently expressive for his particular ends and thus chooses the upbringing of a new language over silence.³⁷

Furthermore, Ball asserts that

ein Vers ist die Gelegenheit,
moeglichst ohne Worte und ohne
die Sprache auszukommen. Diese
vermaledeite Sprache, an der
Schmutz klebt wie von Makler-
haenden, die die Muenzen abge-
griffen haben. Das Wort will ich
haben, wo es aufhoert und wo es
anfaengt.³⁸

[37] Cf. *Ibid.*, 373.

[38] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. 'A verse is the opportunity to get on without words and without language as much as possible. This confounded language, on which dirt sticks to as from the hands of brokers, who have tapped coins. The word I want to have, were it ends and where it commences (my translation).'

Existing language is explicitly portrayed as a *malum*, rather than a *bonum*, which, assumedly, is usually the case. The conclusion that verse should function without language is drawn from the fact that language, as it has been used, is dirty, it being connected to a typical bourgeois profession. The bourgeoisie was Zurich Dada's 'universal opponent',³⁹ which sought to repress it morally⁴⁰ and provided it with a 'conservative or hostile audience'.⁴¹

Moreover, as is manifest regarding the cited passage in the manifesto, art and literature intentionally deviated from bourgeois convictions and conventions in order to achieve said congruence or correspondence with reality.⁴² The bourgeoisie setting (moral) standards and being more powerful financially and legally than a group of penniless artists, the radical practices of Dada put the group into a vulnerable position, where financial insecurity and legal difficulties were not a rarity, but a common occurrence.⁴³

[39] Bru, *Democracy, Law and the Modernist Avant-Gardes*, 156.

[40] Cf. *Ibid.*, 139.

[41] Gascoigne, 'Boomboom and Hullabaloo', 199.

[42] Cf. Esa Kirkkopelto, 'Abandoning Art in the Name of Art: Transpositional Logic in Artistic Research', in *Transpositions*, ed. Michael Schwab, Aesthetico-Epistemic Operators in Artistic Research (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), 33, <http://bit.ly/2PkhuZo>.

[43] Cf. Bitter, 'Dada als Protestbewegung'.

In order to digress further from the bourgeois within the realm of language, Ball insists that he wishes to be in possession of the word at its boundaries, too, just like the word 'dada' is 'at the very threshold of language'.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the word is portrayed as being of chief importance, as the fact of it being at the centre of discussion allows to conclude. This accentuates the characteristic protest element of Dada because it is defending the word against 'the journalistic and political abuses',⁴⁵ which language has endured, as a consequence of which it has been rendered common and undignified.⁴⁶

In the concluding sentence of the manifesto—'das Wort, das Wort, das Weh gerade an diesem Ort, das Wort, meine Herren, ist eine oeffentliche Angelegenheit ersten Ranges'⁴⁷—Ball officially instates the word and how it is made up as an object of utmost importance and thereby protests against its common use.

[44] Wilke, 'Da-Da', 649.

[45] T. J. Demos, 'Circulations: In and around Zurich Dada', *October* 105 (2003): 149, <http://bit.ly/344ILTs>. This refers to its use in war propaganda.

[46] Cf. Hugo Ball, *Flight Out of Time*, trans. Ann Raimés (1927; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 26. Cited in Demos, 'Circulations', 149.

[47] Magnaguagno, Meyer, and Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916'. Printed in Riha, *Dada Zürich*, 30. 'The word, the word, the *Weh* just in this place, the word, gentlemen, is a first-degree public affair (my translation).'



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Conventional language is an element of propaganda and one, if not the element of communication which distinguishes human beings from for example dogs. Thus, it is sufficiently radical and insecurity-desiring to force it to resign and instead, to re-instate the word and newly devised words at the top of hierarchy.

Although my friend and her classmates did not experience the same insecurity, rather experiencing a feeling of absurdity in relation to Dada, its contemporaries may very well have. Firstly, Dada was undeniably novel, both in its objectives and its nature. Dada pursued a path coloured by uncertainty and unpredictability, or in short: insecurity. There is neither is a greater meaning provided for, which would serve as a constant amidst the chaos of WWI and the modern period nor is foreseen the adherence to any conventions, which are familiar and would serve as point of attachment.

Although it could be argued that the decision to pursue uncertainty was a conscious one, and thereby exerting control over their artistic production in an unparalleled degree, this argument can be substantially weakened by the fact that, for the Dada audience, this was not necessarily the case. Control relies on being able to participate and if this participation is not given, Dada represents yet another dictated artistic convention to adhere to, which additionally subjects the unparticipating artist and the audience

to what seems absurd and uncategorisable.

Furthermore, the Dadas aspired to authenticity and their tying art to real life instead of depicting it. Consequently, the horrors of World War I, partly resultant from rapid industrialisation and scientific advances, were also present in art. As a consequence, escapism within the realm of art was no longer feasible and the presence of insecurity was painted as desirable. Direct confrontation ensured atrocious circumstances to be present even in areas where they would conventionally be glossed over by propaganda, or unintentionally romanticised in poetry.

Not even the term 'Dada' itself allows for a precise assessment, as its meanings are conflicting or non-existent. Dada as a

Escapism within the realm of art was no longer feasible.

whole thus became hardly definable, which only aids insecurity to be a characteristic and objective of the movement. Evolutionarily speaking, it makes sense to categorise what is perceived; upon emerging in Africa about 200,000 years ago,⁴⁸ *homo sapiens* needed to distinguish prey from predator and security from insecurity. It may have been unclear whether one thought of Dada as a movement with sufficient momentum to deem it as threatening as an ancient predator.

[48] American Museum of Natural History, *Seven Million Years of Human Evolution* (New York, 2018), <http://bit.ly/364iuGT>.

Insecurity was evoked, nonetheless, since it was unclear what Dada actually was and to which extent it jeopardised bourgeois morals and standards. It stated what it was in numerous manifestos, yet this definition implied the insecure and undefinable.

Not only is Dada somewhat private by virtue of its ambiguity to outsiders, but also by virtue of its argument for a privatised language which is not mutually comprehensible. Undoubtedly, articulated language serves as a mean of communication distinct for the human race, without which 'only' body language remains. Still, Dada advocated for an isolation from the (bourgeois) use of articulated language. Therefore, the group decisively isolated itself and rendered itself all the more undefinable to outsiders and its audience, from where insecurity stems.

The sense of insecurity is further substantiated by the fact that words are aimed to be corresponding to reality, whereby a conciliatory distance between reality and art is omitted. The insecure reality brought about by technological progress and the First World War was thus aimed to be translated into language itself, and henceforth, did no longer gloss over a state of insecurity.

Finally, Dada was radical in its artistic ambitions and objectives. This very radicality resulted in monetary insecurity, and this position was substantiated by virtue of Dada's rebelliousness. The bourgeoisie was arguably more powerful than the Dadas and sought to repress the

nascent movement.⁴⁹ Thus not only their art steered toward a theoretical and abstract form of insecurity, but their literal life circumstances followed suit.

En sommant, Dada differed significantly from the Stoic and Epicurean tradition, which *Fiducia* has richly practised, and furthermore, from Enlightenment thought, which the pendulum introduced us to, as it decisively pursued insecurity and denounced (bourgeois) security. It thereby exemplified that insecurity cannot only be viewed as something desirable, but also as something urgently necessary to combat the 'malaise of the time'.⁵⁰

[49] Cf. Bitter, 'Dada als Protestbewegung'. For example, police reports on the members were written.

[50] Richard Huelsenbeck, *Memoirs of a Dada Drummer* (1974; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), xviii. Quoted in Adamowicz, *Dada Bodies*, 7.

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- Artwork on page 65 by Bärbel Buchholz and Sina Buchholz, 2019, using Hugo Ball Im Kubistischen Kostüm. 1916. Photograph. SLA.

From good girl
to

secure

girl

‘You’re such a goody-two shoes’ is not a phrase you would like to hear someone say to you, right? Some would take it as a compliment, though. After all, it allows you to stay secure.

I am a feminist. Maybe. Why so doubtful, you may ask? There is a rather simple answer to this question: ‘[t]here is an urge to be good. To be seen to be good.’¹ Although this year’s Swiss *Frauenstreiktag*, the first to take place since 1991, counted a large number of participants, one is still greeted with leery looks upon stating that one is a feminist or, worse even, that one actively participates in ‘feminist’ activity, such as distributing flyers for feminist organisations. Perhaps this is because a surprisingly wide-spread notion insists that enough has already been done,² others are worse off, and of course that feminist demands are implausibly demanding. In order not to subject themselves to this kind of criticism, many engage in another type of feminism. This feminism is *Wohlfühlfeminismus*.³ It is more or less self-explanatory: it encompasses all things which make you feel good, such as wearing a t-shirt

with a feminist slogan or flooding your Instagram story with self-care posts. In short, ‘feminism is no longer just a political stance but has become a highly valuable and regularly traded commodity’.⁴ I, for that matter, am guilty of this commercialisation, too, for I have not only taken a conciliatory *laissez-faire* stance concerning *Wohlfühlfeminismus* during a class discussion on *Frauenstreiktag* itself before but have also only ever outed myself as a feminist in a room full of people with closed eyes. I have come to conclude that I do not only want to ‘be good’, as Zadie Smith tells me, but that tacitly, I want to be secure, too. In this, I am by far not the only one.

The question which remains to be asked is why I, living in idyllic, wealthy⁵ and politically stable Switzerland, want to feel and be secure at all. To summarise it: insecurity, for the *majority* of the population, does not consist in the presence of declaredly insecure circumstances, but in the possibility thereof.

[1] Zadie Smith, ‘Fiction by Zadie Smith: “Now More Than Ever”’, 16 July 2018, <http://bit.ly/33JWEXs>.

[2] Cf. Carisa R. Showden, ‘What’s Political about the New Feminisms?’, *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 30, no. 2 (2009): 168, <http://bit.ly/36W8XC5>.

[3] Cf. Fatima Moumouni, ‘Pop Macht Feminismus Einfach. Aber Feminismus Ist Nicht Einfach’, *Republik*, 14 June 2019, <http://bit.ly/3729cLQ>. The literal translation would be ‘feel-good feminism’.

[4] Lyndsey Ogle, ‘Confused Cats and Postfeminist Performance’, in *#identity*, ed. Abigail De Kosnik and Keith P. Feldman, Hashtagging Race, Gender, Sexuality, and Nation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 127, <http://bit.ly/2rFqIWf>.

[5] Cf. Bundesamt für Statistik, ‘Armut’, 2019, <http://bit.ly/2X9KpB0>.

Monetary insecurity due to, for example, unemployment seems to be looming above my head invariably. This is regardless of my (future) qualifications.⁶ The fear of being in a state of economic insecurity is closely tied to the fear of losing my societal position, for my profession or the fact of whether I am currently employed or not are decisive factors in social acceptance. Consequently, there is a collective and somewhat permanent ‘Abstiegsangst’⁷ in spite of comparatively little people being made redundant or living below the poverty line⁸ in Switzerland. Thus, insecurity is largely drawn up by the fear of a future scenario rather than by a present one. Politically speaking, a similar picture maps itself out:⁹ there is a large degree of

trust in the political system. In contrast to the Baroque Age, for example, I am not subjected to some capricious despot but am able to engage in politics via elections, initiatives and referendums, and can thus exert power over myself, by way of which I can become more secure, as described in ‘Of a philosophical pendulum’. As Locke already contested, it is impossible to satisfy the entirety of the citizen body,¹⁰ so surely one cannot assume this the case for each and every Swiss citizen. Perceived threats, however, do evoke insecurity within the realm of politics; this includes religious minorities, asylum seekers and open borders.¹¹ Oftentimes, these are utilised by political parties (one speaks of *Überfremdung*, for example)¹² to generate fear and make policy, irrespective of the threats’ actual magnitudes.¹³

[6] Cf. Christiane Lübke, ‘Leben Wir in Einer Angstgesellschaft? Die Verbreitung von Persönlichen Und Gesellschaftsbezogenen Sorgen in Deutschland’, in *Diagnose Angstgesellschaft? Was Wir Wirklich Über Die Gefühlslage Der Menschen Wissen*, by Jan Delhey et al., ed. Christiane Lübke and Jan Delhey (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2019), 29, <http://bit.ly/2O2rHHy>.

[7] Lübke, 29. ‘Fear of losing social status (my translation)’. Although the source addresses Germany specifically, such tendencies can be observed more generally, too.

[8] Cf. Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, ‘Statistiken Zur Arbeitslosigkeit Und Erwerbslosigkeit’, Arbeitslosenzahlen, 4 July 2019, <http://bit.ly/2CAIj3M>.

[9] Cf. Tibor Tresch Szvircsev et al., ‘Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend’, Sicherheit (Zürich, Birmensdorf: Militärakademie (MILAK) at ETH Zürich and Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2019), 19f, <http://bit.ly/2MLJIA2>.

[10] Cf. John Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’, in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (1689; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chaps VIII, §98, 350f.

[11] Cf. Alexandra Schwell, ‘Angst und das Andere. Dimensionen des Emotionalen in der kulturalanthropologischen Sicherheitsforschung’, in *Der Alltag der (Un-)Sicherheit: Ethnografisch-kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf die Sicherheitsgesellschaft*, by Katharina Eisch-Angus et al., ed. Alexandra Schwell and Katharina Eisch-Angus (Berlin: Panama Verlag, 2018), 112.

[12] Cf. Thomas Buomberger, ‘«Überfremdung»: Geschichte eines Schweizer Begriffs’, *History Reloaded* (blog), 7 April 2018, <http://bit.ly/2Oagzbt>. ‘Foreign domination (my translation)’.

[13] Cf. Schwell, ‘Angst und das Andere. Dimensionen des Emotionalen in der kulturalanthropologischen Sicherheitsforschung’, 112.

The fact that insecurity is largely evoked by the unreal (as in: the possible which has not yet been realised) manifests itself in my view of international politics, the future of which I view as largely grim-looking.¹⁴ For ever seething conflicts,¹⁵ states such as Turkey and Russia¹⁶ and the likes do not hesitate to evoke fear in me, for the political climate seems to be increasingly intoxicated, which, according to my train of thought, cannot culminate in sunshine and rainbows.

How could Wohlfühlfeminismus create sunshine and rainbows, and remove the thunderstorm which seems to be anticipating its own outbreak? Wohlfühlfeminismus, of course, cannot literally dispose of the root causes of the insecurities found in our hemisphere, never mind in hemispheres where our insecurities are desired. In fact, it does not even address the potential thunderstorm but pushes its existence aside in order to draw up security within other realms. The key to finding security in its variable definitions lies in 'being good'. If I am being a 'good girl', I am also being a 'secure girl'.

[14] Cf. Tresch Szvircev et al., 'Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend', 21.

[15] Cf. Reuters, "'Crafty and Vicious": North Korea Warns US Not to Ignore Deadline for Talks', *The Guardian*, 27 October 2019, sec. World news, <http://bit.ly/2pfetyT>.

[16] Cf. Tresch Szvircev et al., 'Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend', 21.

Closely related to 'being good' is feeling good or comfortable. If one feels good, which is manifestly the objective of *Wohlfühlfeminismus*, then one is usually content, too, and this exact notion of *être contente* is constituent of a particular type of security, namely ancient *securitas*, the state of contentment and tranquillity.¹⁷ In spite of this obvious correlation, this in itself is not the most important way by which security manifests itself since our understanding of security has become narrower and has migrated further toward the political, the economic or the assessment of danger.¹⁸

Wohlfühlfeminismus nurtures the private and secluded, and tacitly discourages the confrontational by 'appealing to the broadest constituency possible',¹⁹ which entails permeating the border to popular culture. Was I to wear a t-shirt with a slogan like 'feminism: the radical notion that women are people',²⁰ hardly anyone would take notice of it, it having become acceptable and even welcomed to do so.

[17] Cf. Panos Dimas, 'Epicurus on Pleasure, Desire, and Friendship', in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 171.

[18] Cf. Tresch Szvircev et al., 'Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend', 83.

[19] Michaelae L. Ferguson, 'Choice Feminism and the Fear of Politics', *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 1 (2010): 248, <http://bit.ly/371W0H6>.

[20] This slogan could be found on sweatshirts and t-shirts manufactured by H&M.

Was I to criticise my workplace's sexist policies, my colleagues would not react so acceptingly. *Wohlfühlfeminismus* inherently avoids this kind of confrontation. Admittedly, confrontation, even if on the basis of arguments, is both uncomfortable and insecure because it involves judgement,²¹ which seems to be the striking opposite of 'being good'. I do not enjoy being confined in a solitary existence, wherefore I seek social acceptance by a variety of methods. Perhaps *Wohlfühlfeminismus* is one of them, the latest version of people pleasing. After all, it separates itself from the political and is nearly universally accepted.

Through *Wohlfühlfeminismus* I can assure that I will not be labelled as the pedantic feminist who joyfully disrupts conversations to declare that 'your last sentence was very sexist' or demands the reduction or abolishment of the gender division of labour, to give some examples. Whilst some aspire to become exactly that, the majority of us does not want to step out on the stage in fear of being automatically labelled as an unreasonable creature aiming to wreck the status-quo, instead of rationally dismantling it. If I declaredly separate myself from those who are seen as being too radical,²² I automatically move into the acceptable realm. This is precisely what makes *Wohlfühlfeminismus* so universally acceptable and has found its way into popular

[21] Cf. Ferguson, 'Choice Feminism and the Fear of Politics', 251.

[22] Cf. Ferguson, 248.

culture.²³ The *clou* is that I do no longer have to swim against the tide in order to feel as though I am in fact instigating change.

Although community is important in *Wohlfühlfeminismus*, it favours the private over the communal. Aside from its real-life excesses in t-shirt-wearing, a part of *Wohlfühlfeminismus* occurs online,²⁴ and screens are notorious for creating unsurmountable barriers which are not voluntarily broken down because they allow me to hide and seek simultaneously, and do that with a degree of anonymity. The screen comforts me by promising to have control over my digital intake. If I wish to only see *Wohlfühlfeminismus* à la self-care on my timeline, then I can isolate myself from the remainder of feminist (social) media, which includes imperative, but more complex debates such as the one of intersectionality.²⁵ Critical thinking, which *should* create some inner turmoil, can be adverted effortlessly by tweaking my followed accounts or Google searches to *Wohlfühlfeminismus*. The 'real life' timeline cannot be modified so easily. Moreover, *Wohlfühlfeminismus* does not demand critical thinking within the private sphere either.

[23] Cf. Moumouni, 'Pop Macht Feminismus Einfach. Aber Feminismus Ist Nicht Einfach'.

[24] Cf. Moumouni.

[25] For an introduction on intersectionality see Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, 'Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis', *Signs* 38, no. 4 (2013): 785–810, <http://bit.ly/2OzZwjs>; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 'The Urgency of Intersectionality', (Talk, October 2016).



Quite palpably, I would be feeling rather exhausted instead of good, was I to reflect on my every action to figure out whether they are feminist or not, or to scrutinise my ideas proximally to uncover underlying sexist or non-feminist thought patterns or convictions.²⁶ *Wohlfühlfeminismus* protects me from my very own judgement and does not shy away from creating the illusion that my own choices are truly individual²⁷ and do not foster nor substantiate what we would actually label as non-feminist. By contrast, *Wohlfühlfeminismus* protects me from self-reflection.²⁸ It does not alert me to speak about the teacher who proclaims that ‘women belong into the kitchen’ or the classmate who laughingly declares that Viola Amherd, a Swiss federal councillor, belonged ‘an den Herd’²⁹ because her name already says so. Rather, it aims to gloss over such remarks because, alas, my speaking up in this miniscule event is not significant enough to play a role in a greater scheme.

[26] Cf. Ferguson, ‘Choice Feminism and the Fear of Politics’, 249.

[27] Cf. R. Claire Snyder-Hall, ‘Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of “Choice”’, *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 1 (2010): 259, <http://bit.ly/33JWIXc>.

[28] Cf. Hannah Arendt, *Vom Leben Des Geistes. Das Denken. Das Wollen*. (München: Piper Verlag, 1998), 189.

[29] In the German, ‘Amherd’, the lastname of the said federal councillor, only differs slightly from the expression ‘am Herd’, which means ‘at the stove’ and in this context implies she should be a housewife rather than a federal councillor.

There are more important feminist issues, such as sweatshops or the gender pay gap, to be tackled than a casual remark in everyday speech. Ironically, these more important issues are evidently not being undertaken either. Therefore, detaching my own actions, however miniscule they may be, from a greater societal context³⁰—which they are invariably in—is the equivalent of creating security within myself, for I have not only silenced my inner judgement, which is attempting to convince me that not everything is fine, but also outer judgement, which would denounce my meticulous remarks. Therefore, I can retain my secure tranquility and remain socially acceptable at the same time.

Finally, *Wohlfühlfeminismus* readily promulgates the view that ‘anything goes’,³¹ in the sense that I do not have to alter my course of action in accordance with feminist principles, such as speaking up in cases such as the one mentioned, in order to be considered feminist. I can simply follow my already chosen, indeed thoroughly acceptable path. This path does not differ from the stream,³² and I have still got things straightened out with myself.

[30] Cf. Jessa Crispin, *Why I Am Not a Feminist: A Feminist Manifesto* (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2017), 17f.

[31] Cf. Snyder-Hall, ‘Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of “Choice”’, 259.

[32] Cf. Crispin, *Why I Am Not a Feminist*, 15.

Detaching my actions from their context creates security.

Surely, this type of feminism seems to be more inclusionary and does not draw as distinct of a line between ‘feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’, but simultaneously to finally opening itself up to inclusivity and intersectionality,³³ it also paves the way for the typical *Wohlfühlfeminist*in* whose Instagram bio might say ‘feminist’, but who wants to stay as comfortable as possible, as a consequence of which she or he does not defend feminist concerns against those who still want to see women tied to the stove. To express it with the words of Molière: ‘[L]’hypocrisie est un vice à la mode, et tous les vices à la mode passent pour vertus.’³⁴ In being good, and not raising my voice, I am being hypocritical, subscribing to feminist concerns and understanding myself as a feminist. But at last, I have decidedly removed the distasteful, confrontational element of feminism in order to paint myself a picture of sunshine and rainbows. I have become secure.

[33] Cf. Snyder-Hall, ‘Third-Wave Feminism and the Defense of “Choice”’, 259.

[34] Molière, *Dom Juan Ou Le Festin de Pierre*, ed. and trans. Helmut Stenzel (1665; repr., Ditzingen: Reclam, 1989), 130. ‘[H]ypocrisy is a fashionable vice, and all fashionable vices pass for virtues.’ Translation taken from Molière, *The Dramatic Works of Molière*, trans. Henri Van Laun (Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1876), 161, <http://bit.ly/2Qm64Vt>.

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Artwork on page 75 by Sina Buchholz and Bärbel Buchholz, 2019.

'There is no such
thing as

What do
we want?
Climate
justice!

What do we
want?
Security!

absolute security.'

Susanne Krasmann is a professor for Sociology at the University of Hamburg. We spoke about the benefits of insecurity, the climate strikes and what to do about feeling insecure.

Sina Buchholz: Let us start off with a fundamental question: what do you think does security mean today given that the term has undergone a relatively big development from antiquity, where one thought of it a state of inner tranquillity, until today. What do you think makes up security today, in a societal context?

Susanne Krasmann: I would say that the term has become narrower and has shifted from the broader meaning of tranquillity and being free of care into a direction where in political discourse, it is strongly associated with police and crime, and sometimes also with economic insecurity. The criticism from a psychological standpoint is that oftentimes, what is not achieved by social policies, which then creates economic insecurity, is sometimes replaced by a discourse along the lines of ‘security is jeopardised by certain fields of crime’.

This was an important topic mainly in the 1990s, where the notion exploded a lot of policy was being made with security; security in the sense of crime. I think that in recent times, this has taken on yet another dimension. Due to the fact that in the field of crime fighting, terrorism has come to the forefront, I believe that this particular threat has on the one hand become much more abstract, because it is such an international phenomenon, but on the other hand, has become much more vivid when there are individual attacks. This is to say that I think

that societal perception and discourse, too, have shifted. I suppose that insecurity, which is being related to all these issues like terrorism, threat and so on, has become a bit vaguer.

SB: Would you then say that this need for security is justified if one considers threats such as terrorism or do we oftentimes exaggerate?

SK: I believe one cannot answer this question with either ‘yes, it is justified’ or ‘it is only exaggeration’. If one considers what the odds of being struck by a terrorist attack are ... I am not entirely sure, but I think that someone once said that here in Germany, but surely in Switzerland, too, the odds are less than being struck by lightning. In that sense, it is certainly not valid, but it is justified in the sense that one can definitely say that there are new types of threats—one cannot negate that there is something like a terrorist threat which, especially today, is tied to other forms [of crime] in society. Here, I am chiefly talking about Germany. For example, hate crimes or aggressions against certain demographic groups who are labelled as being ‘other’ or are perceived as such. This means that the question of terrorism, violence and attacks used against ‘others’ are closely tied to each other and of course, in that case one can assert that to the affected people, the threat is obviously very big.

SB: This question is not directly, perhaps just implicitly, connected to this issue. I once read in an interview that in reality, there lies fear behind insecurity. Can one express this in such absolute terms or is there also another possibility?

SK: Fear is something very vague. If one further assumes this meaning of insecurity, of course one can then say that there is a connection there, namely that insecurity is always some manifestation of fear. Insecurity can also be taken in the sense of uncertainty and unfamiliarity, which evokes fear. Oftentimes, this is not related to something which can be labelled, so it is not

a fear of a specific threat as in the fear of a specific object, but it can also

be something very vague in the sense of a societal uncertainty concerning status, for example. All too often it appears to me, one also operates with the fact that that political discourse on threats actually evokes fear in society.

This line of argumentation, I think, one cannot open up in this way. In their everyday lives, people are occupied with different concerns and worries than with this specifically. So, there is not such a direct connection between the discourse on threat and an objective terrorist threat, so that people are frightened of the latter. I would certainly not assert that these things are linked immediately.

SB: I have a question concerning the climate strikes. I have considered whether the attractiveness of the strikes, among other factors,

lies in the fact that people look into the future with worry and think ‘well, it is effectively uncertain what it will look like—we want security’. Of course, this is implicit, even though one cannot directly control what will happen with respect to the climate. Would this be a possibility?

SK: That is an interesting question—of course. The phenomenon is too recent to be able to confirm this in detail, but I would definitely say that it is conspicuous how this is an entirely new political movement, how it expresses itself very differently from earlier social movements and that another group is essen-

Fear can be something vague in the sense of a societal uncertainty.

tial, namely it is teenagers and children who advance here. Of course, this also

entails that the role of parents is a totally new one; the role of parents who are in part of a generation which also partook in political protest movements.

This is a really interesting, new constellation and I would also say that, similar to the other issues, on the one hand, there is a serious concern based on serious facts so that one proclaims ‘we need to do something here’. It is indeed conspicuous that suddenly, teenagers and children emerge who have this kind of factual knowledge which did not play such a big part in earlier social movements and in particular, was not always expressed so obviously and clearly. On the other hand, I can see how there could be something involved as in ‘insecurity is being canalised’.

There is now this new, big topic which involves something like bouts of solidarization so that one says ‘this is the new field in which I can become politically active, in which I can express that I am committed and in which I can perhaps also express that I am concerned’, without deciding that it is always used as a pretext. I do believe though that it gathers momentum and that one becomes part of a community on which everything is focused now and which perhaps also diverts energy away from other fields.

SB: Could not a certain concern, not just in relation to the climate strikes but also more generally, be conducive? Since one always claims that security is something very positive, something desirable and portrays insecurity as something negative.

SK: That is a very good question. It is perhaps something which reveals itself today and is becoming increasingly apparent that this very new generation, but also the adults, are asking themselves what they are actually doing about being politically active regarding protecting the climate or also for becoming active against hate and so on. This negative evaluation could be entailed by neoliberal politics, which trusted in the fact that one should not rely on the state but that one is active as a citizen. For this, it is an ironic turnaround, so to speak. In neoliberal politics, one could say that there are apparently more voices who say ‘we want to do something about this’. There is also a generally approving attention to social changes or to something which has

become an issue within the realm of hate crimes, namely a sensibility to the political or social climate along the lines of ‘there are certain people who commit these hate crimes and there are others who sanction their actions’. This sensibility has increased, equally and in parallel to what is occurring in the climate debate.

SB: Could one also say that there is something like ‘too much’ security?

SK: Of course, I mean the criticism of the welfare state for example, which was issued by neoliberalism, was also justified as in ‘the state takes care of everything, it meddles with private life’. Generally, it criticised that there is an attitude along the lines of ‘the state will fix it anyway’. In this case, one definitely needs to find a healthy balance so that it is not always suggested that we can rely on some superior authority or also that it is not always suggested that there is something like absolute security and that it is the ultimate ambition.

In that case, this can not only lead to the state prying but also to getting too comfortable. The statements I am making are certainly dangerous in the sense that it is not about saying that insecurity is good and people should get out. Take the example of the refugee debate, where there was something along the lines of ‘these are great people, they fled over different countries and we can employ them immediately’, which is also a certain irony concerning what they have suffered through and which pressure they are under.

So, this means that one needs to be careful regarding this aspect, but I would definitely say that there is something like ‘too much’ security, both in the sense of too much control but also of too much security, which is in any case and on both counts limiting the exercise of freedom, if one wants to express it pathetically.

SB: But still, security is very attractive as one we can see everywhere. Why is that?

SK: It is certainly to be taken seriously. On the one hand, security is a condition for having a space in which one is secured in order to attend to art and culture, for example, and in order to not be under pressure due to threats and uncertainties. That is certainly good. There is still a somewhat comprehensible striving for something along the lines of ‘I have my home, my car, my family—I am set up for life’. That is a certain lifestyle which cannot just be contested; it is common and desirable.

Otherwise I would also say that there is also signs of teenagers of that age specifically wanting to experience something else and not being content with everything being without challenge. This whole movement of leisurely sports and extreme sports also has something to do with it and is also distinguishable as ‘people do not just want comfort, they also want a challenge, they want [inaudible]’. This means that sure, security is, especially in the Western hemisphere, the dominant life plan, which belongs to this [security being so popular]. We really live, if we consider

the rest of the world, very securely, comparatively. On the other hand, I believe that most or many people do not want this ‘I am only well and I am becoming comfortable’ unconditionally or also look for something else eventually.

SB: Nonetheless, many right-wing parties, for example the Swiss People’s Party in Swiss politics, feel there is too little security and that especially refugees represent a big threat.

SK: Yes, this is one form of the plea for security, but due to the fact that one first calls on insecurity ... Nevertheless, this is what is so interesting about this right-wing movement, which we also have here in Germany and which argues in a similar way, that they occur in regions where the so-called threat actually does not exist. This means that there is, what do I know, an infinitesimal number of foreigners in Eastern Germany or alternatively, foreign looking people, which objectively speaking cannot constitute a threat.

Simultaneously, one could maybe say that there is a connection to other insecurities which play a part there or also social imbalances, which are then experienced or viewed as having been treated unfairly politically and not economically (as in ‘there was no infrastructure built; so that there is a channelization’).

SB: Now, I still have a relatively open question: can freedom and security be combined? Or are they terms antagonistic to one another, as one might assume intuitively?

SK: No, historically speaking, the state formed due to promises for security and only then, the liberals came into the picture and said ‘yes, but we also need freedom and rights of the citizens, who can then oppose it [the state]’. One can also then say that this ‘there are dangers, from which the state must protect’ was simultaneously always a vehicle to limit civil liberties. Conversely, one can equally assert—which also was done, historically speaking—something along the lines of ‘security is the pre-condition for freedom’. And this is of course true as well: if one abolished the police and all other security authorities ... I do not know if this would conduce freedom, actually. In that sense I would say that it is important that it is not just a question of weighing the two options—so ‘security and more security [lead to] less freedom’ and the inverse—but that they are mutual requirements, which of course does not run along the lines of ‘more security yields more freedom’. It is simply a permanent act of balance to draft bills and to use measures accordingly but also to omit these steps.

SB: Is security, in the sense of a state of objective security, where there is no danger—rather than an inner state of mind—, achievable?

SK: First, I would say that it is impossible because there is no such thing as absolute security. There is always something unpredictable and in that moment in which we think of the future, we can say that we do not know what will be tomorrow nor in an instant—and so on and so

forth. Simultaneously, one can of course assert that the probability that everything, the whole order, will collapse in an instant in our hemisphere is very low. For good reasons, we have the experience that we are able to rely on certain structures. But this ‘being able to rely on something’ is a form of trust. We cannot know that we can rely on something in the sense of some kind of certainty, but rather, it is the experience of the contingency that it could also be different or could become different, even radically so. The latter, it also accompanies.

SB: You have mentioned trust, how is it related to security?

SK: I am talking about trust meaning that one experiences that things stay the way they are, that one can rely on the fact that in these parts, if say one goes to the police, that the police will not just imprison you, but that one can say ‘I have a complaint, could you take care of this?’ and that one then has the experience that this actually occurs. This is the case within certain boundaries. The reliability of state institutions belongs to the fact that trust is built accordingly. That one is not concerned daily with a terrorist attack also appertains to the fact that trust, this belief that the surplus will last, will subsist and that it could of course be different. But this does not come out of nowhere. Even if there is not something as systematic as the political battle of some group against the state but something like in the US.

There was a situation involving a sniper, so somebody who shot people in the supermarket from ambush; one had difficulty finding him and it was a situation in which it was absolutely necessary that the state got this under control because otherwise the entire trust which I, when I would be, so to speak, threatened by the danger of being shot, would have lost, namely just by one person. This means that a form of trust in state institutions, even if they are functioning regularly, can be shattered very quickly.

SB: Can trust also be used, no matter if unconsciously or fully consciously, to create some kind of illusion of security?

SK: One can misuse trust, but I do not think that this plays a big part in security politics to begin with because in that very moment where there is some scandal, for example concerning the abuse of constitution protection by units which covertly engage in illegal activities—, then trust is gone. I think that in this sense and within this realm, this does not work well.

SB: How could one as an individual deal with political or economic insecurity? One always or often claims that we are living in ‘insecure times’, what could be the solution, if one wants to express it so exaggeratedly?

SK: To be politically active. It depends on the realm in which this is the case. To stay fit, to stay flexible concerning social situations is certainly the best prerequisite.

But I would never restrict my answer to this and say ‘so, stay fit and all is well’, but instead connect it to the fact that the degree of feeling insecure and what one can do about it is always a political question.

Now it is your turn ...


In which context have you encountered security before?

How would you relate trust and security to one another?

Do you think that insecurity can also be something beneficial?

How would you attempt to get rid of insecurity?






Why does this samurai figurine (is that what you call it? No clue.) give me security? Well, obviously it is a fighter and that's the main thing about samurais; they fight until they die, exactly what I intend to do. Also, I've had a weird obsession with heroes or fighters since my childhood: pirates, or knights, or whatnot. And my girlfriend gave it to me as a present. So, all these factors combined make it a pretty cherished and safe object for me. In general, the question I ask myself is: what does security feel like? It gives me hope, I guess, that no matter how crap things get, I'll keep fighting and it'll get better. Yes, I think this security mainly feels hopeful to me. Just ignore the fact that samurais sometimes committed seppuku, death by honor, it kind of ruins the vibe. There's nothing honourable about that.

[Meret Mareike Behschnitt]






Literal security is provided to me by my walking sticks and shoes. I slipped twice with my old shoes last year and the second time I even had a twisted ankle and I still sometimes feel the twist up to this very day. Thus, I have become extra-careful, have bought new shoes and use my walking sticks with great enthusiasm, because they make me feel so safe. [M.S.]



My chain works a bit like a mirror. It reflects energy and things that people say back. It's a shield to protect myself and therefore gives me comfort. It's also a form of identification. Bys wearing my chain I get associated with certain groups of people. It's a way of showing what I think and who I am. Being part of those groups and having the people around me gives me comfort aswell. [Olivia]



So, on the one hand safety for me means measurements that are taken so that you are protected from situations that might cause a risk or some kind of physical injury. On the other hand, it is a feeling; a good feeling. It feels warm and as if there was an invisible protective bubble around me which shields me from anything harmful. In this case my safety object, also known as my fluffy friend Bono, is not a measurement—it is an object that provokes this above explained safety feeling. It was given to me by a dear friend of mine before going to Portugal this summer, ‘to take care of me’, and ever since it will not leave my side (actually it has left my side for a bit due to this project). [Sarah W.]



The four metallic objects, also known as keys, on my key-chain may seem rather unspectacular at first sight. And they are, to an outsider. But for me, each one of them is connected to an important thing in my life, which they lock and keep safe and protected. Firstly, and most importantly, the key to my apartment. My home, and especially my room, is my hide-away and the place I feel most comfortable at. The key ensures that I can always return to that place, no matter what. Secondly, the key to the lock of my bicycle. Due to the fact that I go everywhere by bike, it represents my freedom and mobility, and the lock ensures that no one can take that from me. Lastly, I carry two keys to the locker in our

school. My own one ensures that my pricey books and sportswear are safe in a strange place. The one to Sujani's stands for our friendship and the security to know that we have each other's backs. I am not a person that connects to things, but rather the meaning behind them and that is why my keys are so important to me.

[Andrea]

About
a year ago, I found
Le Petit Prince by Antoine de Saint-Ex-
upery hidden in my sister's closet. It has been on my bed-
side table ever since. I pick it up whenever I feel like I
am being crushed by emotions that I can't fully under-
stand nor express with my own words; when I am
alone and restless after a long day and can't make
sense of the world or myself. The book seems to
me like a treasure trove of solacing sentences.
Although it is written for children, it always
gives me the feeling of being understood
and it always leaves me with a lasting
feeling of not being alone in my strug-
gles, that it is a normal part of being
human. It acts as a catharsis for all
my pent up, unexplained, unex-
pressed emotions Once I read
a bit it all comes bursting
out and there is no holding
back the tears anymore.
Then I can finally feel
at rest and be okay
with myself. It of-
fers me security
in a sense that
I know that
I can find
comfort
in it,
that
I



[Debby]

can
re -
late to the
struggles of the
little prince, that
he would understand
me. In a way, it allows me
to let go of whatever is gnawing
at me and get some peace after all.
I usually have a hard time expressing or
accepting emotions like sadness, loneliness
and letting go of inner tension, but just knowing
that the book is always right there to help me with it,
makes me a lot calmer.



As my security object, I chose my mobile phone. I store a lot of information such as reminders, events, and birthday dates on there and my friends' and family's contacts. I'm always reachable on my phone, read plenty of news, and listen to music on it. If I don't have it with me when I expect an important call, or message, or when I have to look something up, I can easily become nervous and tense. That is why I feel secure when I have it on me. It's reassuring to know that I have access to all of these things at any time of the day. [Gyöngyi]





When I was born, my grandfather gave me a little lion. I probably got some other stuffed animals, too, but for as long as I can remember, this little lion has always been with me. Whenever I spent a night at another place I took it with me, and even nowadays it's in my bed in case I need something to cuddle. It's a sign for safety for me because

it reminds me of the time when I was younger, and everything was alright, and all my worries were about stupid little things like 'what am I going to eat for breakfast tomorrow?'. Thinking about this time makes me feel like everything was okay back then, so whatever problems there are now, will somehow turn out to be okay as well.



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This little stuffed moose was given to me by my grandmother when I was still a little girl. For me, my grandmother is a place of safety because I know that she'll always look after me and have my back. For this reason, it's really special to me and I used to take it with me on all my trips and

have it next to me when I slept.

It gave me the feeling that she was with me in a way and that I'd be safe. I'd

describe this feeling of safety as a warm, loving and protected. You could

compare it somewhat with how people experience having a guardian angel. Nowadays,

I'm not as attached to it as I used to be but I still have it next

to me on my bedside table as a keepsake and reminder of her.



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Donald


No matter what state I am in, or how crappy it is, when I see my watch I
feel safe and can calm down well. [Livian]





g book. It's a type of emotional security. An eReader is extremely useful for readers

I read a lot, this I'll admit. Sometimes, my small library simply cannot keep up with my literary consumption, which is why I've read my favourite books multiple times already. I don't who have little space. One can comfortably carry hundreds of thick books in one's bag. That's why I don't need to fear boredom as long as I have my electronic library with me. No




no matter what happens, all my favourite stories are just a hand away. [Gabriel]

mind knowing in advance what will happen. This way, I already know that I won't waste my time on a disappointing


for me seeing my surrounding gives me safety. [Tamara]




I've chosen my glasses because without them I can't really see much and for me seeing my surrounding gives me safety. [Tamara]

A close-up photograph of a hand holding a pearl necklace. The necklace is made of several strands of pearls and is held in a way that it forms a loop. Below the necklace, a lit candle is visible, with its flame casting a warm, golden glow. The background is a soft, out-of-focus orange-brown color. The overall mood is warm and nostalgic.


This pearl necklace was a gift of my grandfather to my mother who later passed it on to me. Since my mother's side of the family all live in Japan and I don't see them so often, wearing the pearl necklace makes me feel connected to them and part of the family and somewhat home and safe. [M.S.]



A game of chess features infinite possibilities, and during a game of serious, competitive chess, the endless variations of the opening and middle game can feel intimidating and sometimes overwhelming. Yet once you have successfully navigated these complications and emerge in the ultimate phase of the game—the endgame—with a winning position, you reach a point when, thanks to studying typical endgame positions, you know exactly what you have to do in order to win. All your insecurities vanish and, in supreme confidence, you move the pieces towards your opponent, safe in knowing that victory is yours. It's a moment when the knowledge you have acquired through study and practice provides you with a sense of complete security. [Anonymous]



[Sine + Cura]
Approaching the Human Need for Security



Supervised by Martin Rüesch
Maturity paper at Kantonsschule Zürich Nord

Foreword

People want to capture what they experience, and they hold onto whatever they have captured. A former Latin teacher of mine introduced this idea of the diligent, yet near-obsessive activity to our class, upon which she moved on to expound on Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*. Her remark prompted some thoughts on what may lie behind the rigorously executed routine of capturing our experiences with the help of camera rolls, voice memos and writing. I eventually accounted the human need for security for it. Out of these reflections, this magazine was first born and then raised. Raising and disciplining *Sine plus Cura* proved to be an invigorating and utterly rewarding experience, which would not have been possible without certain individuals.

First and foremost, I am indebted to my supervisor Martin Rüesch, who carefully probed every line and pixel of *Sine plus Cura* so that it could become what it is today. His perceptive advice in our discussions was both directive and profoundly motivating for the creation and completion of this project. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Susanne Krasmann, with whom I could conduct an enlightening interview on today's security, and Meret Mareike Behschnitt, who gave life to *Fiducia* and the philosophical pendulum. Furthermore, my thanks go to Kate Connolly and Isabelle Morton for kindly taking the time to apply their expertise of the English language to my texts. I am also deeply grateful to my teachers, who lent me books pivotal for research, with whom I had stimulating discussions, and who supported and encouraged this project. In particular, I would like to thank Eike Martens, Dr. Michael Pfister, Oliver Schlumpf, Dr. Myriam Spörri and Christian Suter.

Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude toward my friends. They supported me wholeheartedly, no matter whether by trusting me with their 'security objects', tolerating my endless chatter about security or by giving me creative advice. Their encouragement, their ability to make me laugh and their unconditional care will not be forgotten. You know who you are. Ich möchte ausserdem meiner Grossmutter Ilse Buchholz danken, die mir während zweier Wochen ein kreatives und in jeder Hinsicht inspirierendes Exil bot; I want to thank my aunt Silvia Buchholz, who captured the magazine's essence in its unofficial title *The Histosophe*, and my mother Bärbel Buchholz, who supported and believed in *Sine plus Cura* and myself from start to finish.

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1 Introduction

Sine plus cura yields security, and security is on everyone's lips. What does this much-debated term mean? What does it encompass? Why do we need what is described by it? Since security placed in a variety of contexts,¹ it is not so simple a task to arrive at a concise, sufficiently enveloping definition. Nonetheless, there are different notions encompassed by security, which can roughly be summarised by tranquillity,² the absence of danger,³ the state⁴ and 'Schutz, Kontrolle und Regulierung'.⁵ Precisely 'the term's ambiguity might be said to increase its ideological efficacy'⁶ in a degree which explains its 'enormous cultural power'.⁷ This would shed light on why it is at the forefront of political and societal discussion. Not all notions appertaining to security as a whole are treated equally in scientific discourse, which largely dedicates itself to 'topics dealing with international relations, political science, and law enforcement'⁸ but also to 'Verkehrssicherheit, menschliche Sicherheit, [...]'.⁹ As a result thereof one can infer that primarily, the notion of 'Schutz, Kontrolle und Regulierung'¹⁰ is investigated today. This is mirrored in the research interests of institutes¹¹ and journals¹² occupying themselves with security as well as the field of security studies.¹³ Although often concerned with political philosophy in particular, there are philosophical standpoints such as Michel Foucault's lecture series *Security, Territory, Population*,¹⁴ apart from which security is presently tackled in an approach relating to the history of ideas.¹⁵

¹ Cf. John T. Hamilton, *Security: Politics, Humanity, and the Philology of Care* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 8.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, 51–58.

³ Cf. Frédéric Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, trans. Ulrich Kunzmann (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015), 53–97.

⁴ Cf. Anthony Burke, 'Aporias of Security', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 9f, <http://bit.ly/2rDoypV>; Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 99–121; Cf. Eli Jelly-Schapiro, 'Security: The Long History', *Journal of American Studies* 47, no. 3 (2013): 803, <http://bit.ly/2rwkvfa>.

⁵ Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 186.

⁶ Hamilton, *Security*, 8.

⁷ Anthony Burke, 'Aporias of Security', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 6, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40645035>.

⁸ Hamilton, *Security*, 13.

⁹ Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 185. 'Road safety, human security, [...] (my translation)'.
¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹¹ Cf. 'Forschung', Center for Security Studies, 2019, <http://bit.ly/34wJg9y>.

¹² Cf. 'Security Dialogue', SAGE Journals, accessed 18 November 2019, <http://bit.ly/2DlwbEi>.

¹³ An introduction into Security Studies, a field in International Studies, is provided in Shawn Smallman and Kimberley Brown, *Introduction to International and Global Studies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 35–74.

¹⁴ Cf. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, Michel Foucault, Lectures at the Collège de France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781403986528>.

¹⁵ See for example Jelly-Schapiro, 'Security'; Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*.

In spite of the hegemony of international studies and the likes within scientific discourse, *Sine plus Cura* places itself within another context, which is outlined by three leading questions:

How has the human need for security influenced historical developments? What are philosophical standpoints that have been taken or can be taken? Where can we observe its manifestations today?¹⁶

From the onset, it was nevertheless clear that giving conclusive answers to the questions would exceed the scope of one magazine. Thus, it was the aim to give specific examples for historical developments, philosophical standpoints and contemporary manifestations in order to map out the answers rudimentarily, with the human need for security being the overarching theme. Security and in particular the need thereof being approachable from a biological and psychological standpoint, the magazine looked to additionally implement these subject areas in the form of an interview.

The present report is structured in the following manner: upon this introduction, it will briefly describe why the format of a magazine was chosen and what target group it is intended for. Then, each element of *Sine plus Cura* will be reflected upon accordingly. Moreover, the report contains a comment on the layout as well as reflective and concluding remarks, which take a holistic approach and describe the most notable conceptual changes as well as urgent points of criticism. Finally, some suggestions for further study will be provided.

2 Print is dead

2.1 Why a magazine?

Similar to the term security itself, the magazine is malleable and thus allows for a certain freedom not inherent to the ‘classical’ academic paper, so that the objective of utilising the human need for security as a framework and then closely analysing sub-topics within history, philosophy and sociology could be realised. In addition, the topic could be translated into the layout (chapter 10). To most, a magazine seems more attractive and engaging than an academic paper, which seemed important considering the topicality of the human need for security. Nevertheless, there is the disadvantage to print media of not being as popular as social media platforms, where information is gained increasingly.¹⁷ This movement, however, is already being counteracted by independent publications within the magazine industry,¹⁸ which is what *Sine plus Cura* also intends to do within the context of being a Maturity paper.

¹⁶ The leading questions are cited from the magazine’s disposal, the final version of which was devised in April 2019.

¹⁷ Cf. Vivian Reese, ‘You Won’t Believe How Co-Dependent They Are: Or: Media Hype and the Interaction of News Media, Social Media, and the User’, in *From Media Hype to Twitter Storm*, ed. Peter Vasterman (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 322, <http://bit.ly/33tWnqW>.

¹⁸ Cf. Vanessa Thorpe, Arts, and Media Correspondent, ‘Smart, Cool ... and in Print: How Indy Mags Became All the Rage’, *The Observer*, 22 July 2018, sec. Media, <http://bit.ly/33xY5Yt>; Ruth Jamieson, *Print Is Dead. Long Live Print: The World’s Best Independent Magazines* (München: Prestel Verlag, 2015).

Thus, it does not attempting to fit its intentions and contents into the mould of social media and other online formats.

2.2 The reader

In light of contemporary media not being intended to require long attention spans,¹⁹ it was first the objective to devise shorter articles around four A4 pages in length, which would have rendered the content more accessible and allotted it with a greater potential to be popularised.²⁰ Given I did not want the magazine to be consumed quickly and superficially but slowly and thoroughly, which already restricted the target group to those who wish to entertain themselves with slow media,²¹ the articles became longer throughout the process and tackled topics more remote from everyday life. Since slow consumption similarly entails engaging with the reader, interactive pages for certain articles were created. They pose generally formulated questions to the reader in order to motivate them to express their own opinions and thoughts on the questions addressed in the texts, such as ‘Does *Fiducia* have tunnel vision? Or is she just admirably determined?’.²² These prompts are not exclusively aimed at retaining the attention of the reader but equally, ask them to reflect on the arguments presented in the text critically, and in the described example especially, to subtly criticise an excessive striving toward security. This tacit criticism, however, is elaborated on in the conclusion (chapter 12).

In order to understand the texts, the reader needs to have a good understanding of the English language, as well as foundational knowledge regarding history and philosophy. Nevertheless, contextual information and suggestions for further reading are provided in the footnotes. Aside from these necessary conditions, *Sine plus Cura* addresses a reader who is already interested in history, philosophy, sociology or security rather somebody who is not.

3 Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas

The title ‘Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas’ translates as ‘How *homo sapiens* becomes *securitas*’ and is my translation from English to Latin. With this title in mind, the article relates to the second and third leading questions insofar that it delineates philosophical standpoints all the while issuing a critique on the contemporary striving for security by carrying the latter to the extremes. Despite its main object of study being antiquity, it nevertheless occupies itself with the implications of the human need for security in the present.

¹⁹ Cf. James G. Webster, *The Marketplace of Attention: How Audiences Take Shape in a Digital Age* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 6f.

²⁰ Insofar one can speak of ‘popularisation’ regarding a Maturity paper.

²¹ Cf. Sabria David, Jörg Blumtritt, and Benedikt Köhler, ‘Das Slow Media Manifest’, *Slow Media* (blog), 2010, <http://bit.ly/2sicLxE>. I am mainly referring to the second paragraph of the manifesto, ‘Slow Media fördern Monotasking’.

²² Cited from *Sine plus Cura*, 18.

3.1 The origin and meaning of the term *securitas*

The term *securitas*, the ancestor of the term ‘security’, is a synthesis of the Latin terms *sine* and *cura*,²³ which respectively translate as ‘without’ and ‘care’. As with various philosophical concepts, the term’s meaning was transferred from the Greek to the Latin²⁴ and then assigned a corresponding name, a task which was performed by Roman politician and philosopher Cicero in the first century BC.²⁵ Even in antiquity, *Seuritas* was sufficiently accommodating to encompass varying philosophical notions, such as ‘tranquillity of mind (*ataraxia*, *apatheia*)’, ‘balancing act (*euthymia*)’, safety and defense (*asphaleia*)’ and ‘negligence (*acedia*)’.²⁶ Since *Fiducia* mainly attempted to become what a Stoic understood by *securitas*, the Stoic concept of *securitas* and the Epicurean concept of *ataraxia* will be addressed accordingly.

In the philosophical school of Stoicism, of which Seneca (4 BC–65 AD)²⁷ was a prominent representative, *securitas* came to denote a ‘state analogous to the *apatheia* that defines the blessed life lived in accordance with reason [...]’.²⁸ *Apatheia*, a Greek concept, means the ‘suppression of strong emotions’²⁹ and is the condition for happiness and tranquillity.³⁰ It is programmatic for Stoicism, the latter aiming to achieve ‘vollkommene Selbstbeherrschung’.³¹ In order to arrive at this end, emotions must be subjugated to reason,³² which is evident from *Fiducia*’s repeated practices of rationalisation. *Ataraxia*, an Epicurean term,³³ is personified by *Fiducia*’s aunt *Ata* in the article and delineates a state of tranquillity and calm,³⁴ which should be achieved irrespective of outside threats such as fallacious desires and worries.³⁵ Thus, Epicurean *ataraxia* and Stoic *apatheia* share that the intended state of mind is subjective rather than objective,³⁶ because it is to be realised in spite of interfering or even dismal outside circumstances.

²³ Cf. Andrea Schrimm-Heins, ‘Gewissheit und Sicherheit: Geschichte und Bedeutungswandel der Begriffe certitudo und securitas’ (Universität Bayreuth, 1990), 13.

²⁴ Cf. Hamilton, *Security*, 115.

²⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 51–64.

²⁷ Cf. Dirk Baltzly, ‘Stoicism’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019 (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), <https://stanford.io/2MQtSyI>.

²⁸ Hamilton, *Security*, 147.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁰ Cf. Thomas Pfau, ‘The Letter of Judgment: Practical Reason in Aristotle, the Stoics, and Rousseau’, *The Eighteenth Century* 51, no. 3 (2010): 304; 300, <http://bit.ly/2sidPl8>.

³¹ Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 14. ‘Complete self-control (my translation).’

³² Cf. Daniel C. Russell, *Happiness for Humans*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 185–87.

³³ Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 14.

³⁴ Cf. Panos Dimas, ‘Epicurus on Pleasure, Desire, and Friendship’, in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 171.

³⁵ Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 35.

³⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 8.

3.2 *Securitas* as an objective in Epicurus and Seneca

Throughout the article it is implied that to *Fiducia*, *securitas* is the final objective in life. This, however, is not entirely consistent with ancient philosophical thought, which, with few exceptions, proclaimed *eudaimonia*, in contrast to *securitas* or *ataraxia*, to be the final goal.³⁷ The most notable and influential proponent of this notion was Aristotle, with his *Nicomachean Ethics*,³⁸ which promulgated that *eudaimonia* could be achieved by virtuous activity. The latter consisted of non-painful or even pleasant actions performed for their own sake. The said virtuous activity could increase *eudaimonia* if it were successful.³⁹ In contrast to *securitas*, *eudaimonia* is not a state but an action,⁴⁰ which allows to infer that *eudaimonia* differs considerably from the former. As the premise for *eudaimonia* demonstrates, it is nevertheless ‘indeterminate and malleable’⁴¹ so that subsequent philosophical schools exhibited concepts divergent from Aristotle’s.

The Stoics, especially Seneca, equally deemed *eudaimonia* to be the highest good, which could similarly be achieved by virtue, for which rigorous exercises were compulsory in order to complete the endeavour successfully.⁴² Like the routine(s) *Fiducia* conducts for her to achieve the tranquil state of *securitas*, they employed reason and rationality⁴³ to serve the ends of virtue and *eudaimonia*. Consequently, *eudaimonia* and *securitas* do possess a common denominator, namely them being attainable by way of reasoning. Furthermore, virtue, which is constituent of *eudaimonia*, is presumed to be liberated from ‘disordered emotions’,⁴⁴ which is strikingly similar to the Stoic concept of *apatheia* and insinuates that the latter is thus part of *eudaimonia* itself. Regarding Epicurean thought, *ataraxia* was thought to be a *state* achieved for its own sake, it being the ‘katestematic pleasure [...] constituent of [...] happiness’.⁴⁵ Consequently, *ataraxia* bears parallels to *eudaimonia* or rather, was considered to be *eudaimonia*—the highest good—itself. Therefore, *Fiducia* and *Ecura*, when following Epicurean advice, are tacitly pursuing *eudaimonia* and not solely *ataraxia*.

3.3 Achieving *securitas*

The reason why *Fiducia* takes a practical approach in order to achieve *securitas* is that in Stoicism, *eudaimonia*, which bore close resemblances to *securitas*, could only be achieved by rigorous practice.⁴⁶ Therefore, it seemed apt to illustrate the practices by describing a day in the life of *Fiducia*, who is doing precisely that.

³⁷ Cf. Stefanie Arend, *Glückseligkeit: Geschichte einer Faszination der Aufklärung. Von Aristoteles bis Lessing*, vol. 23, Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert. Supplementa (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2019), 28.

³⁸ Cf. Russell, *Happiness for Humans*, 22f.

³⁹ Cf. Robert Heinaman, ‘Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle’, *Phronesis* 38, no. 1 (1993): 46, <http://bit.ly/2QY1hK4>.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Russell, *Happiness for Humans*, 23.

⁴² Cf. Katerina Ierodiakonou, ‘How Feasible Is the Stoic Conception of Eudaimonia?’, in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, by Øyvind Rabbås et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 192–94.

⁴³ Cf. Arend, *Glückseligkeit*, 23:46.

⁴⁴ Russell, *Happiness for Humans*, 185.

⁴⁵ Dimas, ‘Epicurus on Pleasure, Desire, and Friendship’, 172.

⁴⁶ Cf. Ierodiakonou, ‘How Feasible Is the Stoic Conception of Eudaimonia?’, 192–94.

4 Securitas, securitatum et omnia securitas?

The title alludes to ‘Vanitas, vanitatum [et] omnia vanitas’,⁴⁷ the Latin Vulgate of Ecclesiastes 1:2, which in translation reads ‘Vanity of vanities, said Ecclesiastes: vanity of vanities, and all is vanity’.⁴⁸ This Bible verse is referenced in ‘Vanitas! Vanitatum! Vanitas!’⁴⁹ by Andreas Gryphius, a Baroque poet. Within the context of the magazine, the article’s motif of insecurity is used as a justification as to why the need for security may persist and consequently, ties in with the first leading question.

4.1 Defining the Baroque

Contrary to the readers’ expectation, the article does not commence with a discussion of the term ‘Baroque’⁵⁰ but rather, leaves out such terminological discussions out entirely, which was a conscious decision. Primarily, such a debate was omitted due to the difficulty of arriving at a concise definition,⁵¹ the Baroque containing such a rich variety of hues.⁵² The aim of the article being to highlight certain aspects which evoked insecurity during the Baroque times, relying upon the readers’ connotations and associations was favoured over the minute discussion of such particularities. As a consequence, it is necessary to note that the article should not insinuate that all characteristics falling under a certain definition of the Baroque unambiguously evoke insecurity but conversely, that the highlighted and studied aspects can be said to evoke insecurity. Moreover, the article is more concerned with the individual concepts which are considered to be ‘baroque’—*vanitas*, the objective of art, religion and antitheses—rather than the period as a whole.

4.2 Choice of topic and framework

The Baroque, representing the culmination of a state of crisis due to the Thirty Years’ War,⁵³ is in stark contrast to the preceding article. Consequently, it offers characteristics or epiphenomena of insecurity, which the reader has thus far not been acquainted with.

Given the Thirty Years’ War was mainly carried out on German soil,⁵⁴ where typically Baroque literature⁵⁵ and insecurity were in abundance, the article restricts itself to this location. Within this framework, the approach itself is rather holistic, as it does not, for example, analyse primary sources explicitly, although this task was performed as a preparation for writing. Even though a scrutinising analysis of poetry might have proven illustrative to the reader, this approach was omitted considering

⁴⁷ Ecclesiastes 1:2. ‘Ecclesiastes 1 - VUL Bible’, Bible Study Tools, accessed 23 November 2019, <http://bit.ly/33ugsNC>.

⁴⁸ *The Bible, Douay-Rheims, Old and New Testaments, Complete The Challoner Revision*, 2004, <http://bit.ly/2R1fcy>.

⁴⁹ Cf. Andreas Gryphius, *Gesamtausgabe Der Deutschsprachigen Werke*, vol. 1 (1643; repr., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1963), 17–20.

⁵⁰ Usually, such a discussion refers to the term ‘barocco’ as can be seen in Wolf Wucherpfennig, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. (Stuttgart: Klett, 2015), 38–41.

⁵¹ Cf. Peter J. Burgard, ‘Vorwort: Äquivoke Anmerkungen zum vorläufigen Projekt einer Definition des Barock’, in *Barock: neue Sichtweisen einer Epoche*, by Gernot Heiss et al., ed. Peter J. Burgard (Wien: Böhlau, 2001), 11–14.

⁵² Cf. Gerhart Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1987), 6.

⁵³ Cf. Johannes Arndt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg 1618–1648* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009), 197–201.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁵ Cf. Michael M. Metzger and Erika A. Metzger, ‘The Thirty Years War and Its Impact on Literature’, in *German Baroque Literature: The European Perspective*, by Gerald Gillespie et al., ed. Gerhart Hoffmeister (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983), 38f.

the objective was to create a holistic text rather than a somewhat restricted poem analysis, which could not have offered the width inherent to the form of a magazine. Therefore, the objective was to give a representative overview of the topic and to highlight selected aspects which readily manifested themselves in literature⁵⁶ and moreover, were symptomatic for the Thirty Years' War specifically⁵⁷ and the Baroque Age in general. Undoubtedly, other symptomatic phenomena of insecurity such as the search for order⁵⁸ could have been covered, yet the selection is regarded as being adequately representative of the period in question, the former covering a literary motif, the objective of literature, religiousness as an excursus and finally, an imperative stylistic figure. The reader will most likely be familiar with the topics as such but has probably not approached them in relation to security.

Vanitas as literary motif proved particularly engaging because it combined transience⁵⁹ and phony,⁶⁰ to name only a couple of its implications, which result in a palpable feeling of insecurity, as is demonstrated in the article. Insecurity equally rested on factual, though subjective,⁶¹ observations made during the Thirty Years' War so that the unravelled *vanitas* motif did not only encompass a contemplative notion of insecurity but also its literal manifestations, which is precisely why the first part of the article is dedicated to it. In contrast to *vanitas*, of which the manifestations were overtly lamented, another aspect which (potentially) evoked insecurity was viewed as somewhat desirable, given it was the objective of art: emotionality. As argued for in the article, this objective intentionally conjured security. The fact that this particular pursuit seems like an antagonistic response to the circumstances of the time makes up its appeal to treat it in an article. Although the overarching approach vastly restricts itself to the realm of literature, the article's comment on religion aimed to illustrate how not only within literature but also outside of it there was insecurity readily at hand. Religion in particular qualifies itself due to its hegemonic nature: it was determined by the ruler's religious congregation.⁶² Intuitively, religion may appear as an anchorage and remedy against insecurity yet this was, taking into consideration the article's arguments, not the case anymore so that it is ever more rewarding to consider. Finally, the antithesis, it epitomising the epoch's *Zeitgeist*,⁶³ was selected as a stylistic figure, which, similarly to the other phenomena addressed in the essay, was closely related to historic(al) events. Although bearing certain resemblances to *vanitas*, such as a more or less manifest transience, it succinctly illustrates the

⁵⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 42f; Cf. David Lederer, 'Fear of the Thirty Years War', in *Facing Fear: The History of an Emotion in Global Perspective*, by Ronald Schechter et al., ed. Michael Francis Laffan and Max Weiss (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 29.

⁵⁷ Peter Machamer, 'Die philosophische und wissenschaftliche Revolution und das Zeitalter des Barock', in *Barock: neue Sichtweisen einer Epoche*, by Mieke Bal et al., ed. Peter J. Burgard (Wien: Böhlau, 2001), 194.

⁵⁸ Cf. Gernot Heiss, 'Die Liebe des Fürsten zur Geometrie: Adelserziehung und die Wertschätzung der höfischen Gesellschaft für Symmetrie und Regelmäßigkeit', in *Barock: neue Sichtweisen einer Epoche*, by Mieke Bal et al., ed. Peter J. Burgard (Wien: Böhlau, 2001), 101–19.

⁵⁹ Liana Cheney, ed., *The Symbolism of Vanitas in the Arts, Literature, and Music: Comparative and Historical Studies* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 1.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hoffmeister, *Deutsche und europäische Barockliteratur*, 177.

⁶¹ Cf. Metzger and Metzger, 'The Thirty Years War and Its Impact on Literature', 42f.

⁶² Arndt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg 1618–1648*, 31.

⁶³ Cf. Blake Lee Spahr, 'Baroque and Mannerism: Epoch and Style', *Colloquia Germanica* 1 (1967): 79, <http://bit.ly/2oedY7x>.

oscillations between positive and negative in their respective extremes, which were so characteristic for the Baroque.

4.3 Baroque security

Despite its aim to take a holistic approach, the article does not mention cases of ‘Baroque security’. Undeniably, ‘the’ Baroque as such exhibited characteristics which could, if viewed in isolation, yield the conclusion of security being present. In spite of this, it is imperative to remember that security, and thus its inverse, cannot be considered to be an absolute state.⁶⁴ The Baroque is therefore a similarly grey area since natural sciences and philosophy were gaining momentum until their heyday, the Enlightenment, from the Renaissance onwards, at the very latest.⁶⁵ Consequently, there were not only emotionality and *vanitas* but also the deliberate seeking—and finding—of rationality, albeit religious, which, if taking a Stoic stance, bore security.⁶⁶ After all, the Enlightenment, which could be viewed as being interwoven with the Baroque,⁶⁷ cannot have emerged out of nothing. If one contextualises the fact that philosophy was on the rise, then the former compares to a drop in the bucket reserved for a literate elite.

5 Of a philosophical pendulum

‘Of a philosophical pendulum’ equally appertains to the second leading question as it describes how security was placed at the centre of an Age’s philosophy and thus simultaneously describes a philosophical standpoint as well as a historical development within philosophy itself. This secures its place within the realm of the history of ideas. In a first draft, the text was conjoined with ‘*Securitas, securitatum et omnia securitas?*’. It aimed to answer the question ‘Can the human need for security be named as a cause for the transition from Baroque thought to Enlightenment ideas?’,⁶⁸ yet did not succeed in doing so given the question was formulated too broadly. Even upon restricting the objects of study to the described characteristics of the Baroque on the one hand, and British philosophers on the other hand, an immediate connection of the Baroque’s characteristics and British Enlightenment philosophies could not be forged within the space and time available.

5.1 An ‘Age of Security’

The Enlightenment, in contrast to the preceding article, places security rather than insecurity at the centre of its philosophy,⁶⁹ if any such unity within the Enlightenment can even be said to exist.⁷⁰ Moreover, it introduced a novel meaning of security, namely security denoting the reason for and the objective of

⁶⁴ Cf. Susanne Krasmann, There is no such thing as absolute security, Telephone, 23 October 2019. The complete German transcript is contained in the appendix.

⁶⁵ Cf. Siegfried Wollgast, *Vergessene und Verkannte: zur Philosophie und Geistesentwicklung in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Frühaufklärung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1993), 16.

⁶⁶ Cf. Arend, *Glückseligkeit*, 23:46.

⁶⁷ Harold Jantz, ‘German Baroque Literature’, *MLN* 77, no. 4 (1962): 339, <http://bit.ly/2rwkl7y>.

⁶⁸ Cited from the disposal of article 2.

⁶⁹ Cf. Gros, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit vom inneren Frieden zur äußeren Bedrohung*, 102; Cf. Burke, ‘Aporias of Security’, 2002, 9.

⁷⁰ Cf. James Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?’, *Political Theory* 28, no. 6 (2000): 737, <http://bit.ly/2OPE6ix>.

government.⁷¹ Notably, Augustan times already featured a meaning of security associated with the state, which was epitomised by a personified *Securitas*,⁷² yet the political dimension of security did not come to be cemented as the hegemonial meaning until well after.⁷³ Therefore, the Enlightenment represented a new period within the history of the term ‘security’, which is why the article deals with it.

5.2 The difficulty of definition

Similar to ‘*Securitas, securitatis et omnia securitas*’, the problem of finding a valid definition was omitted deliberately. The article largely treating specific philosophers, who are commonly understood to form part of the Enlightenment despite being considered comparatively conservative,⁷⁴ it was not deemed as absolutely necessary to provide an all-accommodating definition of the Enlightenment in the article itself for that was not its chief objective. Nonetheless, the article tacitly utilises Israel’s description of Enlightenment thought, which propagated that

the improvement of human life inescapably involves emancipating men from the collective force of autocracy, intolerance, and prejudiced thinking, and establishing a predominantly secular morality, no less than it involves promoting the ideals of equality (sexual and racial), democracy, individual liberty, and a comprehensive toleration.⁷⁵

This is not to say that each philosopher who is commonly considered to be an Enlightenment philosopher defended or endorsed every particular idea noted in the definition—Locke, for example, did not ascribe voting rights to women.⁷⁶ Equally, otherwise ‘we [could] speak with [...] confidence of a single, unitary Enlightenment project’.⁷⁷ Given there is, unsurprisingly so, scholarly disagreement and debate concerning the definition, tackling the primary question at hand, namely how philosophical views of Locke and Smith *as part of* the Enlightenment could have established security *in theory*, was favoured over elaborating on the scientific discourse.

5.3 Approaching Britain, Locke and Smith

The article treats Locke and Smith, who are English and Scottish philosophers respectively. Consequently, it is concerned with the British Enlightenment rather than the German *Aufklärung* and thus is not tied to the latter immediately. This is another reason as to why the article was separated from its former other half. Thus, there was the freedom to select individual philosophers. In this case, the choice fell on Locke due to his occupation with the question of security. Smith, by contrast, seems like

⁷¹ Cf. John Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’, in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (1689; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chaps VII, §94, 347.

⁷² Cf. Hamilton, *Security*, 58–60.

⁷³ Cf. *Ibid.*, 137f.

⁷⁴ Cf. Jonathan Israel, ‘Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 3 (2006): 542, <http://bit.ly/2XWJWCB>.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 524.

⁷⁶ Cf. Nancy J Hirschmann, *Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 116.

⁷⁷ Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?’, 737.

an outlier for he did not only live much later⁷⁸ but is otherwise not remarked on in the article. Behind this decision lies the deliberation that at first glance, Smith's theses, such as the *laissez faire* principle, seem wholly antagonistic toward the establishment of security as they argue against state interference and control. Hence, the attractiveness of considering Smith rather than Locke consists in arguing that the premise of security being equal to the state and control is not entirely conclusive. In addition to considering the two philosophers, the text provides a paragraph on the general notion concerning security within the specific topic addressed in order to contextualise the ideas before the pendulum can unravel them further.

5.4 History viewed by a pendulum

The eyes of an unnamed pendulum guide the reader through the philosophical ideas at hand. I opted for employing the metaphor of the pendulum⁷⁹ in this article specifically because, for the reasons elaborated on in chapter 5.1, the Enlightenment and Locke specifically are situated at a palpable extreme of theoretical security, and pendula always swing from one extreme to the next. In addition, the high degree of theoretical security is tacitly juxtaposed with its inverse, which the reader has encountered in the previous article. Nonetheless, the metaphor has the disadvantage of simplification so that it is implied that the found theoretical security is absolute, given it is the extreme. This is of course not the case.

6 Dada is(s)t Sicherheit

'Dada is(s)t Sicherheit' is a world play in German. 'Dada ist Sicherheit' translates as 'Dada is security', and 'Dada isst Sicherheit' translates as 'Dada eats security'. It is therefore suggested that there is some ambiguity regarding Dada's (implicit) standpoint on security, which is supposed to create tension. The article is tackling the second leading questions as it gives light to a standing of a group not explicitly said to be philosophical but artistic, yet which contains a distinct philosophy at its heart. Moreover, it outlines the aims and characteristics of a group with insecurity rather than security as its need, which stands in contrast to the aims of *Fiducia*, the people during the Baroque times and the Enlightenment philosophers encountered thus far.

6.1 The manifesto as a primary source

In contrast to the first three articles, 'Dada is(s)t Sicherheit' analyses a primary source with respect to insecurity, namely the 1916 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest'.⁸⁰ The reason the article considers a manifesto at all is that 'Dada's engagement with the public sphere [was] defining'⁸¹ and thus readily employed 'public' media such as speech and manifestos.⁸² Therefore, it seemed fitting to study a medium which

⁷⁸ Cf. Robert L. Heilbroner, 'Adam Smith', Britannica Academic, accessed 2 November 2019, <http://bit.ly/35BwhDI>.

⁷⁹ The metaphor of the pendulum is employed in a variety of contexts, see for example Cheryl Brown Mitchell and Kari Ellingson Vidal, 'Weighing the Ways of the Flow: Twentieth Century Language Instruction', *The Modern Language Journal* 85, no. 1 (2001): 26–38, <http://bit.ly/2pXctvm>.

⁸⁰ Cf. Guido Magnaguagno, Raimund Meyer, and Hans Bolliger, 'Eroeffnungs-Manifest, 1. Dada-Abend. Zürich, 14. Juli 1916', in *Dada in Zürich* (1916; repr., Zürich: Kunsthaus Zürich & Arche Verlag, 1985), 256. Printed in Karl Riha, ed., *Dada Zürich: Texte, Manifeste, Dokumente* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2015), 30.

⁸¹ Leah Dickerman, 'Dada Gambits', *October* 105 (2003): 12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3397679>.

⁸² Cf. *Ibid.*, 10.

was to some extent representative of Dada expression. The ‘Eroeffnungs-Manifest’ is a controversial document given that it was inaccurately transcribed and titled.⁸³ Due to multiple anthologies I consulted having cited this version, I did not become alert of this blunder early enough. Upon considering the original document, I have nevertheless come to the conclusion that the statements still apply. This is due to the fact that the original version similarly conveys insecurity and that moreover, the article’s arguments are supplemented with secondary sources. Still, one must keep this in mind when reading the article.

6.2 Terminology: ‘Dada’ vs ‘Dadaism’

As alluded to in the text, Dada rejected traditional and especially bourgeois institutions and conventions. This includes unity,⁸⁴ which is the primary reason as to why the term ‘Dada’ rather than ‘Dadaism’ or ‘Dadaisms’ was used as the latter ‘serve primarily as negative signifiers, whose suffixes presuppose the existence of a movement, school or codified group which dada never was nor ever could have been’.⁸⁵ Following this line of argumentation, the article did not want to allude to a unified movement when in reality, this did not exist.

7 From good girl to secure girl

The final article outlines the appearance of the human need for security in today’s societal and feminist discourse and thus engages with the third leading question.

7.1 Impersonal ‘I’

The first-person singular used in ‘From good girl to secure girl’ should not imply that it is a singular entity or me specifically who is experiencing the insecurities mentioned. On the contrary, the ‘I’ should be understood as having the function of describing selected and thus individual concerns and opinions of a sample of the Swiss population, which is mirrored in the use of studies⁸⁶ and scholarly literature to determine the security concerns at hand. Tying this together with the anterior case for an impersonal ‘I’, this yields that the ‘I’ experiences selected, yet widely-observed insecurities which may or may not be distinctly experienced⁸⁷ by every member of the Swiss population. Moreover, the impersonal ‘I’ allows to do justice to the fact that the article treats the present rather than the past insofar that it removes the distance inherent to the third-person singular. This seemed apt considering the article treats the present rather than the past.

⁸³ Cf. Magnus Wieland, ‘Wie Die Nachwelt Dada Erfand’, *NZZ*, 13 July 2016, sec. Feuilleton, <http://bit.ly/37HJBbA>.

⁸⁴ Cf. Dickerman, ‘Dada Gambits’, 10f.

⁸⁵ John Erickson, ‘Dada Distance’, *L’Esprit Créateur* 20, no. 2 (1980): 41, <http://bit.ly/33wkLrH>.

⁸⁶ Cf. Tibor Tresch Szvircsev et al., ‘Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend’, *Sicherheit* (Zürich, Birmensdorf: Militärakademie (MILAK) at ETH Zürich and Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2019), <http://bit.ly/2MLJIA2>.

7.2 Differing from the norm

Despite the arguments for the impersonal 'I', it does have the disadvantage that it differs considerably from the other articles: although 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas', 'Securitas, securitatis et omnia securitas?' and 'Of a philosophical pendulum' are written from the perspective of a character, even if only partly, they are devised in third-person. The fact that especially this article and the first differ considerably from the remainder regarding style is addressed in chapter 11.2. Although a narrative voice conforming to the could be deemed desirable, another possibility, namely the first-person plural, could have been a viable option especially considering the anterior arguments for the impersonal 'I'; the collective experience⁸⁷ inherent to the narrative voice of the first-person plural hints at 'a sum of individual experiences',⁸⁸ which retrospectively, seems more plausible than utilising the first-person singular.

8 Photography series: 'Show me your security!'

The approach (chapter 1) the magazine takes has the disadvantage of not being immediately relevant to everyday concerns such as financial insecurity, and similarly, does not directly address the third leading question. The photography series therefore set itself the goal of being more closely related to contemporary and quotidian experience, which is whence the idea of 'security objects'⁸⁹ comes. In order to contextualise and expound on the said objects, it seemed important to have the participants include a brief text, in which they outlined their understanding of security and why or how their chosen object could then evoke security. All participants are or were members of *Kantonsschule Zürich Nord* and include both students and teachers, who could both choose to stay anonymous, to invent a name or to have their real name (or initials thereof) printed. Upon having received the texts, I standardised spelling and punctuation in addition to correcting mistakes in grammar and removing emoticons. It being the aim to retain the original meaning of the texts, I did not change the content nor meaning. In Gabriel's case, I translated the text from German and attempted to convey its meaning into English as accurately as possible. The full German text is contained in the appendix.

9 Interview: 'There is no such thing as absolute security.'

At the beginning of the process, the objective was to interview a psychologist or biologist since the texts did not explicitly address nor answer the question of the nature of the human need for security; rather through the human need for security being a near invisible driving force. Since *Sine plus Cura* occupied itself more with the implications of the human need for security rather than its scientific nature I nonetheless opted for finding a sociologist as the topic of security. Thus, I contacted Professor Susanne

⁸⁷ Julie Otsuka, *The Buddha in the Attic* (New York: Anchor, 2012). The novel employs the first-person plural.

⁸⁸ Flávia Rodrigues Monteiro, 'Voices That Matter: The Attic Echoes Through the House', *Estudos Feministas* 26, no. 3 (2018): 8, <http://bit.ly/2rwkbn2>.

⁸⁹ Meaning objects which evoke security in a person.

Krasmann of the University of Hamburg. Her research interests are the ‘Sociology of Security, Uncertainty and Vulnerability’.⁹⁰

The interview was conducted in German given that its subject matter was centred on Germany and Switzerland. As for the translation, I aimed at conveying the meaning rather than the exact wording into English, all the while making it more readable than the transcript. The complete German transcript is contained in the appendix (chapter 14.1).

10 Layout

10.1 Process and ideas

Sine plus Cura being an academic journal, it was the original intention to use a simplistic and minimalist layout which would supplement and embed the content rather than distract from it. This was put into practice. Similarly, there were creative ideas which were not realised. Firstly, I intended to divide the magazine into three sections so that each section would occupy itself either with history, philosophy or sociology. Then, I would have chosen a colour palette and design elements for each one of them and thereby, would have translated the fields into the layout. Nevertheless, this idea was quickly discarded given it seemed impossible to assign any article to just one subject. Secondly, I meant to standardise the title pages of the articles, for which I intended to use photographs displaying insecurity as a visual antithesis to the topic.



Figure 1: title page of 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas', first draft, July 2019.



Figure 2: title page of 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas', final version, November 2019.

⁹⁰ ‘Prof. Dr. Susanne Krasmann: Personen: Universität Hamburg’, WiSo-Fakultät, 2018, <http://bit.ly/35GSnoj>.

As an example, I photographed crumpled paper and shattered windows yet given that the photographs did not immediately relate to the articles, this idea was equally discarded after the first layout draft. Instead, each article was assigned a distinctive colour (e.g. light-blue as seen in figure 1), which is present on the title page, in highlighted quotes within the text, on the background of the bibliography and the interactive pages, and in the frames around artwork. Additionally, title pages which relate to the content, such as the pillars reminiscent of antiquity seen in figure 1, were drawn using Adobe InDesign. The idea of emphasising the content was retained, which equally included making the texts well legible. In order to achieve this, I used Baskerville, a serif font, for the main body, Avenir Medium for highlighted quotes within the texts and (outlined) Avenir Black for titles. The latter two as sans-serif fonts are suitable for this purpose. Striving for legibility also included the questions of footnotes, which were split across columns and pages in the first draft given it was easier to avoid typographical errors such as orphans and widows. For the sake of readability and giving the reader the opportunity to access supplementary information immediately, I decided to use non-split footnotes. Due to the focus on legibility, illustrations are limited to one to two pages per article and serve as dividers which pick up on themes, symbols and imagery found in the texts.

10.2 Technicalities

The format (190x240mm) is based on *HOHE LUFT kompakt*.⁹¹ It was measured off a copy of the said publication by the *Buchmanufaktur*,⁹² where the magazine was printed digitally. A rather small format was deliberately chosen in order to render it make the magazine easily to handle and portable.

10.3 Design elements

Although the layout should serve as an embedding (chapter 10.1), I aimed at translating the topic of security into it by using design elements. Square brackets, which were used around footnotes and page numbers, and intended to symbolise containment and security, is one of them. In former drafts, the frame as such an element was used around highlighted quotes, the main body of text and all illustrations, yet its prominence was reduced due to its distracting nature. It is still contained implicitly, as seen from the columns in figure 1, the title of an interactive page in figure 3 and an initial letter in figure 4. The title page, which consists of waves emulating Seneca's 'voyage of life'⁹³ (mentioned in 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas'), uses both design elements. '*Sine + Cura*' is contained and thus secured by square brackets. Furthermore, the waves are placed within a frame, which should similarly allude to security. Generally speaking, the magazine largely utilises an airy design with its outlined fonts, pastel colours and frames. Where considered fitting due to the content, this theme was given up to assume a heftier,

⁹¹ Cf. 'HOHE LUFT kompakt', accessed 17 November 2019, <http://bit.ly/2q2IAtK>.

⁹² Cf. 'Buchmanufaktur', Buchdruckerei, Winterthur, accessed 17 November 2019, <http://bit.ly/34xwoA8>.

⁹³ Cf. Sen. Cons. Polyb. 9; Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, 'Ad Polybium de Consolatione', in *Schriften zur Ethik: Die kleinen Dialoge*, ed. Gerhard Fink, Sammlung Tusculum (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 632–35, <http://bit.ly/2LWlj4L>.

darker design; this can, for example, be seen in the title page of ‘Securitas, securitatis et omnia securitas’. Since the article concerns itself with insecurity, it utilises a darker colour palette and Avenir Black in its filled version.

Now it is your turn ...

Figure 3: title of an interactive page, final version, November 2019.



Figure 4: initial letter in ‘Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas’, final version, November 2019.

10.4 Inconsistencies and difficulties

Typographically speaking, orphans and widows represented a dominant difficulty. The texts containing up to sixty-five footnotes with essential information, it was difficult to format the paragraphs utilising unsplit footnotes so as to avoid orphans and widows. Although there are neither orphans nor widows across pages, both remain across columns, albeit rarely, as it was not always possible to replace, delete or add words or even sentences. Moreover, there persist holes of small to medium size toward the end of columns although it tried to be avoided wherever possible.

Sine plus Cura

Let us call her *Evani*. Just like *Fidavia*, *Evani* is on the road to *securitas*. They share their ambitious goals as they shared a locker back in grammar school and before that, the same sandpit. Friends, especially from childhood continue help to ground her. Unlike her cousin they come and go but their effect is constant. Tonight, a soirée, not as French as it may sound, is on the programme at *Evani*'s symposium,^[35] which is routinely hosted at her house. Their whole group of friends has turned up, now either eagerly juggling or indifferently shuffling into her house.

The latter really needs their weekly dose of *Evani*'s convincing speeches; that will surely put them back on track, *Fidavia* thinks. After all, friendship is not only there to have fun or to dry each other's tears. It also serves a much more relevant purpose: to strengthen, to consolidate and to keep from going astray. All in a community, one for all and all for one. *Fidavia* recalls having picked that up at school, when they were discussing Epicurean philosophy.^[36] With *Evani* by her side, of course.

A perfectly adequate amount of food later,^[37] discussions begin. They talk religion, although whom they believe in so firmly is distant and non-interfering, which mainly serves the purpose of omitting all fear of punishments for sin or other wrong-doings that the Church, in isolation from what the supernatural calls for, rejoices in imposing.^[38]

They practise gratitude to their Gods and Goddesses, not because they have watched one of many million YouTube videos on mindfulness and the importance of gratitude, but because they know that thanks to their Gods and Goddesses, ‘Lebenslust’ is no longer dependent on an ‘unsichere[r] Zufall [...]’.^[39] Moreover, their conceptions of the supernatural has another conducive effect on their path to *ataraxia*, or *ataraxia*. Gods and Goddesses being no more than atoms, which are in perpetual motion in the boundless universe,^[40] they are representative of *ataraxia*.

[35] Cf. Fiona Hobden, *The Symposium in Ancient Greek Society and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7. A symposium was an ancient Greek communal gathering, where [...] companionship and pleasure [re]fract explicitly on the agenda [...].

[36] Cf. Gino, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit von innen Frieden zur äußeren Befähigung*, 34; 39. Friendship is the second ‘pillar’ of *ataraxia*, which is a second variation of inner security.

[37] Cf. Arcud, *Götterdämonen*, 23/32. Veracious pleasure consists of moderate and restrained enjoyment.

[38] Cf. Gino, *Die Politisierung der Sicherheit von innen Frieden zur äußeren Befähigung*, 41. In Epicurean thought, Gods and Goddesses are considered to be non-interfering, which is claimed to create security from all Church-called penalties. This represents another of the four pillars of *ataraxia*.

[39] Bohl, 42. ‘Pleasure’ is no longer dependent on an ‘insecure coincidence (my translation)’.

[40] Cf. Tim Whitmarsh, *Beating the Gods: Ataraxia in the Ancient World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 173.

[15]

Figure 5: page with a medium-sized ‘hole’ at the end of the column, final version, November 2019.

Another inconsistency which must be expounded on is the layout chosen for ‘Show me your security!’. The double-page spreads do not utilise the design elements of square brackets and the frame except for

the names of the owners, which are noted in brackets. The layout concept was significantly broken with in order to do justice to the fact that the photography series addresses a more intimate perspective in a medium thus far not encountered except for the illustrations in articles 2 and 5.⁹⁴

11 Reflexion

11.1 Conceptual developments

How has the human need for security influenced historical developments? What are philosophical standpoints that have been taken or can be taken? Where can we observe its manifestations today?⁹⁵

As predicted, *Sine plus Cura* does not provide conclusive answers to the leading questions but gives outlines of answers insofar that it answers precise, narrow questions which are subjugated to one or more of the leading questions. Nevertheless, the focus of the magazine partly shifted away from the human need for security during the process; it does not address it as explicitly as originally intended. Primarily, this is true for the first leading question. The question of historical and philosophical developments, for example, would have been answered more explicitly had the second and third articles been conjoined as planned (see chapters 4 and 5). Even in that case, the historical development due to the human need for security would have been of philosophical nature and thus would have belonged to the realm of intellectual history. This marks an important conceptual change: not historical developments like revolutions or wars, but philosophical developments are focused on. Naturally, they are nonetheless influenced by their historical circumstances, which can be seen in the second article. Furthermore, the shift away from human *need* for security also entailed that no biological or psychological perspectives were provided (chapter 8).

Moreover, it is the precondition and presumption for the articles that there exists something like a human need for security. Otherwise, why would *Fiducia* want to become security and why would the contemporaries of the Thirty Years' War feel and be insecure, and denote this experience as being a negative one? Why would the pendulum be intrigued by Enlightenment thought and why is *Wohlfühlfeminismus* so attractive if not in part due to the fact that it evokes security? As alluded to, the leading questions concerning historical developments and philosophical standpoints cannot be separated. Philosophy and history are merged in the fields of intellectual history and the history of ideas, which both more accurately describe the magazine's orientation. As described in the foreword, the magazine's unofficial title is *The Histosophe*, which, considering these deliberations, illustrates the synthesis of history and philosophy occurring in *Sine plus Cura*. Nevertheless, this unofficial title neglects the fact that the magazine occupies itself with the present, too.

⁹⁴ The illustrations are found in *Sine plus Cura*, 34; 75.

⁹⁵ The leading questions are cited from the disposal, the final version of which was devised in April 2019.

The occupation with the present is performed by the last article, the interview and the photography series and in contrast to the historical and philosophical elements, was executed as foreseen. Nevertheless, in conclusion the final overarching approach differs considerably from the one outlined in the disposal. It is much broader in the sense that the articles are not strictly confined to the initial leading questions. The magazine thus treats an ancient philosophical standpoint which manifests itself today, describes a particular state of insecurity found in the Baroque, expounds on how Enlightenment philosophy could theoretically evoke security, provides an example of an artistic group aiming for insecurity and outlines how today's insecurities prompt an attenuated interpretation of feminism.

What further deviates from the initial approach is that the magazine addresses insecurity more explicitly than merely as a pre-condition for the human need for security. This occurs especially in articles 2, 4, 5 and the interview. As one scholar observes, '[t]here is never security without insecurity'.⁹⁶ Thus, one can infer that insecurity must be dealt with as well, especially when the contributions on it could not only provide a justification of the human need for security by analysing the nature of insecurity, but also delineate how conversely, insecurity could become a human need, too.

The primary reasons for these conceptual changes are versatile. Firstly, it is evident that historical developments, say the founding of the UN after WWII, are in part instigated by the human need for security, which aims to establish a state of security. What is however not immediately evident is the nature of security in each particular case. Thus, it seemed more valuable to approach historical developments in a fashion which allowed to closely examine the meaning(s) of security, which is a question dealt with in philosophical thought. Secondly, the shift to focusing on insecurity did not only occur due to the immediate relation of security and its inverse but also because the security-centred approach seemed partly repetitive. After all, striving for security is not always the only or the most viable option, as article 4 demonstrates.

11.2 Room for improvement

Regarding the structure, it could be viewed as being imbalanced since the texts are subsequent to one another, and not intermitted by the interview and the photography series. Thus, the more complex and demanding content makes up the first block, and the less sophisticated elements constitute the second block. The deliberation behind the structure is that it is ordered chronologically insofar that the first element is concerned with antiquity and the last element with the present year, 2019. The structure should emulate a stroll through history with respect to security, which has the disadvantage of seeming unevenly distributed. The order, similar to the layout, utilises the bracket as an element since the two less academic texts, namely the first and last articles, surround the other more tamed pieces of writing. Additionally, the idea of the 'stroll through history' promulgates the reader approach the elements in

⁹⁶ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 19. Cited in Jelly-Schapiro, 'Security', 801.

order, which is not typical for the magazine, where each element should be more or less independent from the others. This flaw is compounded by the fact that there are intertextual references, for example

Tranquillity, which *Fiducia* would argue to constitute *securitas*, can hardly be achieved, as it seems to be antagonistic to a lack of meaning, deconstruction and ominousness regarding its contents.⁹⁷

Moreover, the titles of the articles may prove confusing as they require the knowledge of English, Latin and German. Nevertheless, it seemed unapt to expound on them further as it would have given away the punchline. In addition to the titles, the writing style features lengthy sentences with more advanced vocabulary, which may be fitting for the interested reader part of the target group but rather not for the general reader who wants to read simpler, less academic texts. Despite not being entirely academic, the articles using first-person narrators, describing a day in the life of somebody or viewing history through the eyes of a pendulum, they are densely referenced and require subject-specific knowledge. Thus, the magazine is not entirely accessible. This is compounded by the fact that the articles, which make up the majority of the magazine, are engaged with topics rather remote from everyday discourse so that the magazine, which supposedly should prove more readable, engaging and interesting within a non-academic context, renders itself less attractive to be commercialised.

12 Conclusion

A magazine can inform, a magazine can discuss and a magazine can criticise, even if it holds itself to academic standards. *Sine plus Cura* thought of its task as being one of informing, outlining and presenting lesser known and idiosyncratic concepts within the realm of the human need for security. It addresses a target group with an interest in researched articles, which delineate a contemporary and commonplace subject with a largely historical and philosophical approach. It combines this stroll through (intellectual) history with coeval and more creative perspectives using photography, the layout and an interview. Nevertheless, *Sine plus Cura* omits the third domain: explicit criticism.

Although closely, even if restrictedly, analysing the need for security and its implications in relation to the leading questions proves insightful, it does not allow to overtly criticise the ‘enormous cultural power’⁹⁸ of security. If anything, *Sine plus Cura* testifies to this very fact. The pursuit of security is seen as viable and self-evident, which omits the question of whether this cultural hegemony does not have negative implications, too. In this light, one could address phenomena such as ‘securitisation’.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Cited from *Sine plus Cura*, 60.

⁹⁸ Burke, ‘Aporias of Security’, 2002, 6.

⁹⁹ Cf. Alexandra Schwell, ‘Angst und das Andere. Dimensionen des Emotionalen in der kulturanthropologischen Sicherheitsforschung’, in *Der Alltag der (Un-)Sicherheit: Ethnografisch-kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf die Sicherheitsgesellschaft*, by Katharina Eisch-Angus et al., ed. Alexandra Schwell and Katharina Eisch-Angus (Berlin: Panama Verlag, 2018), 112.

Securitisation is a process performed by ‘Securitisating Actors’ who evoke fear and insecurity in the population although the feared objects do not actually constitute a threat which would justify these allegations. Refugees and religious minorities, for instance, are frequently used by Securitisating Actors for this purpose.¹⁰⁰ *Sine plus Cura* contains such subtly executed approaches, though not regarding securitisation, for example in ‘Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas’, where the reader is asked whether the adamant pursuit of security is as beneficial as the protagonist views it.¹⁰¹ Further examples are the fourth and fifth article, which both criticise the striving for security implicitly as well as the interview. This approach, however, could be applied more explicitly, which could occur within the framework of another magazine or otherwise interdisciplinary research, the topic being approachable in an array of fields. Surely, the approach outlined in *Sine plus Cura* could be continued by way of unmasking further historical developments, philosophical concepts and contemporary phenomena to be related to security. In particular, one could extend the scope to non-Western peripheries. Nevertheless, one must concede that this approach could easily become repetitive.

A magazine can inform about the human need for security, a magazine can discuss the human need for security and a magazine can criticise the human need for security. It should not only treat the tree grown out of the seeds of *sine* and *cura*, and its numerous fruits as an object of reverence and self-evidence, but motivate its readers to carefully probe its every bud. After all, the most desired fruit is not always the least poisonous.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰¹ In reference to the interactive pages of ‘Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas’, *Sine plus Cura*, 18f.

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13.3 Illustrations

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- Figure 1: title page of 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas', first draft, July 2019. 13
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- Figure 3: title of an interactive page, final version, November 2019. 15
- Figure 4: initial letter in 'Quomodo homo sapiens fit securitas', final version, November 2019. 15
- Figure 5: page with a medium-sized 'hole' at the end of the column, final version, November 2019.. 15

14 Appendix

14.1 German interview transcript

SK=Susanne Krasmann, **SB**=Sina Buchholz

SB: Ganz am Anfang vielleicht 'ne grundlegende Frage, aber, was würden Sie sagen, bedeutet Sicherheit heute, denn der Begriff hat ja eine relativ grosse Entwicklung durchgemacht, von der Antike, wo man dachte «ja, das ist so ein Zustand von innerer Ruhe» bis heute, was würden Sie sagen, denkt man heute gesellschaftlich was Sicherheit ist?

SK: Hm, also heute würd' ich sagen, dass der Begriff sehr verengt ist und diesen ehemaligen grossen, weiten von der grossen, weiten Bedeutung der Ruhe sozusagen und frei von Sorge hat es sich, denk' ich mir, mehr in die Richtung entwickelt, dass es stark mit Polizei, mit Kriminalität assoziiert wird – manchmal auch durch die politischen Diskurse mit ökonomischer Unsicherheit, aber also eine Kritik aus psychologischer Perspektive ist ja oft, dass sozusagen das, was in Sozialpolitik nicht geleistet wird, also was ökonomische Unsicherheit erzeugt, dass das manchmal ersetzt wird durch diesen Diskurs von «Sicherheit ist bedroht durch bestimmte Kriminalitätsfelder». Und gut, das war jetzt vielleicht das Thema hauptsächlich so in den 90er Jahren, ist das ja so n bisschen explodiert, dass man gesagt hat «sehr viel wird mit Sicherheit Politik gemacht» und mit Sicherheit in diesem Sinne von Kriminalität. Ich glaube jetzt in jüngerer Zeit hat das wieder 'ne andere Dimension angenommen, also dadurch, dass Terrorismus, im Feld jetzt von Kriminalitätsbekämpfung Terrorismus in den Vordergrund getreten ist, ist glaub' ich dieses, diese Bedrohung einerseits viel abstrakter, also weil das ja so 'n internationales Phänomen ist und andererseits natürlich auch viel anschaulicher, wenn es einzelne Anschläge gibt. Also, das heisst ich glaube, da hat sich auch die, die gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung und auch der Diskurs so 'n bisschen verschoben und auch, ich nehme mal an, dass das die Unsicherheit, die damit verknüpft wird jetzt mit diesen ganzen Fragen von, von Terrorismus, Bedrohung und so weiter, dass die 'n bisschen diffuser geworden ist.

SB: Okay, mhm würden Sie denn sagen dieses Bedürfnis nach Sicherheit ist in dem Sinne berechtigt, wenn man Bedrohungen wie Terrorismus anschaut oder übertreibt man da auch häufig?

SK: Hm, ich glaube das kann man nicht so «berechtigt ja oder nur Übertreibung» beantworten, so wenn man sich anguckt, wie gross die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist, von einem terroristischen Anschlag getroffen zu werden, ich glaube ... ich weiss es nicht genau, aber ich glaube es hat mal jemand gesagt, dass es irgendwie hier in Deutschland, also jetzt in der Schweiz sicherlich auch, äh ist es geringer als vom Blitz getroffen zu werden (lacht). Dann in dem Sinne ist es sicherlich nicht berechtigt, aber berechtigt ist es nun mal für in dem Sinne, dass man natürlich schon sagen kann, dass es neue Formen von Bedrohungen gibt, man kann ja nicht negieren, dass es so was wie 'ne terroristische Bedrohung gibt und dass es insbesondere heute dann auch wieder das ja verknüpft ist auch mit in der Gesellschaft so 'nem, also ich red' jetzt immer eher so von Deutschland, in der Gesellschaft stark verknüpft ist mit mit anderen Formen, also sozusagen hate crimes oder eben Aggressionen gegen bestimmte

Bevölkerungsgruppen, die irgendwie als anders bezeichnet oder wahrgenommen werden oder wie auch immer. Das heisst, also diese Frage von Terrorismus und Kriminalität gegen anders ... oder Gewalt, Angriffe gegen, gegen in Anführungsstrichen Andere, die ist ja sehr stark verklammert und da kann man natürlich sagen, dass die Bedrohung da also für diese Betroffenen natürlich sehr gross ist.

SB: Gut, dann noch eine Frage, die damit jetzt nicht im direkten, vielleicht im indirekten Zusammenhang steht, und zwar: ich hab' mal in einem Interview gelesen, dass hinter dieser Sicherheit oder hinter Unsicherheit, sollt' ich sagen, eigentlich Angst steckt. Stimmt das, kann man das so absolut ausdrücken oder gäbe es da auch noch 'ne andere Möglichkeit?

SK: hm, also Angst ist ja sowas, sowas äh diffuses und aber wenn man das jetzt davon weiter ausgeht, diese Bedeutung von Unsicherheit, dann kann man natürlich schon sagen, dass es da 'ne Verknüpfung gibt, also dass Unsicherheit immer so 'ne, so 'ne Erscheinungsform von Angst ist, also Unsicherheit in dem Sinne auch von Ungewissheit, Unvertrautes und das, was dann sozusagen seinerseits, Angst auch, hervorruft, und aber ich glaube man kann auch sagen, dass Un-, also unsicher – das war die Frage, 'ne? Also ob Unsicherheit mit Angst verbunden ist, das oft auch nicht mit sowas verknüpft ist, also mit so 'nem, dass man das sozusagen benennen kann und sagen: «das ist 'ne Angst» vor 'ner konkreten Bedrohung ist es nicht, also eine Furcht vor einem konkreten Objekt, sondern kann auch was ganz diffuses sein, also im Sinne von so 'ner gesellschaftlichen Statusverunsicherung beispielsweise. Und allzu oft scheint mir auch tatsächlich sogar auch von kritischer Seite, dass zu sehr, zu leicht damit auch operiert wird, dass so politische Diskurse über Bedrohung, dass die dann tatsächlich in der Bevölkerung Angst erzeugen. Also diese Schiene glaub' ich kann man so nicht aufmachen. Also, die Leute sind glaub' ich in ihrem Alltag mit ganz andern Sorgen beschäftigt als jetzt dem, was, also es gibt nicht so 'n direkten, so 'ne direkte Verknüpfung von, da gibt's irgendwie so 'nen Bedrohungsdiskurs oder es gibt auch 'ne objektive terroristische Bedrohung meinetwegen und die Leute haben dann Angst davor, das würd' ich auf keinen Fall sagen, dass das so unmittelbar mit einander verknüpft ist.

SB: Gut, mhm, dann hätt' ich noch eine Frage und zwar zu den Klimastreiks. Ich hatte mir mal überlegt, ob die Attraktivität der Klimastreiks unter anderem vielleicht auch daran liegen könnte, dass die Menschen in die Zukunft blicken und denken «Ja, das ist ja im Grunde unsicher, wie das aussehen wird – wir möchten Sicherheit, versteckt natürlich, auch wenn man das konkret, genau natürlich nicht kontrollieren kann, was dann mit dem Klima geschehen wird. Wäre das möglich?

SK: Ist eine interessante Frage, also auf jeden Fall, also man muss das, das Phänomen ist ja noch zu neu um das so richtig tiefgehend schon sagen zu können, «so ist es», aber ich würde auch sagen, dass ... also es ist ja auffällig, dass das jetzt 'ne ganz neue politische Bewegung ist und sich auch ganz anders artikuliert als frühere eh pol- soziale Bewegungen, und natürlich auch 'ne andere Gruppe da massgeblich ist, also Jugendliche und, und Kinder da voranschreiten und die Rolle der Eltern jetzt 'ne ganz neue ist, und zwar von Eltern, die in 'ner Generation teilweise sind, die auch in politischen Protestbewegungen waren. Also das ist ja 'ne ganz interessante, neue Konstellation und ich würde auch sagen, dass auf der einen Seite, dass man sagen kann also, wie bei den andern Sachen auch, also es gibt

‘n, ‘n ernsthaften Concern sozusagen, also ‘ne ernsthafte Fakten, dass man sagt «also hier müssen wir was machen» und das ist ja auch auffällig, dass plötzlich Jugendliche und Kinder auftreten und Faktenwissen haben, was vielleicht in früheren sozialen Bewegungen nicht immer so deutlich ‘ne Rolle spielte, besonders nicht immer so deutlich und klar zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde. und auf der anderen Seite kann ich mir auch vorstellen, dass dabei auch sowas ist wie sozusagen sagen «so ‘ne Unsicherheit wird kanalisiert». Man hat jetzt ‘n neues, grosses Thema, wo es auch sozusagen sowas wie Solidarisierungsschübe gibt, dass man sagt «okay, ja, das ist jetzt auch das neue Feld, in dem ich was, was politisch äh tun kann und in dem ich zum Ausdruck bringen kann, dass ich mich engagiere und in dem ich auch vielleicht zum Ausdruck bringen kann, dass, dass ich besorgt bin. Also ohne dem jetzt abzusprechen, dass also ohne jetzt zu entscheiden, dass sozusagen man schiebt irgendwas vor, aber ich glaube, es überlagert sich sowas von dass es natürlich auch ‘ne Dynamik bekommt, dass man Teil so einer Gemeinschaft wird, auf die sich jetzt alles konzentriert und die vielleicht auch Energien von anderen Feldern dann abzieht.

SB: Könnte denn eine gewisse Sorge, nicht unbedingt nur in Bezug auf die Klimastreiks sondern auch ganz allgemein, auch förderlich sein? Weil man sagt ja immer «ja, Sicherheit ist etwas positives, etwas erstrebenswertes» und Unsicherheit wird ja meistens positiv, nein negativ, bewertet.

SK: Ja, sehr gute Frage, also genau, das ist vielleicht was, was, was sich heute zeigt und was sich auch sogar mehr und mehr abzeichnet, dass diese ganz junge Generation aber auch die die Erwachsenen zunehmend sagen «was machen wir eigentlich für, dafür, dass» also dafür, dass wir uns politisch für den Klimaschutz engagieren, aber auch dafür, dass wir uns engagieren gegen Hass und so weiter. Negativ bewertet könnte man sagen, das hat auch was, auch ‘nen Ausläufer von neoliberalen Politiken, die mehr und mehr darauf gesetzt haben, dass man nicht mehr auf den Staat setzt und mehr als Bürger sich engagiert, dafür ist das ‘ne ironische Wende, sozusagen, in der neoliberalen Politik kann man sagen, dass, dass es offenbar mehr Stimmen gibt, die sagen «wir, also wir, wollen was tun» und dass so ‘ne allgemein zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber gesellschaftlichen Umbrüchen oder zum Beispiel auch gegen sowas, was jetzt im Bereich dieser Hasskriminalität mehr Thema geworden zu sein scheint, also so ‘ne Sensibilität gegenüber einem politischen Klima, also oder einem sozialen Klima nach dem Motto «da gibt es welche, die üben diese Hasskriminalität aus und da gibt es aber andere, die dulden das» und diese Sensibilität hat mir, hat, hat nach meinem Eindruck äh zugenommen, genauso oder parallel vielleicht wie auch in dieser Klimadebatte.

SB: Gut, könnte man auch sagen, dass es etwas wie «zu viel» Sicherheit gibt?

SK: Klar, also, also dieses, ich meine die Kritik am Wohlfahrtsstaat zum Beispiel, die durch den Neoliberalismus aufgebracht wurde, war ja auch ‘ne berechtigte Kritik; so dieses, dass der Staat irgendwie sich um alles kümmert, der Staat zu viel sich einmischt in, in das Privatleben und auch überhaupt, war ja auch ‘ne Kritik an dem, dass sozusagen es so ‘ne Attitüde gibt nach dem Motto «der Staat wird’s schon richten» und da muss man auf jeden Fall ‘ne gute Mischung finden, dass nicht immer suggeriert wird, also dass «wir können uns da auf ‘ne obere Instanz verlassen» oder auch, dass nicht

immer suggeriert wird hier, «es gibt vollkommene Sicherheit» und darauf, und dass es sozusagen das oberste Ziel. Dann kann es auch dazu führen, nicht nur dass der Staat schnüffelt, sondern auch, dass, dass man sozusagen bequem wird und solche Äusserungen, die ich gerade mache sind natürlich aber auch gefährlich in dem Sinne, das geht natürlich nicht da drum zu sagen «Unsicherheit ist gut und Leute bloss raus» und je mehr, je mehr, also was es jetzt zum Beispiel in der Flüchtlingsdebatte gab, nach dem Motto «das sind tolle Menschen, die sind alle schon mal über verschiedenen Länder geflüchtet und die können wir eigentlich sofort einstellen», was ja auch 'ne gewisse Ironie ist, darüber was, was die erlitten haben und unter welchem Druck die stehen. Also das heisst, da muss man vorsichtig sein, aber sehr wohl würd' ich sagen, gibt es zu viel Sicherheit, sowohl im Sinne von zu viel Kontrolle als auch zu viel Sicherheitsbedürfnis, dann auf jeden Fall, in beiderlei Hinsicht, einschränkend ist, was, was sozusagen 'n Ausüben der Freiheit ist, wenn man das pathetisch ausdrücken möchte.

SB: Und trotzdem ist die Sicherheit ja sehr attraktiv, wie man überall eigentlich erkennen kann. Woran liegt das eigentlich?

SK: Es ist ja auch ernst zu nehmen. Also einerseits, also Sicherheit ist schon auch 'ne Voraussetzung dafür, dass man, dass man einen Raum hat, in dem man abgesichert ist, um sich mal entspannt irgendwie auch Kunst und Kultur zu widmen, beispielsweise, und, und dass das nicht andauernd unter Druck steht von irgendwelchen Bedrohungen und Ungewissheiten ist, ist sicherlich gut und, ich wollt' noch was anderes sagen und das ist mir jetzt entfallen. Ne, was haben Sie ... warum das so 'n, warum man das sieht, dass die Leute das gut finden?

SB: Joa, würd' ich schon sagen, weil meistens wird Sicherheit ja als Ziel dargestellt oder auch im Wahlkampf als Slogan benutzt zum Beispiel ...

SK: Ach so, genau, jetzt ist es mir wieder eingefallen. Klar, also ich meine, es gibt immer noch vielleicht auch 'n verständliches Streben nach diesem, nach dem Motto «ich hab mein Haus, ich hab mein Auto, ich hab meine Familie, ich hab ausgesorgt», das ist halt 'ne bestimmte Lebensweise, die kann man vielleicht nicht einfach anderen Leuten einfach streitig machen und das ist ja, verbreitet angestrebt. Andererseits würd' ich auch sagen, dass es ja auch Zeichen dafür gibt, dass Jugendliche insbesondere in dem Alter, dass die auch was anderes erleben wollen und sich nicht damit zufrieden geben, dass alles ohne sozusagen ohne Herausforderung ist und dass also diese ganze Freizeitsportbewegung und Extremsportbewegung würd' ich sagen, hat auch was damit zu tun oder ist auch lesbar als «die Leute wollen nicht nur Bequemlichkeit, die wollen auch Herausforderung, die wollen auch [unverständlich]», also das heisst, gut, Sicherheit ist insbesondere in unserer westlichen Hemisphäre das dominante, also dominante Lebensentwurf, dass das dazu gehört und wir leben ja, wenn man in die Welt rausguckt, wirklich vergleichsweise sehr sicher und andererseits glaub' ich, dass die meisten oder viele Menschen zumindest dann doch, also dieses «ich hab' es nur gut und ich mach es mir bequem» nicht unbedingt haben wollen, oder irgendwann auch was anderes suchen.

SB: Trotzdem empfinden ja gerade viele rechte Parteien, ich komme auf mein Beispiel aus der Schweizer-Politik zurück, die SVP, dass es zu wenig Sicherheit gibt, dass Flüchtlinge gerade eine grosse Bedrohung darstellen ...

SK: Ja, das ist 'ne Form des Appells an Sicherheit, aber dadurch, dass man zuerst mal an Unsicherheit appelliert, gleichwohl ist ja das interessante genau in dieser rechten Bewegung, die wir hier in Deutschland ja genauso haben und die auch ähnlich argumentiert, dass das eigentlich in Regionen stattfindet, wo das, was als Bedrohung dargestellt wird, ja gar nicht da ist. Das heisst, diese nach dem Motto «in Ostdeutschland gibt es eben, also was weiss ich, eine verschwindend geringe Anzahl von Ausländern» beziehungsweise ausländisch aussehenden Menschen, die eben dementsprechend objektiv gesehen überhaupt gar keine Bedrohung darstellen können. Und gleichzeitig kann man vielleicht sagen, dass das auch 'ne Verschiebung ist so zu dem, dass man, dass da sich andere Unsicherheiten im Spiel sind, oder auch eben Ungerechtigkeiten also die, die so erlebt werden als die wurden ungerecht behandelt politisch gesehen, nicht ökonomisch: keine Infrastruktur in der Region geschaffen und so weiter und so fort, dass das sozusagen da seine Kanalisierung ...

SB: Jetzt hab' ich noch eine relativ offene Frage, lassen sich Freiheit und Sicherheit, wenn man das ganz absolut und irgendwie abstrakt formulieren möchte, lassen sich die zwei kombinieren? Oder sind das, wie man vielleicht instinktiv denken würde, zwei komplett gegensätzliche Begriffe?

SK: Hm, nö, also das ist ja sozusagen nach den, jetzt auch historisch gesehen, hat sich der Staat zuerst gegründet auf der Grundlage von Sicherheitsversprechen und dann kamen die Liberalen und haben gesagt «na ja, aber also wir brauchen auch die Freiheit des Bürgers und wir brauchen die Rechte des Bürgers, der sich auch gegen den Staat wenden kann» und dann kann man aber auch sagen, dass dann sozusagen dieses «es gibt Gefahren, vor denen der Staat schützen muss» immer gleichzeitig so 'n Vehikel war, um genau diese Freiheitsrechte einzuschränken. Und umgekehrt kann man ja genauso sagen, und wurde ja auch historisch gesagt, nach dem Motto «die Sicherheit ist eben die Voraussetzung für Freiheit» und das stimmt natürlich auch, also wenn man irgendwie die Polizei komplett abschafft und alle möglichen Sicherheitsbehörden komplett abschafft, ich weiss nicht, ob das der Freiheit dienen würde, tatsächlich. Also in dem Sinne würd' ich sagen ist es wichtig, dass, dass auch nicht nur Frage von Abwägung ist also «Sicherheit, mehr Sicherheit, weniger Freiheit» und umgekehrt, sondern dass das beides sich wechselseitig bedingt, aber dass das auch wieder nicht also einfach funktioniert nach dem Motto «mehr Sicherheit ergibt mehr Freiheit». Und dann, dass es eben ein permanenter Akt der Balance ist entsprechende Gesetze zu schaffen und entsprechend der Massnahmen so einzusetzen, aber auch zu unterlassen mal.

SB: Gut, dann vielleicht zum Abschluss noch eine Frage, ist Sicherheit in dem Sinne realisierbar, also ein Zustand der Sicherheit, ein Zustand der objektiven Sicherheit, also nicht bezogen auf einen inneren Gefühlszustand sondern eben darauf, wie viele Gefahren existieren? Ginge das theoretisch oder ist das sozusagen unmöglich?

SK: Also, als erstes würd' ich sagen «ist unmöglich», weil es eine absolute Sicherheit nicht gibt. Gibt immer, immer gibt es etwas Unvorhergesehenes und sozusagen in dem Moment, in dem wir an die Zukunft denken, kann man sagen «wir wissen nicht, was jetzt morgen und jetzt gleich ist» und so weiter und so fort und gleichzeitig kann man natürlich schon sagen, dass in unseren Hemisphären die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass jetzt gleich alles mögliche, die ganze Ordnung zusammenbricht, die ist eben nicht so gross, also wir machen die Erfahrung und aus guten Gründen, dass, dass wir uns auf bestimmte Strukturen verlassen können. Aber da ist dieses sich verlassen können, ja auch 'ne Art von Vertrauen. Können nicht wissen, dass wir uns verlassen können im Sinne von einer Gewissheit, sondern es ist eine Erfahrung immer von dieser Kontingenz, dass es auch anders sein könnte und anders werden könnte und auch, dass es sich radikal verändern könnte; davon ist es ja auch immer begleitet.

SB: Sie erwähnen das Vertrauen, inwiefern hängt das mit Sicherheit zusammen?

SK: Na ja, Vertrauen in diesem Sinne von, also dass man, dass man die Erfahrung macht, dass es sozusagen so weitergeht, dass man sich verlassen kann, was weiss ich, vielleicht hierzulande, wenn man zur Polizei geht, dass die Polizei einen nicht gleich einkerkert, sondern dass man sagen kann «ich hab hier mal 'ne Beschwerde, können Sie sich mal drum kümmern?» und das man die Erfahrung macht «ja, das passiert auch», also jedenfalls in gewissen Grenzen ist das so, und dass also sozusagen diese Verlässlichkeit von staatlichen Institutionen gehört dazu, dass Vertrauen, dementsprechend geschaffen wird oder eben auch dieses, dass man eben nicht täglich es mit einem terroristischen Anschlag zu tun hat gehört dazu, dass man, dass dieses Vertrauen, also dieser Glaube, dass es so weitergeht mit dem Überschuss, dass es natürlich anders sein könnte, dass das weiterbesteht, aber nicht von ungefähr. Was weiss ich, selbst wenn es nicht sowas systematisches gibt wie 'n, 'n politischer Kampf einer Gruppe gegen den Staat oder so, sondern sowas wie, was weiss ich wie in den USA, gab's ja mal die Situation von so einem Sniper, also jemandem, der mit 'nem Gewehr aus dem Hinterhalt Leute beim Supermarkt getroffen hat und den hat man nicht so leicht finden können und das war zum Beispiel so eine Situation; da das unbedingt nötig war, dass der Staat das in den Griff bekommt, weil sonst das ganze Vertrauen, das ich, wo ich sozusagen bedroht bin, von, von dieser Gefahr erschossen zu werden, verloren hätte und zwar nur durch eine einzelne Person. Das heisst, dass so eine Art von Vertrauen in staatliche Institutionen, auch wenn sie sozusagen regulär funktionieren, dass das sehr schnell erschüttert werden kann.

SB: Kann Vertrauen also dazu benutzt werden, ob jetzt unbewusst oder vollbewusst, eine Art Illusion von Sicherheit zu erschaffen?

SK: Also, also man kann Vertrauen missbrauchen, aber ich glaube das spielt in diesem Bereich von Sicherheitspolitik erst mal nicht so 'ne grosse Rolle, weil, also in dem Moment, in dem es 'nen Skandal gibt, also zum Beispiel bei Verfassungsschutzmissbrauch sozusagen solcher Organe, die verdeckt illegale Machenschaften machen, dann ist das Vertrauen weg. Ich glaube das funktioniert in diesem Sinne, in, in diesem Bereich schlecht.

SB: Wie könnte man denn als Einzelperson sozusagen mit politischer oder ökonomischer Unsicherheit umgehen, dadurch, dass man ja immer sagt «ja, wir leben in unsicheren Zeiten» oder häufig sagt «wir leben in unsicheren Zeiten», was könnte da so eine Art Lösungsmittel sein, wenn man das so überspitzt ausdrücken möchte?

SK: Politisch aktiv sein (lacht). Ja, es kommt drauf an, in welchem Bereich, in welchem Bereich das der Fall ist. Also sich ein bisschen fit zu halten für, also beweglich zu bleiben was soziale Situationen angeht, ist sicherlich die allerbeste Voraussetzung, aber ich würde das nie da drauf begrenzen und sagen «also, bleibt fit und dann ist alles gut», sondern das immer, ich würd' das immer mit, damit verbinden, dass das auch politische Fragen sind, wie unsicher man sich fühlt oder was man dagegen tun kann.

14.2 Gabriel's original text

Ich lese viel, das gebe ich gerne zu. Manchmal kann meine kleine Bibliothek einfach nicht mit meinem literarischen Konsum mithalten, weswegen ich meine Lieblingsbücher alle schon mehrmals durchgelesen habe. Es macht mir auch nichts aus, schon im Voraus zu wissen, wie alles ausgehen wird: So weiss ich schon, dass ich meine Zeit nicht für ein enttäuschendes Buch verschwenden werde. Es ist eine Art emotionale Sicherheit. Ein eReader ist für Lesende mit Platzproblemen enorm nützlich. Man kann damit hunderte Wälzer bequem in der Tasche herumtragen. Deshalb brauche ich die Langeweile nicht zu fürchten, solange ich meine elektronische Bibliothek dabei habe. Egal, was passiert, alle meine Lieblingsgeschichten liegen nur einen Handgriff entfernt.